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Abstract  
To address challenges arising in the safety assessment of critical engineering systems, 
research has recently focused on automating the synthesis of predictive models of 
system failure from design representations. In one approach, known as compositional 
safety analysis, system failure models such as fault trees and Failure Modes and Effects 
Analyses (FMEAs) are constructed from component failure models using a process of 
composition. Another approach has looked into automating system safety analysis via 
application of formal verification techniques such as model checking on behavioural 
models of the system represented as state automata. So far, compositional safety 
analysis and formal verification have been developed separately and seen as two 
competing paradigms to the problem of model-based safety analysis.  
This thesis shows that it is possible to move forward the terms of this debate and use the 
two paradigms synergistically in the context of an advanced safety assessment process. 
The thesis develops a systematic approach  in which compositional safety analysis 
provides the basis for the systematic construction and refinement of state-automata that 
record the transition of a system from normal to degraded and failed states. These state 
automata can be further enhanced and then be model-checked to verify the satisfaction 
of safety properties. Note that the development of such models in current practice is ad 
hoc and relies only on expert knowledge, but it being rationalised and systematised in 
the proposed approach – a key contribution of this thesis.   
Overall the approach combines the advantages of compositional safety analysis such as 
simplicity, efficiency and scalability, with the benefits of formal verification such as the 
ability for automated verification of safety requirements on dynamic models of the 
system, and leads to an improved model-based safety analysis process. In the context of 
this process, a novel generic mechanism is also proposed for modelling the detectability 
of errors which typically arise as a result of component faults and then propagate 
through the architecture. This mechanism is used to derive analyses that can aid 
decisions on appropriate detection and recovery mechanisms in the system model.  
The thesis starts with an investigation of the potential for useful integration of 
compositional and formal safety analysis techniques. The approach is then developed in 
detail and guidelines for analysis and refinement of system models are given. Finally, 
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the process is evaluated in three cases studies that were iteratively performed on 
increasingly refined and improved models of aircraft and automotive braking and cruise 
control systems. In the light of the results of these studies, the thesis concludes that 
integration of compositional and formal safety analysis techniques is feasible and 
potentially useful in the design of safety critical systems. 
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CHAPTER 1.  Introduction  
1.1 Research Context and Scope  
This thesis is concerned with the integrated application of emerging safety analysis 
techniques for safety-critical systems.   
Safety critical systems are systems whose operational deviations can potentially lead to 
catastrophic consequences or loss of human lives. These systems are widely employed 
in many industries, including the automotive, aerospace, weapons and nuclear 
industries. Modern safety-critical systems often incorporate numerous embedded 
control components, involve various engineering disciplines, and employ distributed 
architectures and complex communication structures. (Knight, 2002) discusses several 
other major challenges in safety-critical systems which include the elimination of 
“physical separation” due to resource sharing, and ineffective interaction between 
software engineering and system engineering.  These characteristics present substantial 
challenges, and considering the consequences of failure in these systems, as well as the 
fact that safety critical systems have become more prevalent in everyday life, it is 
crucial that these systems are subjected to a rigorous safety assessment process. 
Classical safety assessment techniques such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) are still employed to predict the safety of such 
systems. However, classical techniques are traditionally applied in a manual process, 
which in the context of a complex system become difficult, laborious, expensive and 
error-prone. For this reason, FTA and FMEA are rarely performed more than once and 
often at the late stage of lifecycle when the design has been finalized. This late 
contribution means that results from the process miss the opportunity to influence 
system design, potentially incurring extra cost and effort in late design modifications. 
Problems also arise in the lack of systematic methods to capture and manage design 
models and safety artefacts as in traditional practices system design models and safety 
analyses are often created and handled separately. With these drawbacks, classical 
18 
 
safety analysis techniques face tremendous challenges and are no longer deemed to be 
sufficiently effective in managing the rising intricacy of modern complex design.  
To address some of those difficulties, recent research has been focused on investigating 
and developing more-effective and robust safety assessment techniques through 
automation of the analysis process. Model-Based Safety Analysis (MBSA) is a 
collective body of work which introduced semi-formal and formal models in the centre 
of the design and assessment process. MBSA extended the popular model-based 
development approach, in which effort is focused on the construction of the formal 
specification of the system model. This specification model is subsequently used as the 
foundation for various development activities like visualization, code generation, testing 
or prototyping (Heimdahl, 2007). Although the primary focus is placed on the 
development of software (digital) systems, model-based tools and techniques can also 
be used to model physical hardware components (for example, electrical or mechanical 
components).  
To perform a thorough safety assessment, it is crucial to understand not only how a 
system behaves in its normal working condition (represented in the nominal model), but 
also in the presence of failure(s). This is done by extending the nominal model with 
failure information to construct the failure-augmented model, termed fault model (Johsi 
et al., 2006) or error model (Walker et al., 2008).  
The automated analysis of these extended models enables various safety assessments to 
be performed. Such analyses typically include fault simulation and prediction of effects 
of failure, proof that certain safety properties hold in the model and causal safety 
analysis resulting in synthesis of fault trees which link causes to effects of failure. 
Figure 1 illustrates this point and shows the type of analyses that can be performed on a 
system model extended with faults in MBSA. Automated analysis of models brings 
substantial benefits as it lightens the burden on designers and analysts, simplifies the 
process, saves time and contributes to more reliable results. More importantly, it enables 
safety analysis to be incorporated as part of an iterative design process - as new results 
can be more easily generated to reflect changes – and therefore driving the design with 
safety in mind. 
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The two most prominent paradigms of MBSA today are Compositional Safety Analysis 
(CSA) and Behavioural Safety Analysis (BSA). Techniques which are based upon the 
CSA approach include Hierarchically Performed Hazards Origin and Propagation 
Studies (HiP-HOPS) (Papadopoulos & McDermid, 1999), Component Fault Trees 
(Kaiser et al., 2003), and State-Event Fault trees (SEFT) (Grunske et al., 2005). CSA 
uses a process of composition to construct system failure models from the topology of a 
system and local failure models of its components.  
BSA, on the other hand, uses exhaustive exploration of behavioural models of the 
system to assess satisfaction of safety requirements. Because this approach mainly 
employs model checking as its primary method of assessment, the term „model-
checking based‟ is often used interchangeably to characterise this type of safety 
analysis.  A model checker typically verifies conformance of the model to its safety 
requirements and, if requirements are violated, it relates those violations to 
combinations of causes, e.g. component failures. Prominent examples based on this 
approach include Altarica (Arnold et al., 2000) and FSAP/NuSMV (Bozzano & 
Villafiorita, 2006).  
Model for 
digital system  
 
Model for 
mechanical 
system  
Fault model for 
digital system 
+ 
 
Fault model for 
mechanical 
system  
Proof of Safety Properties  Fault Tree  
Simulation  
Figure 1: Automated Model-Based Safety Analysis (adapted from Johsi et al., 2006) 
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1.2 Research Motivation 
CSA and BSA techniques have emerged with little integration. Both techniques are 
fundamentally different in their objectives of assessment, working mechanisms, and 
application process. CSA is often used to facilitate reliability engineering. For example 
with techniques like HiP-HOPS, it is possible to effectively enable not only the 
identification of root failures through qualitative analysis, but also advanced 
probabilistic quantitative analysis. BSA on the other hand, places primary focus on the 
application of model checking for validation and verification of various safety 
properties. Also, while CSA relies largely on Boolean-based analysis, BSA explores all 
possible system states in brute force manner. The computationally efficient and iterative 
nature of CSA means that the technique can be applied from the early stages of design 
and on models that have a high level of abstraction. BSA on the other hand requires 
more mature and detailed behavioural models and is, therefore, applicable at later stages 
of the development process. In this thesis, it is argued that understanding these 
differences and exploiting each technique‟s strengths can bring substantial values to the 
development process, in particular at early design stages.  
Early functional design is arguably the most appropriate phases to address design 
problems and take remedial measures. The volume of design information and system 
complexity naturally increase as system development progresses with time. The more 
complex the design artefact, the more difficult it is to identify problems within and the 
more extensive the remedy required to address problems. It is therefore best to address 
problems as early as possible when models are still abstract and then continue to do so 
as more detail is added to the design of the system.   
One of the difficulties in the current industrial practice is that among classical safety 
analysis techniques, there is a lack of rigorous and effective techniques that can help 
analysis of models and identification of potential problems. (Johannessen  et al., 2001) 
highlights that “there is still uncovered demand for early hazard analysis at functional 
level”, and SAE Aerospace Recommended Practices documents ARP4761 have 
21 
 
recommended Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA) to be performed at the 
earliest stages together with the design activities.  
1.3 Research Hypothesis  
CSA and BSA have been developed as two competing paradigms in MBSA. In this 
thesis it is argued that the traditional gap between the two approaches can be overcome, 
as CSA and BSA are effectively combined in a novel model-based design and safety 
analysis process which therefore benefits from the advantages of both approaches, 
namely the flexibility, early applicability and scalability of CSA and the precision, 
behavioural analysis capabilities and detailed insights offered by BSA.     
In the proposed process, integration of CSA and BSA is meaningful. Traditionally, early 
behavioural system models used in BSA are constructed in an ad hoc manner via human 
translation of textual requirements into state-machines. In the proposed process, these 
state-machines are largely constructed in a systematic manner driven by the results of a 
CSA analysis of the system.  The proposed MBSA process can facilitate a more 
rigorous and well-rounded safety assessment at early design stages. It can therefore 
increase the confidence in design models before the decision is taken to progress 
towards refinement of the model or implementation.  
1.4 Research Objectives  
To test the hypothesis outlined above, the following overarching research aim has been 
set: 
“To develop a novel approach in which the combined application of CSA and BSA 
can be achieved and to evaluate the benefits and limitations of this approach using 
realistic examples and case studies.” 
To achieve this aim the following research objectives were defined: 
1. To examine CSA and BSA techniques and investigate their strengths, limitations, 
and applications in different stages of design development. This thesis determines 
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complementary aspects of these techniques that can be exploited via synergistic 
combined application. 
 
2. To propose a systematic technique to utilize analysis results from CSA and BSA in 
the course of design. This involves investigating how input to each technique can be 
systematically constructed, in particular, how results of CSA can assist the 
construction of behavioural model for BSA‟s formal verification. It is also important 
to understand how these results can provide constructive feedback to designers 
towards an iterative system modelling process.  
 
3. To illustrate how a chosen CSA and a chosen BSA technique can in practice be 
harmonised in the context of a method for combined application. Different MBSA 
techniques assume different representations of failure information and system 
modelling. In the context of combined application, it is important to explore ways 
for translation of information (in particular, failure information) between relevant 
models. In the context of this thesis, HiP-HOPS has been selected as a 
representative example of CSA. NuSMV has been selected to perform symbolic 
model checking and enable formal verification to support BSA. The thesis shows 
the integration of HiP-HOPS with NuSMV and defines a process for useful semi-
automatic translation of information between the two models. 
 
4. Overall, the thesis proposes an improved approach to MBSA. The final research 
objective is to study the potential use of this approach in the design of mechanisms 
for detection and recovery from failures. More specifically, we propose a generic 
mechanism for modelling the Detectability (or NOT) of errors propagated among 
components of an architecture within a typical CSA. We show that the inclusion of 
this mechanism makes it possible to use the results of CSA as a basis for rational 
decisions about the inclusion of fault tolerant mechanisms in a design.     
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1.5 Structure of Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows:  
Chapter 2: Background  
The background chapter presents an overview of modelling and safety analysis 
techniques. It includes a brief discussion on system modelling, and discussions on early 
functional model and safety assessment techniques performed at this stage (FHA, 
PSSA).  
This chapter also discusses relevant safety analysis techniques, including those briefly 
mentioned in the Introduction chapter. It discusses classical techniques like FTA and 
FMEA, and more recent CSA developments such as HiP-HOPS, CFTs and SEFTs. In 
this thesis, HiP-HOPS is representative of CSA and therefore it is discussed in more 
detail. BSA and relevant techniques (Altarica and FSAP/NuSMV) are also presented 
here. This chapter also explains further the distinction between the two techniques.  
Chapter 3: Integrating CSA and BSA in a unified MBSA process 
This chapter describes in detail a method for combined, harmonized application of CSA 
and BSA techniques in the context of an improved MBSA process. HiP-HOPS and 
NuSMV provide two representative CSA and BSA techniques employed here. Stages 
involved in the method include: construction of system model from requirements, 
failure severity analysis, local failure behaviour annotation, translation of CSA results 
into the BSA model, generation of abstract state machines, and application of formal 
verification through model checking. This chapter also discusses how different models 
(and relevant failure information) can be obtained and translated between different 
models of CSA and BSA.  
Chapter 4: Case Study on Brake-by-wire System 
This chapter describes a case study on a brake-by-wire system to demonstrate the 
practicability and usefulness of the proposed method. Both functional and more-refined 
models of the system are presented. This chapter shows how CSA is effectively applied 
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on the early functional model and facilitates early improvement of system design. 
Safety artifacts from CSA are used as the basis of BSA models construction, which are 
then formally verified. This chapter also highlights how model checking can be used to 
verify a simple control & recovery procedure of diagonal-locking mechanism in car 
wheels.  
Chapter 5: Case Study on Aircraft Wheel Brake System  
This chapter describes a case study on an aircraft wheel brake system, and presents a 
model which was adopted from (ARP 4761, 1996).  This second case study provides a 
second example of the feasibility of the process and demonstrates how CSA and BSA 
shape the development of design.   
Chapter 6: Detectability Analysis   
This chapter introduces and describes the concept of detectability analysis, and its role 
in the overall modelling and analysis of the proposed method, particularly as a part of 
CSA. It shows how its application can be generalized and how it can be implemented in 
HiP-HOPS. A small example of a cruise control system is also presented to illustrate 
these points.  
Chapter 7: Conclusions  
This chapter describes conclusions drawn from this work and gives recommendations 
for future work  
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CHAPTER 2. Safety Analysis for Complex Safety-
critical Embedded System 
This chapter provides an overview of contemporary safety analysis techniques. It 
focuses on CSA and BSA techniques, the two classes of model-based safety analyses 
that have been identified in Chapter 1.   
2.1 Modelling and Specifications  
During the design of  a system, a set of abstract informal specifications are typically  
transformed into sets of progressively  refined, more detailed models  that can be used 
for the implementation,  production and  manufacturing of the system.  
Models can be classified according to several perspectives, and different modelling 
notations are used to reflect the selected aspects (for example information flows, control 
flows, or behaviour) of the system to be represented.  Sommerville (2004) points out 
that generally a system can be viewed through: an external perspective showing the 
system‟s context and its relationships with its environment, a behavioural perspective 
showing the behaviour of the system, or a structural perspective showing the system‟s 
data architecture. Through these different perspectives, various models can be 
developed during the design phase - for example: a data-flow model which shows how 
data is transferred and processed at different stages; an architectural model which shows 
the composing sub-systems and their interrelationships; or a stimulus/response model 
(also known as a state/transition model) which shows how the system reacts to internal 
and external events.  
Models can also be distinguished according to their structure into conceptual, 
computational and mathematical structures (Jones & Mitchell, 1987). Conceptual 
models are used to capture and understand high level design concepts. Computational 
models provide more detailed aspects in terms of operation between participating 
agents. Mathematical models can define a system in terms of equations between terms, 
or by functions that map programs to corresponding abstract values, or by logical 
definitions of effects of an action to a state. While conceptual models are relatively 
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abstract, computational models and mathematical models usually fall into the category 
of more-detailed specification models, and depending on the formality of the model can 
be analyzed formally. Specification models usually cover device models which capture 
the physical part of the system.  
For complex embedded systems, model-based development is becoming an increasingly 
popular approach for development. In model-based development (Davey, 2007), focus 
is placed on semi-formal or formal specifications. The term „formal specification‟ is 
usually used interchangeably with „formal model‟ in the literature and refers to models 
with strong mathematical foundation.  Although model-based tools and techniques are 
primarily used to model system software components, they can also be used to model 
physical components. Joshi (2006) combines models containing digital components 
(hardware and software) with models of mechanical components (like pumps and 
valves) which can be extended with failure information to produce extended system 
models upon which various safety analysis techniques (like formal verification and fault 
tree analysis) can be performed.   
This thesis focuses primarily on conceptual models. In particular, early design where 
abstract functional models of the system are being produced to describe functions, their 
dependencies and abstract behaviour. It is being increasingly recognised that safety 
assessment should start as early as possible to prevent expensive design iterations later 
on. Techniques that enable safety assessment of model that describe functional designs 
are therefore highly desirable (Faller, 2009).  
2.2 Early Functional Design  
To better understand and explore the context of functional model and early functional 
design, we identify and examine several fundamental key questions relating to the 
functional design environment: how early is early? What information is available at this 
stage? What are the current existing analysis techniques? These questions are briefly 
discussed below before being explored further in their proceeding sections.  
By “early” in the design process, we mean early enough to make design changes or 
incorporate new requirements without incurring excessive cost, time or effort. The 
artefacts produced at this stage are often functional model, capturing system 
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requirements. Such models do not make references to specific hardware architecture and 
are abstract and minimal in detail. Refinement of such models is typically necessary to 
derive more detailed architectural models and system implementations.   
2.2.1 Functional Analysis   
Functional analysis is defined as "the process of identifying, describing, and relating the 
functions a system must perform in order to fulfil its goal and objectives” (NASA, 
1995). The result of this process is a functional model. A function is performed by one 
or more system elements composed of hardware, software, firmware, people, and 
procedures to achieve system operations. In the early stage, functional analysis plays an 
important role in assisting system engineers to understand the objectives and constraints 
in the process of developing and formulating system design solutions. All functional 
aspects of the system are identified, organized and defined. It can be also be used to 
derive requirements, which are then allocated to solutions in the form of a physical 
architecture. (NASA, 1995) highlights several of its key roles especially in identifying 
system requirements, identifying measures of system effectiveness and performance, 
excluding design alternatives that do not meet requirements, and providing insights to 
system-level model builders. 
Functional analysis deals more with what the system has to deliver than how to do it. It 
examines system functions and sub-functions that will accomplish system‟s goals. As 
the level of details is refined and functions are decomposed into sub-functions, the 
requirements associated with the functions are decomposed as well. This decomposition 
increase manageability as it organizes functionalities and connections into a more easily 
understood hierarchy. The process is repeated until each process is decomposed into 
basic sub-functions, and until connections between functions, sub-functions, and 
environment are fully defined.  
This functional analysis flow process is described and summarized in (FAA, 2006) as 
shown in Figure 2. The process starts off with list of requirements and constraints as 
input, from which top level functions are defined. These functions can then be 
organized into logical relationships, decomposed, and evaluated accordingly to produce 
the functional architecture and more refined requirements and constraints. 
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Figure 2: Functional analysis process (summarized from FAA, 2006) 
Complex safety critical system requires hazard analysis to be performed as early and as 
often as possible to avoid costly design iteration. Therefore it is beneficial to start safety 
analysis early at functional level before design solutions progress too far. Once the 
functional model is established, the design is evaluated to detect design limitations and 
weak points to help establish a more robust and improved design. Functional Hazard 
Assessment (FHA) and Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA) are classical 
preliminary assessment techniques widely accepted and practiced in this role (ARP 
4754, 1994). FHA looks at failure conditions associated with the system functions. 
PSSA is applied after FHA to demonstrate how the system meets the qualitative and 
quantitative requirements for various hazards identified. It also derives safety 
requirements for subsystems, mainly using FTA. PSSA is iterative and performed 
continuously throughout the system design phase.   
 
Input:  
 Requirements 
 Constraints 
Process tasks:  
Start: Describe operational 
mission, environment, and 
requirements 
 Define top level 
functions 
 Organize functions 
into logical 
relationship 
 Decompose functions 
 Evaluate alternative 
decomposition  
End: Deliver functional 
architecture 
 
 
 
Output:  
 
 Functional 
architecture  
 Analysis 
requirements  
 Constraints, 
concepts, 
concern 
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2.2.2 Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) 
FHA identifies and classifies failures associated with system functions, covering both 
functional losses and malfunctions. It can be organized according to  
 System levels, for example, in the avionics system presented in (ARP 4761), the 
two levels of FHA are the Aircraft level FHA and System level FHA.  
 Or system operation phases and modes, for example, ground idle, landing, take 
off.  
Similar to the decomposition of functional models, FHA is conducted starting from 
higher-level functions to lower-level functions. Failure conditions related to these 
functions are considered and the effects of the failures are identified and classified.  
The primary aim of FHA is to identify hazardous functional failure conditions. Its 
methods are relatively direct and results are usually represented in a tabulated format as 
show in Table 1. First, the function and its purpose and behaviours are defined, and 
phases of the systems where functions can be performed are also recorded. Hypothetical 
failure conditions (for example: loss of functions) that can occur for this function and its 
effects are identified. This identification of the effects of function failures on the system 
allows a representative severity class to be assigned. Lastly, a comments column 
records necessary modification ideas and describes potential methods of addressing the 
failures.  
Table 1: Example of FHA on car brake function (source: Johannessen et al., 2001)  
Function Failure 
Condition 
Phase Effects on 
System 
Severity Comments 
Electric brake 
force 
distribution 
Loss of 
function 
Straight dry 
road 
More brake 
force on rear 
wheels  
Marginal Only affects a 
loaded car, 
which gain 
longer braking 
distance  
... ... ... ... ... ... 
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2.2.3 Functional Failure Analysis (FFA) 
FHA is extended in (Johannessen et al., 2001) and (Papadopoulos, 2001) to include 
failure classes, similar to the classes used in HAZOP (Kletz, 1997). Failures are 
classified, although not restricted, into „Omission‟, „Commission‟, „Timing‟, and 
„Value‟.  Further discussion and analysis of the meaning of these failure classes can be 
found in (Bondavalli, 1990). Hazards identified in FFA can be used to represent top 
events of a fault tree through HiP-HOPS. The extended FFA in (Papadopoulos, 1998) 
organizes the tabulated FHA to include: function, failure type(s), effects of failure on 
system, severity of failure, detection method, recovery plan, and design 
recommendation.  An example of FFA is presented in the Table 2.  
Table 2: Example of FFA on car brake function 
Function Failure 
Type  
Effects on 
System  
Severity Detection  Recovery 
Plan 
Design 
Recommendation   
 Brake 
Pressure 
Omission No brake 
force 
available; 
vehicle 
cannot be 
stopped; 
driver loses 
control.  
Catastrophic  Using 
feedback 
from 
pressure 
sensor  
Not  
possible  
Redundant 
components and 
back up 
mechanism should 
be introduced  
... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
2.2.4 Preliminary Systems Safety Analysis (PSSA)  
PSSA builds upon FHA to generate a complete list of updated system requirements, and 
is used to demonstrate how a system will fulfil requirements for hazards identified in 
FHA. In PSSA, design and architectural decisions are made and these help to generate 
lower-level system requirements. Safety analysis techniques like FTA are often 
employed to perform top-down analysis to determine how failures can lead to functional 
hazards identified in FHA. This process also identifies remedial strategies, for example 
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by introducing fail-safe architectures, to meet the safety requirements. PSSA is iterative 
and applied continuously throughout design process to derive thorough system 
requirements.  
FTA will be discussed along with other safety analysis techniques in the next section.   
2.3 Classical Safety Analysis  
Classical safety analysis techniques such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure 
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) are employed to predict the safety of safety 
critical systems. However, as modern systems are becoming increasingly complex, 
employing distributed architectures and programmable electronic components, new 
approaches are being developed to meet the rising intricacy of designs. Model-Based 
Safety Analysis (MBSA) is one such recent development.  
Before further discussing the two prominent paradigms of MBSA – Compositional 
Safety Analysis (CSA) and Behavioural Safety Analysis (BSA) – we first study the 
background of several commonly used classical safety analysis techniques which 
essentially underpin the newer MBSA approaches.  
2.3.1 Fault Tree Analysis  
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is an approach that aims to identify the root causes of an 
undesired event by performing top-down traversal of a fault tree. A fault tree itself is a 
diagrammatic description that shows how combinations of component failures (basic 
event) can cause the undesired event (top event) to occur. These component failures are 
connected within the fault tree through logical operators (for example, AND/OR).  
Two types of analysis can be performed in FTA: quantitative and qualitative analysis. 
Quantitative analysis is performed to calculate the probability of the top event. 
Qualitative analysis is performed to identify the necessary and sufficient combination(s) 
of basic events that cause the top event. These necessary and sufficient combinations are 
called minimal cut sets (Vesely et al., 1981). The identification of minimal cut sets in a 
fault tree helps the designer to focus on the design weak points. For example, if the 
failure of component C1 is identified during FTA as being a direct cause of the failure 
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of the system, the system designer is now informed about this critical  component, and 
can reassess the design (e.g. by introducing a backup component to prevent this single 
point failure).   
2.3.2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis  
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) provides an analysis that details possible 
failure modes for each component and their effects on the system. FMEA is presented in 
tabular manner and can contain additional information about the component failure (e.g. 
criticality and probability of occurrence). Classical FMEA is unable to determine 
complex failure modes resulting from multiple component failures. This limitation is 
addressed and overcome in HiP-HOPS where FTA and FMEA are automatically 
generated and analyzed from system model, in hierarchical approach, enabling it to 
determine further effects of a component failure.  
Most classical techniques operate in either an inductive or a deductive way. Inductive 
techniques attempt to determine the effects of a failure, while deductive techniques 
attempt to discover the causes of a failure. FTA is a deductive approach, whereas 
FMEA is an inductive approach. FTA and FMEA are traditionally a laborious and 
manual process.  
2.4 Compositional Safety Analysis  
In CSA, predictive models of system failure are typically produced in the form of well-
known safety artefacts like fault trees. This technique models the failure behaviour of 
the system - as opposed to the nominal (working) behaviour - by extending components 
with local failure information.  
The process starts from requirements which are translated into preliminary models. 
These models can be decomposed into structural hierarchies, and the local failure logic 
of components in these hierarchies is provided by analysts. Faults trees or FMEAs are 
then automatically produced by establishing how the local effects of component failures 
combine as they propagate through the topology of the system. The process is flexible 
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and adaptable to different stages of model development (from early functional models to 
more detailed architectural models).  
This is especially valuable as assessment can be started early in the design process when 
concrete system details are still scarce. CSA produces safety artefacts which are familiar 
to safety engineers including fault trees and FMEAs. These artefacts reveal potential 
failures and design weaknesses (e.g. single points of failure) which can guide possible 
design modifications, and help to derive and refine requirements. CSA techniques allow 
quantitative analysis and in some cases also architectural optimization.  
One key limitation of CSA is the inability to perform formal verification. Another 
limitation is the fact that FTA and FMEA are static analyses, which do not take into 
consideration the changes in system states and are therefore unable to capture dynamic 
behaviour. This limitation has been to some extent addressed in HiP-HOPS with a 
recent extension that enables assessment of sequences of failures via synthesis of 
temporal fault trees and FMEAs (Walker et al., 2006).  
Examples of techniques based on CSA are: Component Fault Tree, State Event Fault 
Tree, Embedded Systems Safety and Reliability Analyser, and Hierarchically Performed 
Hazard Origin and Propagation Studies.  
2.4.1 Component Fault Tree  
The Component Fault Tree concept (CFT) (Kaiser, 2003) is an extension to traditional 
fault trees that allows definition of partial fault trees corresponding to actual technical 
components. Although traditional fault tree allows modularization, it paths the failure 
propagations to the root causes. Component failures are often affected by other 
components, and therefore it is hard to model component independently.  
Apart from the similarities with traditional fault tree - including the analysis techniques 
- CFT also introduces the concept of a „port‟ to enable the modelling of component as 
independent entity. Each component has internal basic events, logical gates, and input 
and output ports which connect to other components. Components without input ports 
can be analysed alone. Instead of fault trees, Directed Acyclic Graphs, called “Cause 
Effect Graphs” (CEG) are used. CEGs differ from traditional fault trees in the sense that 
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repeated events are represented only once in CEG and CEG may contain several top 
events (more than one failure mode). Figure 3 shows an example of a CFT, with “BE” 
representing basic event:  
 
Figure 3: CEG in a Component Fault Tree 
2.4.2 State Event Fault Trees  
State Event Fault Trees (SEFTs) (Grunske et al., 2005) are the youngest compositional 
technique. They aim to extend traditional FT capability by distinguishing the notions of 
“states” and “events” notion to better capture sequence of action and state history. 
Traditional FTs do not differentiate states (a system condition that last over a period of 
time) from events (sudden phenomena, especially state transitions). So semantically, a 
SEFT is an extended state machine model instead of a true combinatorial model (i.e. 
like a traditional fault tree).  Like many other state machine based models, the states and 
events that appear in SEFT are not necessarily failures.  
Component C1 
AND 
Component C2 
BE1 
Internal failure 
BE2 
BE3 
TOP event 
OR OR 
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SEFTs deal with a finite state space for each component, where each component is 
exactly one state at each instant of time. The notion „state‟ in SEFTs indicates the 
condition a component is in for a given interval of time, while „event‟ indicates the 
instantaneous phenomena that do not take time to occur (e.g. state transitions). System 
failure can be represented as either top-events (which happen instantaneously) or top-
states (which last over a period of time). In SEFTs, the commonly used gates fall into 
the following categories:  
 NOT gates, which have one state input and one event output. There is no 
negation of an event;  
 OR gates, which combine either states or events (state OR state / event OR 
event). There is no OR gate that mixes states with events;  
 and lastly, AND gates, which join states and/or events (state AND state / state 
OR event). There is no simple (event AND event) except for History AND and 
Sequential AND. This is because an event is assumed to occur over {a very | an 
infinitesimally} short time interval, thus only one can occur at a time. Gates 
need to be converted to match state inputs to event outputs and vice versa. 
2.4.3 Embedded Systems Safety and Reliability Analyser  
ESSaReL (Embedded Systems Safety and Reliability Analyser ) (Kaiser et al., 2007) is 
a recent development that aims to integrate different models (Markov Chains, Fault 
Trees, State charts) and support the new State/Event Fault Tree (SEFT) approach 
(Kaiser et al., 2004). ESSaRel takes SEFT models as input and produces probabilistic 
analysis results based on Deterministic Stochastic Petri Nets (DSPNs) as output. Main 
phases for safety analysis employing SEFTs are:  
1. SEFT construction  
2. Translation of SEFT into DSPN 
3. Analysis of flattened DSPN.  
SEFTs are constructed like traditional fault trees, but just like CFT, they are organized 
by components. A SEFT enables analysts to trace back and finds out which system 
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states or events initiate, propagate, or inhibit the failure behaviour. Figure 4 shows an 
example of SEFT fragments.  
 
 
Figure 4 : SEFT fragment (source: Kaiser, 2007) 
Being a state-based model, a SEFT cannot be evaluated by traditional combinatorial 
FTA algorithms, and therefore needs to be translated into formal notation where known 
algorithms exist (Kaiser et al., 2007). Deterministic and Stochastic Petri Nets (DSPNs) 
(Ciardo & Lindermann, 1993) are chosen as they are better suited to analyzing dynamic 
models of this sort (German, 1995). Each SEFT state is mapped to a DSPN place and 
each SEFT event to a DSPN transition. SEFT gates, however, are translated as a whole 
by looking up the corresponding DSPN structure in a dictionary (Kaiser et al., 2007).  
For quantitative probabilistic analysis of SEFTs, the component SEFTs are translated 
into DSPN and then merged (flattened) into one flat net. Then an existing Petri Net 
analysis tool, like TimeNET (German & Mitzlaff, 1995) is used and it offers both 
transient and steady-state analysis. Currently the translation to DSPN and its analysis is 
carried out manually.  
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2.4.4 Hierarchically Performed Hazard Origin and Propagation 
Studies 
Hierarchically Performed Hazard Origin and Propagation Studies (HiP-HOPS) 
(Papadopoulos et al., 2001) - on which this project/thesis is developed - is a 
compositional safety analysis technique currently being developed in the University of 
Hull, which pioneered semi-automated fault tree analysis and IF-FMEA (Interface 
focused FMEA). HiP-HOPS models the propagation of failures through the system by 
constructing hierarchical component failure logic into a network of fault trees.  
The HiP-HOPS tool can work in conjunction with commonly-used system modelling 
tools, such as Matlab Simulink or Simulation X. Failure editors can be integrated in 
these modelling tools which allow the system designers to annotate the model 
components with failure information.  
The failure information describes how the component fails and its relationship with 
other component failures in the system. HiP-HOPS then takes this information and 
examines how the component failures propagate through the system topology, 
producing sets of interrelated fault trees and eventually an FMEA. This approach also 
enables the hierarchical structure of the system to be captured neatly in the fault trees.  
HiP-HOPS consists of three main phases: a model annotation phase, a fault tree 
synthesis phase, and the generation of minimal cut sets and FMEA (the analysis phase). 
Figure 5 illustrates the concept and steps involved in HiP-HOPS. The process starts 
with the system designer (or analyst) annotating the components with failure 
information. This stage provides information to HiP-HOPS on how the components can 
fail. Local failure information takes the form of a set of expressions which are manually 
added to each component. A failure class which occurs on a port (input or output 
connections of the component) is known as deviation. These local failure expressions 
describe how deviations of the component output can be caused by a combination of 
deviations received at the component inputs and/or by failure modes (internal 
malfunctions) of the component itself. For example, in this figure, we assume failure in 
component C1 can be caused by its internal malfunction C1BE. Failure O-S1 which can 
occur in S1 is said to be the system failure.  
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HiP-HOPS uses the local component failure behaviour and the topology of the model to 
generate a network of fault trees that connect output deviations of the system to internal 
failures of individual components. These fault trees show how the component failures 
propagate from one component to another and affect the system or subsystems 
individually or in combination with other component failures. Here, to maintain 
simplicity, component failure C1BE is assumed to be a direct cause of system failure O-
S1.  
 
Figure 5: Main phases in HiP-HOPS 
In the analysis phase, the synthesized fault trees are analyzed and an FMEA is 
generated. Both qualitative and quantitative analysis can be performed depending on the 
amount of information provided. Qualitative analysis is performed through the 
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implementation of selected FTA algorithms and minimal cut sets are obtained from this 
analysis. Eventually, the data is combined into a multiple failure mode FMEA which 
shows both direct effects of failure modes on the system as well as the further effects of 
the failure modes (i.e. the effects a failure mode can have on the system when it occurs 
in conjunction with other failure modes). The resultant FMEA is presented in a table 
that can be conveniently displayed through a web browser. In this example, the FMEA 
table shows how component failure C1BE is a direct cause of system failure O-S1.  
HiP-HOPS not only provides a consistent and robust model throughout design and 
analysis, it also takes the pressure off the designer through the application of effective 
analysis early in the lifecycle – by detecting potential design flaws early on, they can be 
quickly remedied before they become serious problems. HiP-HOPS is flexible and 
scalable, and is therefore well-suited to be performed iteratively throughout the design 
phase. 
2.4.5 Summary of CSA Techniques  
Having reviewed the aforementioned CSA-based techniques, we have selected HiP-
HOPS to facilitate CSA in the IACoB process based on the following reasons. Firstly, 
HiP-HOPS has been considerably developed in the recent years. It has been tested on 
several industrial systems (Papadopoulos et al., 2005), (Hamann et al., 2008), and has 
recently been extended with the capabilities to enable the analysis of temporal fault 
trees (Walker, 2008) and multi-objective optimisation (Parker, 2010). HiP-HOPS also 
provide tools implementation which allows practical support.  In the context of this 
thesis, it is also a natural choice because of the support and expertise available on site, 
as well as the access provided to source code for any necessary expansion of the tool 
(please see work on chapter  6).  
2.5 Behavioural Safety Analysis  
In the Behavioural Safety Analysis (BSA) approach, system-level effects of failures are 
established by injecting faults into the formal specification of the system, and the effects 
of these faults on system behaviours are observed. The BSA technique employs model 
checking to allow formal verification. Model checking formally verifies safety 
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properties which represent safety requirements and enables the assessment of dynamic 
behaviour. The model checking process is performed when a detailed formal model is 
established. Formal models are expressed as state automata (or “finite state machines”) 
in the language of the particular technique (e.g. Altarica language for Altarica and 
NuSMV for FSAP/NuSMV). Model checking performs exhaustive exploration to check 
whether a safety property – which is usually expressed in temporal logic – holds. The 
tool produces Boolean output with a counterexample when safety properties do not hold 
to show traces of „simulation‟ on how the breaching condition is reached.  
The strength of this approach lies in its ability to facilitate automated formal verification 
and capture the system‟s dynamic behaviours. It is also possible to differentiate between 
transient and permanent failures and model the temporal ordering of failures. However, 
this technique also has a number of drawbacks including the fact that most model 
checker tools require the system model to be expressed in that particular model checker 
input language. Valuable safety artefacts like fault trees produced from a model checker 
generally have „flat‟ structures representing a disjunction of all minimal cut sets, which 
can hamper understanding of the fault trees. The analysis is also typically qualitative in 
nature and not probabilistic. Other challenges of model checking techniques can be 
found in (Holzmann, 2005). Formal models (which are required as input to the model 
checker) are only developed at later stages where designs are more mature, detailed and 
stable. Lastly and perhaps most critically, model checking based approaches are 
computationally expensive and inductive in nature which means that the exhaustive 
assessment of the effects of combinations of component failures is infeasible in any 
non-trivial system.  
2.5.1 Introduction to Model checking  
Model checking (Clarke & Emerson, 1980) tools explore all possible system states to 
check if a condition holds true. This way, it can be shown that a system model truly 
satisfies certain safety requirements (properties).  If a model state is encountered that 
violates the property, a counterexample is generated to show how the model could reach 
the undesired state. The counterexample describes an execution path that leads from the 
initial system state to a state that violates the property being verified. By studying it, 
sources of the errors can be identified.  
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For a model checking tool to do this “state-exploration”, the input model needs to be 
represented in the right format. Most real-time embedded or safety-critical systems are 
control-oriented, and for control oriented systems, finite state machines (FSM) or finite 
state automata are widely accepted as the abstract notation for defining the system 
model. To model real-life complex industrial systems, the system model needs to be 
represented in different level of detail (sub-systems, components) that can be combined 
and integrated. Most model checking tools have their own rigorous formal language for 
defining input models.  
Typical safety properties that can be checked using model checking are of a qualitative 
nature. For example: “Both processes can never be in their failed state simultaneously”, 
“memory overflow can never occur”, or “as long as the plane is not on ground, the 
engine should never stop”.  
These properties (safety requirements) need to be expressed in a precise and 
unambiguous statement, and temporal logic is employed to do this. Temporal logic is a 
form of logic specifically tailored for statements and reasoning which involve the notion 
of order in time. In model checking, it serves to formally state properties concerned with 
the execution of systems. PLTL (Propositional Linear Temporal Logic) and CTL 
(Computation Tree Logic) are the two most commonly used temporal logic in model 
checking.  
In temporal logic, classical Boolean combinators are necessary: the constants true and 
false, the negation , Conjunction and , Disjunction or , logical implication , and 
double implication  (if and only if). These combinators enable the construction of 
complex statements by relating various simpler sub-formulas.  
In addition to Boolean operators, temporal logic also includes the additional temporal 
connectives. The table below shows some of the common temporal connectives in CTL. 
“E” (for some paths) and “A” (for all paths) are path quantifiers, while “F” (for some 
states) and “G” (for all states) are state quantifiers for states in a path. “X” indicates 
next. 
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Temporal Connectives Description 
EX φ True if formula φ is true in at least one of the next 
states 
EF φ True if there exist some states in some path that 
satisfies formula φ 
EG φ True if every state in some path satisfies formula φ 
AX φ True if formula φ is true in every one of the next 
states 
AF φ True if there exist some state in every path that 
satisfies formula φ 
AG φ True if every state in every path satisfies formula φ 
Figure 6: Commonly used temporal connectives table 
An example of a safety requirement specified in CTL is the statement: “AG 
(ComponentA = activated)” which specifies that component A must be activated all 
the time.  
A system state is defined by a tuple of values for each of the variables. For example:  
state1 = (componentA=off, componentB=off, level=low). 
Most model checker tools convert a state model of the system provided as input into a 
particular state transition model called a kripke structure (Kripke, 1963). This 
conversion process removes hierarchies in the finite state machine, as well as parallel 
compositions, guards and actions on transitions. Each state in a kripke structure contains 
one value for each state variable, and transition in a kripke structure indicates changes 
in one or more state variable values. A given property is checked against the kripke 
structure, which is further unfolded into an infinite tree where each path in the tree 
indicates a possible execution or behaviour of the system.  
Figure 7 below shows an example of an execution tree. In an execution tree, the states 
of the system are arranged so that the root is the initial system state and the children of 
any state denote the next possible states. The definitions of how the system changes 
from one state to another, and what states it can be in next, are defined in the input 
model. If, for example, in Figure 7 the first variable of each node represents the state of 
ComponentA, the second represents the state of ComponentB, and the third represents 
that value of requirement AG (ComponentB = off) (level = low)), which 
means: “every time component B is in its off mode, the level state is low”, then through 
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the inspection of this execution tree, a model checker can determine that the 
requirement is clearly not true.  
 
Figure 7 : Execution tree showing next possible states 
2.5.2 FSAP/NuSMV-SA 
FSAP/NuSMV-SA (Bozzano et al., 2003) is a safety analysis technique developed 
within the ESACS project and consists of two main components: 1) FSAP (Formal 
Safety Analysis Platform) which provides a graphical user interface 2) NuSMV-SA 
which performs the safety assessment and is based on the NuSMV model checker.  
FSAP/NuSMV-SA takes system models in NuSMV format as input and produces 
analysis results as well as trace information like simulation results, counterexamples, 
property verification results, minimal cut sets and fault trees as output. The following 
phases describe how safety analysis is performed in FSAP/NuSMV-SA:  
1. Model capturing 
2. Failure mode capturing and model extension  
3. Safety requirement capturing  
...  <off,off, 
low>  
<off,off, low>  
<off,off, low>  
<on,off, 
high>  
<on,off, high>  
<off,off, 
low>  
<on, on,   
high>  
...   …  …   …  … 
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4. Model analysis 
5. Results extraction and analysis  
Model Capturing: The starting point is the formal model of the system, which can be 
modelled as a system model (written by a design engineer) or a formal safety model 
(written by a safety engineer). These models are written using the NuSMV (Cimatti et 
al., 2000) input language and entered using a text editor. An example of simple bit 
adder written in NuSMV is shown in Figure 8:  
 
Figure 8: Fragment sample of NuSMV model for one-bit adder (source: Bozzano et al., 2003) 
Failure Mode Capturing and Model Extension: Failure modes which describe how 
various components of the system can fail are defined using a GUI. Here the safety 
engineer can specify which nodes of the system can fail, how they fail, and with what 
parameters. The failure modes can be stored and retrieved from a Generic Failure 
Modes Library.  
Once the failure modes are defined, they are then inserted into the models and the result 
is called the extended model. “Injection” of this failure mode also produces a new piece 
of NuSMV code that is automatically inserted into the extended system model. Figure 9 
shows a sample of NuSMV model extended with failure modes:  
MODULE bit(input)  
VAR 
output: {0,1}; 
ASSIGN 
output:=input;  
 
MODULE adder(bit1, bit2) 
VAR  
output: {0,1}; 
ASSIGN 
output:=(bit1 + bit2) mod 2; 
 
  
 
MODULE main 
VAR 
random1: {0,1}; 
random2: {0,1}; 
bit1: bit(random1);  
bit2: bit(random2);  
adder: 
adder(bit1.output,bit2.output
;  
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Figure 9 : NuSMV model extended with failure mode (source: Bozzano et al., 2003) 
Safety Requirement Capturing: During this stage, the design and safety engineer 
define functional and safety requirement that will be used to assess safety behaviour of 
the system. The safety requirements are expressed in temporal logic and the input 
process is simplified through an available requirements library from which safety 
patterns can be chosen and instantiated. Requirements can be subsequently verified 
using the NuSMV model checking verification engine.  
Model Analysis: FSAP/NuSMV performs simulation of both system model and 
extended system model. The behaviour of a system is assessed against the functional 
and safety requirements. The model analysis phase is performed by running the model 
checker on the system properties. Two main verification tasks are performed:  
1.  Model checker NuSMV tests the validity of a system property and generates a 
counterexample if the system property is not verified. At the moment, the model 
checking tool is BDD-based.   
2. FSAP/NuSMV generates fault trees. The FSAP/NuSMV-SA tool is able to 
perform failure ordering analysis (Bozzano & Orita, 2003) which provides 
information on timing constraints (where applicable) among the events in a 
minimal cut set.  
VAR  
Output_nominal: {0,1};   
Output_FailureMode: {no_failure, inverted};  
ASSIGN 
Output_nominal :=input;  
DEFINE Output_inverted := !Output_nominal;  
Output Output := case 
 Output_FailureMode = no_failure : output_nominal;  
 Output_FailureMode = inverted : output_inverted;  
esac;  
 
ASSIGN 
next(output_FailureMode) := case 
output_FailureMode  = no_failure: {no_failure, inverted}; 
output_FailureMode = inverted : inverted;  
esac;   
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Result Extraction and Analysis: The analysis results are displayed in formats 
compatible with traditional commercial tools. Trace results obtained from a simulation 
task or counterexample are bound to a system verification property or minimal cut set, 
and can be displayed in textual, structural (XML), graphical (gnuplot utility) or tabular 
display. Fault trees generated can be viewed in commercial tools like FaultTree+.  
Joshi (Joshi et al., 2006) discuss several limitations of FSAP/NuSMV-SA which include 
the “flat” structure of generated fault trees (fault trees generated are only two levels 
deep and can be very broad). This might hamper the understanding of the system via the 
fault trees. A normal fault tree shows multiple levels of causation, and in the CSA 
approach also indicates the propagation of failures through the system. There is also 
limited flexibility in defining the fault model, as there is no good way (in capturing the 
hierarchy) of specifying fault propagation or simultaneous or dependent faults. 
2.5.3 ALTARICA  
The AltaRica language (Arnold et al., 2000) is designed to formally specify the 
behaviour of a system. AltaRica models can be assessed through fault tree generators or 
model checkers. The process takes in system models (AltaRica models) as input and 
generates fault trees and model checker verification results as output.  
The main phases for safety assessment with AltaRica are as follow (Bieber et al., 2002):  
1. System Modelling  
2. Formal Safety Requirements  
3. Graphical Interactive Simulation  
4. Safety Assessment : Fault Tree generation and Model checking  
System Modelling  
The AltaRica language is a hierarchical specification language based on constraint 
automata used to formally model system specifications and behaviour. Formal syntax 
and semantics of the language are described in (Point & Rauzy, 1999). AltaRica 
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describes complex systems consisting of interacting components with semantics 
expressed in terms of an interfaced transition system. Components can be defined 
hierarchically and composed together (synchronized) to create more complex 
components. AltaRica provides a general synchronization mechanism and other features 
like bidirectional flow, broadcast vectors and transition priorities.  
An AltaRica model of a system consists of hierarchies of components called nodes. A 
node gathers flows, states, events, transitions and assertions.  
Flows: visible variables of the component which are used to exchange information with 
the environment (other components of the system). 
States:  local/internal variables which are inaccessible by the environment.  
Events:  occurrences that change the state of a component (e.g. failures). Transitions: 
describe how internal states may evolve. They are characterized by a guard, an event 
name and a command part. A guard is a Boolean constraint over the component flow or 
states. An event is the trigger for transition. Lastly, the command part is a set of values 
assigned to some state variables, which describe the actions or results of the transition.  
Assertions: Boolean formulae that describe the constraints linking flows and internal 
states. These constraints express mutual dependencies on/between the states of the 
components. 
Consider the following example in Figure 10 of a simple component called “block”. A 
block represents a basic energy provider and receives two Boolean inputs, I and A. 
Input I is true every time the component receives energy and input A is true whenever 
the component is activated. The component has a Boolean output O that is true 
whenever it produces energy. It has an internal state S that is true whenever the 
component is working properly (the safe state). Initially, S is assumed to be true. A 
transition for the block can occur if the component is safe (S is true) and the event 
„failure‟ occurs. After this transition, the component is no longer safe (S is false). The 
block produces output O only when both of the inputs are true and the component is 
safe.  
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Figure 10: Sample of block 
The following shows the representation of block in the form of an AltaRica node :  
Node block  
 Flow  
  O : bool : out ;  
  I, A : bool : in ; 
 State 
  S : bool ;  
 Event  
  Failure;  
 Trans 
  S │- Failure → S: = false;  
 Assert 
  O = (I and A and S) ;  
 External initial state = S = true ;  
Edon  
The whole system node (main node) is built by connecting basic nodes. Components are 
combined together by two means: assertions and synchronizations.  Global assertions 
allow the definition of the flow connections (for example: stating that input flows of a 
node are the output flows of another node). Connections can also be related to events 
shared by a set of nodes (synchronization of events). Recently a time extension has been 
introduced to AltaRica to enable the verifying of real-time AltaRica specifications 
(Pagetti et al., 2003)  
Formal Safety Requirements:  
In this phase, the safety requirements are formalized with the use of linear temporal 
logic operators (bieber et al., 2004). A library can be defined to store (and retrieve) 
useful safety formulae.   
A 
 
I  
  
<off,off, 
low>  
 
O 
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Graphical Interactive Simulation:  
Safety engineers can check the effect of failure occurrences on the system architecture 
using the graphical interactive simulator. It enables the safety engineer to choose an 
event and the resulting state is computed by the simulator.  
Safety assessment  
Once a system model is specified in the AltaRica language, it can be compiled into a 
lower level formalism for verification purposes. Compilers available for AltaRica could 
produce automata, fault trees and stochastic Petri Nets. Figure 11 Illustrates the main 
phases of Altarica and  its safety artefacts.  
 Automata: An AltaRica program can be compiled into a finite state automaton on 
which formal verification techniques like model checking can be performed by the 
MEC 5 (Arnold, 1994) model checker.  
 Fault trees: another compiler could produce a fault tree on which reliability analysis 
can also be carried out through the ARALIA program/tool (Groupe ARALIA, 
1996). Compilation of AltaRica descriptions into Boolean formulae (i.e. a fault 
tree) is discussed in (Rauzy, 2002) where a mode automaton is introduced as the 
underlying mathematical model. An extended type called AltaRica Data-Flow 
which is based on mode automata is introduced.  
 Stochastic Petri Nets: the third compiler produces a stochastic Petri Net on which 
performance analysis can be performed. 
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Figure 11 : Analysis phases of Altarica 
2.5.4 Summary of BSA Techniques  
NuSMV has been selected as a BSA method to complement HiP-HOPS in IACoB based 
on the following considerations. Firstly, NuSMV is fundamentally a symbolic model 
checker. Symbolic model checkers are generally more scalable and therefore, are 
recommended for larger real-life systems. NuSMV has a strong advantage over 
Altarica, as (Bieber, 2002) highlighted that Altarica‟s MEC model checker is limited on 
the size of systems it can handle.  NuSMV is also more suitable for Boolean-based data 
(as opposed to enumerated type) (Miller, 2007). Considering that most of the failure 
data obtained from HiP-HOPS are Boolean-based, NuSMV is a logical choice. The 
NuSMV support tool is also available as an open-source program which allows it to be 
tailored more effectively into a future integrated support tool.  
2.6 Relevant Work on Other Integrated Approaches 
To propose an integrated approach, it is first of all, important to understand the notion 
of „integration‟ in this context. We believe that the generic primary characteristics 
which constitute an integrated approach (methodology, tool, or both) include:  
AltaRica model 
(nodes)  
Compiler  
Automaton  
(MEC 5)  
Fault Tree 
(ARALIA)  
Petri Net  
(MOCA-RP)  
Produce: 
(Analysis Tool)  
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 The application of these different techniques (CSA and BSA) within the same 
process 
 The link between relevant models (model representations in CSA and BSA) 
should be well-established  
 The integrated approach should provide better analysis capabilities (and results) 
compared to a single technique  
Here, we also briefly reviewed recent model-based techniques which incorporate the 
critical elements of CSA and BSA, namely the capabilities to perform FTA and model 
checking within its application.  
Techniques like Altarica and FSAP/NuSMV are able to perform model checking and 
generate fault trees. However, the primary characteristic shared between these 
techniques is that they start with a BSA-based technique, and the fault trees are 
produced as a result of the model checking analysis. As previously mentioned, this 
approach has the drawback of having a “flat” fault tree structures.  
ForMoSA (Formal Methods and Safety Analysis (Ortmeier et al., 2004b)) proposed a 
combined use of traditional safety analysis (FTA) and formal verification via the use of 
„failure-sensitive specification‟. Failure-sensitive specifications are used to derive more 
complete failure modes by first generating all possible scenario combinations. It then 
removes implausible behaviours and behaviours that do not fulfil specification rules 
which govern the intended behaviour. The extracted behaviours results in a list of 
failure modes, which is then separated from intended behaviour (nominal model). These 
failure modes along with results obtained from independently-constructed fault trees, 
are used to extend the nominal model. The main challenge this approach faces is the 
state explosion problem in its generation of „failure-sensitive specification‟, in which all 
combinations are first to be produced.  
The “failure injection” nature of model checking in BSA can also be used to validate 
results of CSA. Failure injection approach introduces failures and observes the changes 
in the system behaviour in response to these failures. Lisagor (2006) recommends the 
use of results from failure injection to verify the completeness of minimal cut sets 
produced from FTA in CSA. 
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Here, we approach the integration from a radically different angle. Instead of starting 
from a BSA process (which tends to be performed at the later stage of design 
development), we believe it is possible to start the integrated process from CSA. We 
also demonstrate a way in which the results of the CSA can be used for the systematic 
construction and refinement of state automata that describe dynamic behaviour and can 
be further subjected to BSA. In the following chapters, we discuss further the proposed 
approach and demonstrate how these characteristics of integration can be achieved.  
2.7 Chapter Summary  
In this chapter, the background and context of this research work in system modelling 
was briefly discussed. Attention was paid to the early functional design as we hope to 
fill the gap in providing a more-robust safety assessment at (although not limited to) this 
stage. MBSA techniques have been recently developed to cope with the rising 
complexity of modern systems. The two most widely used MBSA-based techniques are 
the CSA and BSA. CSA is generally based upon classical techniques like the FTA and 
FMEA. It is widely used in reliability engineering, and its Boolean-based and 
compositional nature makes the analysis efficient and scalable. However, CSA is 
mainly limited to static analysis and is not capable of formal verification. This chapter 
reviewed several CSA- based techniques, for example CFT, SEFT, and HiP-HOPS.  
BSA, on the other hand, is based upon formal techniques like model checker. It relies 
on exhaustive state exploration and allows formal verification of the model. BSA 
limitations include the fact that it requires a relatively mature model, and therefore it is 
often applied only at the later design stage. Example of BSA-based techniques reviewed 
here are Altarica and FSAP/NuSMV.  
This chapter provided an overview of the working mechanism, strengths, and 
limitations of these techniques. We also studied the different objectives, and 
complementary of aspects of CSA and BSA. In the next chapter, we proposed a method 
to combine their applications.  
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CHAPTER 3. A method for Integrated Application 
of Compositional and Behavioural Safety 
Analysis (IACoB)  
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter develops a method for safety analysis which integrates the application of 
CSA and BSA techniques. Its application is mainly explored in two contexts: early 
functional design, and more detailed architectural design.   
In early functional design, the method is applied to an early model where design details 
are not yet mature. At this stage, focus is drawn to the benefits yielded by the method in 
enabling systematic derivation of abstract behavioural models via CSA and then useful 
application of model checking on such models. Application of the method is also 
demonstrated in a later stage of design where the model includes more detail about the 
architecture of the system. It is shown that the method is generic and applicable as an 
iterative process that can span across the design lifecycle.  
The key steps involved in IACoB analysis are illustrated in Figure 12. The method starts 
with a given set of system functional requirements and safety specifications. From this, 
a functional model of the system is established, which shows input processing and 
output functions and dependencies among them, e.g. the data exchanged among 
functions (or material and energy in the general case).  In the next step, design engineers 
are asked to examine further this model in order to evaluate the severity of failures of 
output functions, i.e. functions provided by the system to users and its environment. 
Each function is then annotated with its local failure behaviour in the style of HiP-
HOPS, enabling automated preliminary FTA to be conducted via application of CSA 
analysis. The result is the generation of an FMEA of the system model. This FMEA is 
then studied and interpreted, leading to recommendations for design improvements, and 
additional safety measures in particular.  
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With the introduction of new safety measures, the requirements and system model are 
updated. The severity of the failures of output functions and the local failure behaviour 
of all functions are revised, and the next iteration of FMEA can be performed. This 
might again lead to further iterations, until the design is deemed satisfactory. At this 
point, results from FMEA are analyzed and interpreted to assist the further development 
of the design via construction of state machines that represent system dynamic 
behaviour. Model checking is then used to verify whether this dynamic system model 
conforms to the requirements and specifications. If conformity is verified, the process 
proceeds to either further refinement of the model and iteration of the above process or 
its implementation. Otherwise, counter-examples are produced to show how the model 
fails to fulfil certain requirements and to point out to useful revision of the model. Each 
of these stages is discussed further in the next section.  
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Figure 12: Process outline of IACoB method 
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System Dynamic Behaviour  
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Figure 13 shows how it is believed the IACoB method could fit into the traditional 
safety assessment process (adapted from (ARP 4754)). The inclusion of IACoB in this 
process enables techniques like FTA, FMEA and formal verification to be performed 
earlier (following FHA once functions are allocated) rather than being applicable only 
during or after a more detailed PSSA.  
 
Figure 13: System development and safety assessment process (source: ARP 4754) 
IACoB 
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The IACoB Process  
This section presents a detailed description of IACoB. It gives a series of steps in which 
various analyses and their results help to transform a basic initial functional model of 
the system into a more robust, better prepared model which eventually becomes the 
blueprint for system architecture and thus the foundation of development. For each step, 
an accompanying table is given that summarises the input, primary activity, and output 
of the processes that take place in the given step.  
3.2 Functional Model  
The essential element of early conceptual and preliminary design is the development of 
a functional model. A functional model is the representation of the system functional 
architecture that fulfils the system requirements. From a list of requirements, functions 
are initially derived from the identification of „processes‟ that need to be performed by 
the system. The task of identifying and organizing the system functions depends on the 
application and the experience of designers. However, in general, functions would fall 
into three categories: input, processing, and output functions. A Functional model can 
then be seen as a function-oriented pipeline where data or control gets transformed as it 
flows from input to output. 
Functional models are popularly represented as functional flow block diagrams, an 
example of which is shown in Figure 14.  
 
Figure 14: Functional model in basic block diagrams 
 
Function 
F1 
Input  
Output  Processing  
Function 
F2 
Function 
F3 
Function 
F4 
Function 
F6 
Function 
F5 
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An input function refers to a function that acquires the input parameters needed by the 
system. In architectural designs, input functions are typically implemented with sensors 
or communication controllers reading data on communication buses. A processing 
function is a function that describes how the input data is processed, and finally an 
output function provides function to the user or environment based on information 
received from processing functions. 
In situations where more information is available in the early stage, it is possible not 
only to model the higher level functions of the system, but also to show hierarchical 
decomposition of functions in networks of sub-functions.  
One popular diagrammatic technique used in functional modelling is the Functional 
Flow Block Diagram (NASA, 2007).  A Functional Flow Block Diagram (FFBD), also 
known as a Functional Flow Diagram or a Functional Block Diagram, is a step-by-step 
flow diagram consisting blocks connected through lines, and it is used to represent 
functional flow in a system.  
FFBDs are a general tool and can define operational and support sequence for systems, 
but also describe the processes for developing and producing systems. In FFBDs, 
functions are organized according to their logical order of execution, and might depend 
on the execution and completion of other functions. To manage complexity, functions 
are decomposed into several levels. This functional decomposition defines the lower-
level functions and their sequential relationship allows traceability throughout.  
Basic elements of a FFBD include: function blocks, directed lines and connection logic 
symbols. Each function block in FFBD represents a single defined function. The block 
contains information like the function name (which is generally expressed as verb) and 
the function identification number (which establishes relationships and traceability 
between levels). Reference functions which are denoted as bracketed blocks can also be 
used to show reference to other functional diagrams. Figure 15 shows an example of a 
functional block.  
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Function blocks are connected by directed lines, which depict function flow and flow 
direction. Usually the function blocks are structured so the flow is directed from left to 
right, as shown in Figure 16  
 
 
 
In summary, the input, process and output of this stage of the construction of functional 
model are: 
Input  Initial (textual) requirements 
Process   Identify, define and  relate functions  
 Translate requirements into functional model   
Output Functional model/ functional architecture  
3.3 Severity Assessment of Output Function  
Once the high level functional model is developed, it is important to assess the severity 
of deviations at output functions. We define an „output function‟ as the following: 
F1  
Perform calculation of 
distance 
Function number  
Function name 
Figure 15: Example of a functional block 
Function number 
Function name [Proceeding function]  [Succeeding function] 
Figure 16: Connection flow between functions  
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A function that interacts directly with the environment of the system by 
providing information material and energy.  
The „environment‟ of the system refers to the users and other external elements outside 
the system boundaries. The interaction with the external environment is not exclusive to 
output functions. An input function naturally accepts its value and „input‟ to be 
processed from its environment. Here however the focus is placed on output functions 
because of their effects on the environment and their potential contributions to hazards. 
The classification of failures is assisted through the use of guide words similar to those 
used in HAZOP, (Bonadavali & Simoncini, 1990) and (Pumfrey, 1999). These guide 
words help categorize failure classes and their use depends on the level of details 
available.  Omission and Commission are commonly used at this stage. „Omission‟ of an 
output function indicates the condition in which function output is not provided when 
expected, while „commission‟ indicates the provision of unwanted output. It is also 
possible to use more to indicate timing failures (late, early) and value failures (more, 
less).  
The categorization of failures in terms of severity is based on the IEC-61508 (IEC 
61508, 1998) and is presented in Table 3. According to this, the severity of failures can 
be classified, according to their consequences for humans (or for the quality of services 
provided in the more general sense), into the following categories: Catastrophic, 
Critical, Marginal and Negligible.  
These severity classes are assigned to the failures using simulation, testing or 
experience. The classification can be assigned as part of information presented in FFA 
(please see the example FFA in Table 2) and allows the safety analysis to be focused 
correctly, especially when there is any conflicting priority in the functional design. 
Failures at functional outputs under the „catastrophic‟ or „critical‟ categories need to 
receive higher priority compared to those which have „marginal‟ or „negligible‟ effects.  
Table 3: Allocation of severity category based on consequences to people and service (IEC-61508) 
Description  Consequence to human 
stakeholders  
Consequence to service  
 
Catastrophic  Fatalities and/or multiple - 
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severe injuries 
Critical  Single fatality or severe 
injury 
Loss of major system 
Marginal  Minor injury Severe system damage  
Negligible  Possible minor injury System damage  
In summary, the input, process and output of this severity assessment for output 
functions process stage are:  
Input  System functional model  
Process  Estimate risk and classify the severity of output function failure based on 
their consequences  
Output  Severity analysis of output functions 
 Prioritisation of output failures using severity as criterion; 
Identification of higher priority (critical) functions 
3.4 Local Failure Behaviour 
Apart from deciding the severity of failures of output functions, it is also important to 
determine the potential causes of these failures as these can be seen to arise from the 
specified functional model of the system. Qualitative analysis which identifies these 
causes could provide valuable feedback towards improvement of the functional 
architecture design by pinpointing weak parts in the system model, for example single 
points of failure that can lead to severe output failures. To achieve this, local failure 
behaviour of each function needs to be established. Failure behaviour can be described 
using deviations.   
A deviation contains information on the failure type and the „port‟ (i.e. input and/or 
output) where it occurs.  Failure of output function can be defined by output deviations. 
An output deviation describes a set of Boolean expressions that represents the causes of 
the output failure. These causes can consist of internal failures, input deviations, or 
both. When representing deviations, the dash “-“symbol is used to separate the failure 
type from the input or output parameters. Failure causes are connected by logical 
operators. Commonly used logical operators are the disjunctive operator (“OR”, “˅”, 
“+”) and the conjunctive operator (“AND”, “˄”, “.”).  
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For example, the following expression:  
Omission-Output = InternalFailure OR Omission-Input 
defines an output deviation for Function F1 (which is shown in Figure 17) where an 
internal failure (InternalFailure) of the function or an omission of the input 
(Omission-Input) can cause an omission of the output (Omission-Output) in the 
function.  
 
 
 
This annotation of failure behaviour for each function, in addition to the topology of the 
functional architecture, allows failure logic to be developed and propagation of failure 
to be subsequently established. The synthesis and analysis of fault trees are employed to 
achieve this.  
In summary, the input, process and output of this local failure behaviour annotation of 
function are:  
Input  Functional model  
Process  Establish failure information for each functional block  
Output  Functional model with failure data information 
 Establishment of causes (internal failure and failure of input) of 
function failure  
 
Input   Output  
InternalFailure   
Function F1  
Figure 17: Local failure behaviour for Function F1 
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3.5 Fault Tree and FMEA Synthesis and Analysis  
Compositional safety analysis techniques like HiP-HOPS can be applied to perform the 
automated construction and analysis of fault trees from the functional model.  
The global view of failure propagation in the functional architecture can be captured by 
traversing and following the causal links defined in each function‟s local failure 
information. The process starts from a failure in an output function and moves 
backwards progressively to record failures from other functions which contribute to this 
particular output failure. This results in a set of fault trees that represent the 
relationships between failures of output failures and their root causes in the functional 
model of the system.  
These fault trees in HiP-HOPS can be analyzed qualitatively, and the results are 
summarized in an automatically generated FMEA table. The FMEA table shows the 
direct links between potential failures of all functions in the model and the output 
function failures which represent the hazardous failures of the system. Traditional 
FMEA shows only the direct effects of a single failure on the output functions, but 
because of the way the FMEA is constructed by HiP-HOPS from a series of fault trees, 
it also captures the effects of a functional failure when it occurs in conjunction with 
failures from other functions. These are termed the further effects of the function failure.  
The FMEA table generally contains information on the list of functions, failure modes, 
effects of the function failures in terms of the failures of the output functions, and other 
contributing failures that need to occur collectively to cause failures in output functions. 
It is also possible to include information on severity of the affected output function, 
recommended treatments and other general comments.  
The FMEA table essentially shows how internal failures of functions can contribute to 
the hazardous failures of output functions. By determining these relationships between 
failures in functions and failures in output functions, it is then possible to establish the 
criticality of the function in the functional architecture.  
Figure 18 illustrates this point by showing a functional architecture that produces three 
output functions: Function F7, Function F8 and Function F9. For simplicity we assume 
that every function has a single output failure - omission - and that this is caused by 
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internal failure of the function or omission of its input.  For this reason, we do not 
explicitly define the obvious annotation of each function. Severity assessment 
performed during FFA identified that the severity of omission failure in output Function 
F8 is catastrophic, while the severities of Function F7 and Function F9 are marginal.  
 
 
HiP-HOPS analysis of the above model with its simple failure annotations creates the 
fault tree of Figure 19 for the failure Omission of Function F8. The fault tree is analyzed 
and an FMEA table (as partly shown in Table 4) is generated. The FMEA table 
identifies those functions (Function F2, Function F3 and Function F5) whose failures 
play a vital role in contributing to Omission of Function F8 failure. These are shown in 
shaded function blocks in Figure 20.   
Function F1  Function F4 
Function F2  
Function F5 
Function F6  
Function F7  
Function F8  
Function F3  
Function F9  
...  ...  
Figure 18: Example of the functional architecture 
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Table 4: Example of FMEA table  
Function 
  
Failure 
Mode 
Effects  Contributing 
Failure  
Severity  
Function F2 Internal 
Failure  
Omission of 
Function F8  
Internal Failure in 
Function F3 
Catastrophic 
Function F3  Internal 
Failure  
Omission of 
Function F8 
Internal Failure in 
Function F2  
Catastrophic 
Function F5  Internal 
Failure  
Omission of 
Function F8 
 Catastrophic 
... ... ... ... ... 
 
Omission of Function F8  
Internal Failure 
of Function F5  
Internal Failure 
of Function F2  
Internal Failure 
of Function F3  
OR Gate  
AND Gate  
Legend: 
Figure 19: Example of generated fault trees 
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Interpretation of the table allows the failure behaviour of the functional architecture to 
be checked against safety requirements. By examining the FMEA table, safety measures 
can be devised (for example, by revising the design structure or introducing safety 
mechanism). Focus is placed especially on functions whose failures contribute to 
hazardous effects, as they need to be prevented by design or at least have their impacts 
minimized. Further discussion on the common techniques and solutions employed to 
divert critical failures are discussed in Chapter 6.  
While the design solution ultimately relies on the engineer‟s decision and experience, 
this identification of criticality for each function offers assistance in the management of 
effort allocation and design modification. For example, apart from identifying that focus 
should be placed on Function F2, F3 and F5 due to their failure criticality, the fault tree 
also shows that Function F5 is a single-point of failure that might need additional 
attention.  
To achieve a safer design, modification of the system structure, for example through 
incorporation of backup or redundant components (in later versions of the designs) for 
fail-safe purposes, is often necessary. The introduction of these safety mechanisms 
might result in new modules (functions in an earlier design, or implementation 
Function F1  Function F4 
Function F2  
Function F5 
Function F6  
Function F7  
Function F8  
Function F3  
Function F9  
...  ...  
Figure 20: Identified critical functions based on failure propagation  
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components in a detailed design) and brings about the need to iterate the process to 
generate updated FTAs and FMEAs. 
From this process, more refined design and safety requirements can be derived. The 
identification of lower level failures leading to output failures can be evaluated, and this 
helps derive more refined design requirements. This results in fewer late design changes 
in comparison to traditional practice where assessment at this stage is often limited to 
FHA. In classical safety assessment, FTA and FMEAs are performed manually, making 
safety analysis a laborious process while often meaning it is deferred until the PSSA 
stage where the details of the design are more concrete.  
In summary, the input, process and output of fault tree and FMEA synthesis and 
analysis are:  
Input  Functional model with local failure behaviour information 
Process   Generate FTA and FMEA from functional model  (HiP-HOPS is 
applicable for this) 
 Identify weak points in system design - contributing function 
failures that leads to (severe) output function failure : by linking 
failures in output functions to their causes  
Output  Effect of functional failures on output functions 
 Better understanding of the criticality of input, processing and 
output functions in the system 
3.6 Generation of State machines and Their Translation into 
Model Checker Input Language  
One important aspect in this research is the investigation on how application of CSA 
and BSA techniques can be integrated constructively. To achieve this, we need to 
establish an effective association between the primary elements of CSA and BSA 
techniques, namely the FTA/ FMEA results (output of CSA) and state machines (input 
of BSA) respectively.  
In IACoB, the results of the FMEA are used to construct behavioural models that can be 
subjected to BSA. Indeed application of the method leads to synthesis of state machines 
that describe the dynamic behaviour of the system in conditions of failure.  Iterative 
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application of the method starts from “abstract” state machines which progressively 
become more “refined” as they contain more details about the behaviour of the system. 
In general, these state machines show how functional failures assessed in the FMEA 
move the system to degraded or failed “modes” where there is reduced function or no 
function at all.  We use the term mode as in (Papadopoulos, 2000) to indicate an abstract 
functional state in which the system delivers a set of functions. We also use the term 
“mode chart” to indicate a state machine which shows transition between modes.  
To create such mode charts, in IACoB, an FMEA-ModeChart assistance table is 
constructed to help organise state machine elements and create the “abstract” state 
machine. Transitions in this state machine are then refined to produce a more “refined” 
state machine. Traceability between abstract and refined state machines allows the 
understanding of how transition in a more-refined level affects the higher level state of 
the system. The refined state machine can also be produced directly from HiP-HOPS 
failure annotations to model system failure-related dynamic behaviour. Both abstract 
and refined state machines can be represented in the NuSMV model, and can be 
extended with nominal behaviour. Figure 21 illustrates the process of generating state 
machines from FMEA results. 
This process is further discussed in the following section. First, we investigate the 
representation of abstract state machines, their purpose and application, how they can be 
constructed based on information gathered from results of previous process, and the 
value of their analysis.  
70 
 
 
 
 
  
Failure-
extended model 
(error model)   
 
Figure 21: Generation of state machines  
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3.6.1 Modelling the Dynamic Nominal Behaviour of a System  
State machines can be used to model the dynamic behaviour of discrete event systems. 
In the early functional design stage, the state machines are usually abstract and are used 
to model high-level system behaviour. In later stages of development, they can be used 
to model more refined behaviour.  
Overview of State Machine fundamentals 
Traditional (finite) state machines are flat and sequential. Such state machines have 
proved to be a useful theoretical tool in computer science, but are unsuitable for 
representation of large or complex system. David Harel introduced state charts as a 
language to describe state machines by extending finite state machines with additional 
capabilities, including hierarchy, concurrency and priority (Harel, 1987). While the 
approach we discuss here is not tied to any particular commercial support tool, the 
modelling of state machines in this thesis is based on the general semantics of state 
charts. Being an unofficial language, many variants of state charts have been proposed 
in the literature - as reviewed in (Von der Beek, 1994). One of the most widely known 
implementations of state charts is the STATEMATE tool, the semantics of which are 
described in (Harel & Naamad, 1996).  The complete discussion of semantics and 
syntax of state charts is out of the scope of this thesis, and readers are referred to (Harel, 
1987). This section presents the key concepts of state charts and discusses how these 
foundations enable state charts to be a prominent notion in modelling complex system 
behaviour, and how its extension can be adopted as part of early design analysis.  
State  
A state is defined by Weilkiens (2007) as the representation of a set of value 
combinations for the underlying system elements. It describes the system internal 
behaviours at a given time (and when a state is active, the system is said to be „in‟ that 
state). Apart from the internal behaviour which is executed based on defined events, a 
state can have three other behaviours that are triggered by predefined events:  
1) entry behaviour – which is executed immediately once the state is entered 
2) exit behaviour – which is executed immediately before the state is exited 
3) do behaviour – which is executed while the state is active  
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Figure 22 below illustrates an example of a state chart. States are shown in rounded-
corner rectangles, and charts are shown with soft greyed dash border.  Sometimes states 
and charts are not distinctively/uniquely named, for example S1 is both a chart and a 
state. A state may itself host and contain other state charts and this creates the relations 
of „parent-chart‟/„sub-chart‟ and „parent-state‟/ „sub-state‟.  
States in state charts are categorized into two types: OR states and AND states. OR 
states (for example S1, S4 and S5) are states that have sub-states related to each other 
by „exclusive-or‟, i.e. they are mutually exclusive and are reached sequentially. Basic 
states (for example S2, S6, S7, S8, and S9) are states that are at the bottom of hierarchy 
and do not contain any sub-states. Basic states are considered OR states. AND states 
(for example S3) are states that contain at least two sub-charts that are reached 
simultaneously when the parent-state is activated, and thus AND states are used to 
model concurrency.  
 
 
 
 
Transition 
Transition (t1..t5) defines the trigger and condition of the directed relationship between 
states. These are expressed by a „transition label‟ which can be defined in the form of 
Figure 22: Sample of state chart  
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„e[c]/ac‟, where e is the event that triggers the transition, c is the condition that guards 
the transition, and ac is the action that is performed when and if the transition occurs. A 
default transition defines the state that is entered once the chart is active. In the Figure 
22, the defaults are the transitions to S2, S6 and S8, and are denoted by the circle-ended 
arrow. 
Events can be generated externally or inside the same sub-chart. Additionally, events 
can also be predefined (as mentioned earlier) and be generated when a state is entered 
“en(s)” or exited “ex(s)”or when the value of a Boolean variable “variable” becomes 
true “true(variable)” , false “false(variable)” or changes “change(variable)”.  
Conditions are used to guard the transitions. A condition can contain expressions on 
data values or expressions on elements of state charts. The combination of events and 
conditions is called the trigger of the transition, and the trigger is fired only when the 
Boolean combination of these events and conditions are true. A condition persists until 
the instance when the inverse condition holds. 
Transitions can generate actions which control other charts. These actions are 
categorized into basic actions, which form basic events, and compound actions, which 
modify state chart elements (i.e. data variables). Referring to the Figure 22 for example, 
transition t3 which is triggered by event „c‟, will cause action „d‟ to be fired, which in 
turn triggers transition t4 and causes a transition from state S8 to S9.  Transition actions 
will be executed after the source state is deactivated, but before the target state is 
activated. Similar to events, actions can also be executed when a state is entered or 
exited in addition to appearing along transitions.  
The following is an excerpt of the transition label syntax grammar customized from 
(Loer, 2003):  
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<label>  ::= [<event>]/{<action>;} 
<event> ::= E    event variable  
  | (<event>and<event>) Boolean combination 
  | (<event>or <event>)  
  | not(<event>)  negation 
  | en(<state>)  chart entered state 
  | ex(<state>)  chart left state  
  | [<condition>]  condition is true 
   tr(<condition>)  condition became true 
  | fs(<condition>)  condition became false 
  |  ch(<condition>) condition changed 
<condition> ::= C     condition variable (Boolean) 
  | not <condition>  negation  
  | (<condition>) and (<condition>) Boolean combination 
  | (<condition>) or (<condition>)  
  | in(<state>)  chart is in „state‟ 
<action> ::= E     event variable  
  |  tr!(C)    set  C to true 
  | fs!(C)   set C to false 
  |  C:=<condition>  assign the value of (Boolean) condition to C  
  |D:=   <condition> assign the value of (data) <arithmetic expression> to D   
 
In the state chart semantics system behaviour is described as a set of possible runs 
(Harel & Naamad, 1996). Runs represent the system responses to external stimuli, and 
consist of a sequence of status. A status is the set of all currently visited model states 
and may contain information on: active states, values of data items, conditions, 
generated events and scheduled actions. The transition from one status to the next is 
defined by steps.  In addition to external stimuli, changes occurring during and since 
previous steps would trigger transitions between states and as a result the system moves 
to a new status, as illustrated in the figure below:  
 
Status 
(initial)  
..... Status  Status Status  
Step  Step  Step  Step  
Status  
Figure 23: Status and steps in state charts semantics (source : Harel & Naamad, 1996 ) 
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General Principles and Language Restrictions 
Although currently there is no agreed common standard that defines formal semantics 
for state charts, (Harel & Naamad 1996) describe the general principles to define the 
semantics of state charts:  
1) Changes that occur in a step, and reactions to internal and external events, can 
only be sensed after completion of the step 
2) Events „live‟ for duration of one step only and are not remembered in 
subsequent steps  
3) Calculations in one step are based on the situation at the beginning of the step 
(i.e. the states the system is in and the value of data items) 
4) Greediness property: the maximal subset of non-conflicting transitions are 
always executed 
5) Execution of a step takes 0 instances of time, i.e. it is instantaneous 
3.6.1.1  Overview of NuSMV  
As introduced earlier in Chapter 2, NuSMV is a newer version of Symbolic Model 
Verifier (SMV, (McMillan, 1993)). It automatically verifies if a system (which is 
expressed as a finite state machine) satisfies its specifications.  
A NuSMV model describes system behaviour by declaring a set of variables. The initial 
values for these variables and how the variables change are explicitly defined. This 
description can be grouped into a set of modules with one main module. Modules are 
generally used to define or distinguish separate physical (sub) systems. A NuSMV 
module can consist of a set of variable declarations, assignments of variable initial 
values and definitions, and property assertions. The variable declaration section contains 
the local variables names and their types in the form „variable_name : 
variable_type‟. Variables type can generally be of Boolean, numerical or enumerated 
types. The assignment section contains a set of assignments of variables into their initial 
value or its value in the next execution step, describing how a variable can change 
value. This can be expressed in the form „variable_name := value‟. Various 
operators are available for variable assignments, including Boolean logic operators 
(and, or, not), conditional operators (case, switch), arithmetic (+, -, *, /), and 
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comparison (=, <, >, <=, >=). To assign a value of a variable in its initial and next 
execution step, operators init and next are used. The next value of a variable is 
defined using operators and constants from the range of values that the variable can 
have, as described in the declaration. Variables that do not have an assignment change 
non-deterministically. The assertion section is where safety properties (written in LTL 
or CTL) are defined, and these properties should hold over all executions.  
Each module can also have input parameters (which are assigned outside the module) 
and output parameters (which are assigned inside the module). An excerpt of an 
example NuSMV model is presented below, showing relationship between input 
parameters and how they affect the internal variables:  
MODULE functionF1 (inputParam1, inputParam2) 
VAR 
functionStates: {state1, state2, state3 }; 
functionEvent1: boolean;  
functionEvent2: boolean;  
ASSIGN 
init (functionEvent1):= 0;  
functionEvent2 := !functionEvent1;  
functionStates := case 
functionEvent1 & inputParam1 : state1;  
functionEvent2 & inputParam2 : state2;  
1: state3;  
esac;  
next(functionEvent1):=case  
functionEvent1 = 1: 1; 
1: {1,0}; 
esac;  
 
AND states, however, require each of the state values to be defined independently as 
separate variables to allow the states to run simultaneously. For example:  
VAR  
state1: ... 
state2: ...  
state3: ... 
defines that state1, state2 and state3 run in parallel, and each can hold value of its 
own (i.e. sub-modes, which will be discussed in the next section).  
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3.6.1.2 Hierarchical Modelling in State Machines 
Contemporary systems are often required to perform large and complex functions in 
different stages of operation. For example, functions in an aircraft may vary from 
critical functions such as flight management, communications, and engine control to 
secondary electrical domestic and comfort/entertainment facilities. These functions 
involve large numbers of behavioural states, transitions, structural configurations, and 
interactions, and managing them is no trivial task.  
One way to help the management of this large complex labyrinth of dynamic behaviour 
is through hierarchical modelling. Hierarchical modelling manages the decomposition 
of a state machine relating to a system by breaking it down into smaller parts, similar to 
those in static decomposition of systems and subsystems.  
The activity of a state depends on the hierarchy of its parent-state. Hierarchy enables the 
states to nest, allowing the parent-state and sub-state relationships. (Drusinsky, 2006) 
outlines roles of hierarchy, mainly:  
1) Refinement of states in a top-down manner 
2) Reduction of transition clutter  
3) Maintaining orthogonality, where parent-states are to be place holders for 
independent, irredundant activities (concurrency)  
4) Enabling shared actions, where all sub-states shares the action of parent-state 
Consider the example in the figures below. State machines in Figure 24 and Figure 25 
describe the states and transitions in System S1. Both figures are semantically 
equivalent, but Figure 25, in which states belonging to State 3 are grouped, is more 
readable and less cluttered. Transition triggered by Event 8 in State 3.1 is required to be 
represented once in the parent-state State 3, as opposed to every sub-state in Figure 24.  
This significance is especially clear when there is need for the decomposition to be 
constructed into several levels (e.g. State 3.1.1, State 3.1.2 ...).   
78 
 
 
Figure 24: Simple state machine without hierarchy  
 
Figure 25: Simple state machine with hierarchy  
Decomposition of states into sub-states is useful, but a state machine hierarchy should 
ideally also capture the physical and logical decomposition of the system into 
subsystems and components, which as mentioned earlier, can be represented in the 
functional model in the early stage or architectural model in the later stage of 
development.  (Papadopoulos, 2000) describes how decomposition of a dynamic model 
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can be framed around the decomposition of its static structural model. For each (sub) 
system in the static hierarchy, a state machine is constructed to describe their 
behavioural transformations. For example, Figure 26 illustrates this relationship 
between static hierarchical model of System S and its subsystems, and their dynamic 
hierarchical model in state machines. System S can be structurally decomposed into 
subsystems S1, S2 and S3; while subsystem S1 is further decomposed into component 
C1, C2 and C3. The top level of the dynamic model represents the main operational 
states of the system S1, and transitions between them; the second level represents the 
behavioural states of the subsystems S1, S2, and S3.  And the lowest level represents 
behavioural states of component C1, C2 and C3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
System S  
S1 
S2 
S3 
System S  S
1 
Static model for system and 
subsystem s 
Dynamic model for system and 
subsystem s 
S 
S1 
S2 
S3 
Subsystem S1  
C1 
C2 
C3 
C1 
C2 
C3 
Figure 26: Relationships between static and dynamic models hierarchy of the system 
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3.6.1.3 Hierarchical Modelling in NuSMV  
Hierarchy and decomposition in NuSMV models are managed through modules. The 
top-most module of the hierarchy needs to be declared as the main module. Modules, 
except for the main module, can instantiate multiple modules; and likewise a module 
can be instantiated by one or more other modules. Variables in a module can be local or 
global, and they can be accessed globally using path names.  
For example, Figure 28 shows an excerpt of a NuSMV model representing the state 
machine shown in Figure 27. Sub-state St1 is modelled in a separate module, and sub-
state St1a can be referenced as St1.St1a. Events can be managed locally or globally. 
Events which are managed by other modules can be passed to corresponding modules as 
input parameters. Other parameters can be included to allow management of transitions 
and control. For example, additional variables can be assigned to manage activation of 
states (i.e. to inform sub-states whether parent-state is active) or to define which sub-
state becomes active initially when the parent-state is activated. These allow transitions 
and control in AND/OR states to be managed accordingly.  
Further discussion on semantics of NuSMV can be found in (Cavada et al., 2005).  
 
Figure 27: Sample state chart for S1 
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3.6.2 Modelling the Dynamic Failure Behaviour of a System 
The ability to capture system dynamic behaviour as part of the overall safety analysis 
process is vital because we need to understand how the system behaves not only during 
its normal operational conditions, but also in the presence of failures. In this section, we 
explore further the dynamic modelling of system failure behaviour, particularly in the 
construction of dynamic failure models and the information that can be obtained from 
their analysis. 
Depending on the level of detail that they contain and their position in the IACoB 
design lifecycle, state machines in this discussion can be loosely grouped into two 
types: “abstract” state machine and more “refined” state machines. Abstract state 
machines are generally used to refer to the state machines that are created at early 
design stage (e.g. during development of functional model). Refined state machines 
refer to the state machines constructed at later stage (e.g. during development of 
architectural model). Construction of an abstract state machine generally focuses on 
modelling the delivery of the system functions. Construction of a refined state machine, 
MODULE S1 (...) 
VAR  
state : {St1,St2}; 
E1: boolean;  
E2: boolean; 
E3: boolean; 
E4: boolean; 
 
St1: Sub_St1(E3,E4,...); 
 
... 
 
ASSIGN  
init (state):= St1; 
next(state):=case  
state = St1 & E1: St2;  
state = St2 & E2: St1;  
1: state;  
esac;  
 
... 
 
MODULE Sub_St1 (E3, E4, ...) 
VAR 
state: {St1a, St1b}; 
ASSIGN 
init (state):= St1a;  
next(state):=case 
state = St1a & E3: St1b;  
state = St1b & E4: St1a;  
1: state; 
esac;  
... 
Figure 28: Modules to model hierarchy in NuSMV 
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on the other hand, focuses more on exploiting hierarchical links and the topology of the 
system to manage the failure-related transition triggers between state machines of the 
components. These are also discussed further in the following sections.  
3.6.2.1 Abstract Functional State Machine  
Early development process revolves around the construction and analysis of the 
functional model. At this stage, dynamic behaviour can be expressed as a set of different 
functional states of the system and transitions between them. A functional state in turn 
is defined by the set of functions delivered by the system in this state. (Papadopoulos, 
2000) calls such states “modes” and defines a process for the construction and analysis 
of abstract state machines (or mode charts) that contain transitions among such modes.  
This type of abstract state machine modelling plays a major part in the IACoB process 
as the introduction of safety-driven system mechanisms assisted by interpretation of the 
FMEA table brings new challenges in its safety analysis process.  Failure in a function 
can cause occurrence of failure in other functions, or trigger the activation of other 
dormant functions. This in turn, changes the structure, interrelations and dependencies 
between the functions, and inevitably the failure propagation. The modelling and study 
of these new system dynamics pose new challenges for static assessment techniques like 
FTA. To address these problems and help model the dynamic behaviour, abstract state 
machines are used to describe the transition of the system from one state to another as 
the functional characteristics change. The advantage of including state machines here is 
twofold: 
 Firstly, it helps to identify the fault tolerance mechanisms that can be introduced 
to the design by showing how the system can experience transition gracefully 
into the non-critical states after experiencing failures.  
 Secondly, the abstract state machine captures dynamic system behaviour in a 
higher level manner. It retains the state/transitions information that enables it to 
provide input to formal verification/model checker tools.  
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3.6.2.2 Mode chart to Represent Abstract State Machine  
Mode 
In this thesis, the term mode is adopted to define the notion of a “functional state in 
which the system maintains a stable functional profile” as in (Papadopoulos, 2000). 
Mode is thus used to describe different phases of operations, in which the system 
behaves and functions in different ways. In a similar way, „mode‟ is a more precise term 
that can be used to replace „state‟ in an abstract state machine. Therefore it is adopted in 
this section to describe the application of an abstract state machine. The term „mode 
chart‟ is subsequently used instead of state chart to more precisely represent this type of 
state machine.  
General types of mode that are used in the modelling of abstract state machines can be 
categorized as into the following:  
1. Normal mode  
2. Degraded mode 
3. Failed mode  
The system is said to be in normal mode when it delivers its predefined set of functions. 
Degraded mode describes the condition where a system delivers part of the intended 
functionality safely, whereas failed mode refers to the condition where there is complete 
loss of function or the system behaves in an unpredictable and hazardous manner. This 
implies that in cases when the system loses even only one of its many functions, if the 
lost function happens to be critical and has catastrophic effects on the system as a 
whole, the system is said to be in failed mode.  
Modes and Their Roles in Fault Tolerance  
Although this general classification of system modes is based upon delivery of 
functions, degraded and failed modes can be further divided into sub-categories as there 
are several well-established ways to categorize failures (and subsequently how these 
modes can possibly be further classified in relation to the response or nature of 
causative failures). For example, the general fault classification table presented in (Suri, 
1995) outlines different types of faults according to different criteria such as: activity 
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(latent and active), duration (transient and permanent), causes (random and generic) and 
so forth. Here however, focus is placed on time-based classification. Degraded and 
failed modes can be categorized into temporary and permanent. A system is said to be 
in temporary degraded or temporary failed mode when the system has lost its normal 
functionality, but action can be taken to restore the normal mode. The system is said to 
be in permanent degraded or failed mode when it is no longer recoverable.   
This classification and introduction of degraded modes is part of the effort to gain better 
understanding of the implementation of fault tolerance in early designs. Failures in (sub) 
systems should be compensated and managed in such way that their impacts leading to 
hazardous system failure are minimized. An abstract state machine is therefore designed 
to capture how degraded modes can act as potential buffers to divert hazardous failures.  
One way to achieve this goal of fault tolerance is through introduction of redundant 
structures. In a more detailed design, redundancy can be implemented in the hardware, 
software, or information domain. For early design, we assume these are encapsulated as 
a more generic entity referred to as a module, which represents a function that can be 
refined accordingly into a system or component at a later stage.  
Basic approaches to redundancy can be classified into static and dynamic redundancy. 
Static (also known as passive) redundancy does not detect or perform active action to 
control failures, but rather masks the failures to prevent failure propagation. Dynamic 
(also known as active) redundancy employs fault detection, diagnosis and 
reconfigurations. Hybrid redundancy combines both static and dynamic where masking 
is used to prevent propagation of failures and error detections, diagnosis and 
reconfigurations are also used to handle faulty components.  
In static redundancy, modules are replicated according to the desired fault tolerance 
capability. Majority voting is typically used as the selection mechanism to decide on the 
correct output. To avoid single points of failure, voters can be duplicated and moved to 
the inputs of the modules.  
Dynamic redundancy, on the other hand, uses less module duplication at the cost of 
heavier information processing. A minimal configuration consists of two modules (one 
main module and one standby module) performing the same functions. Fault detection 
and reconfiguration modules can be included for support. A fault detection module 
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monitors the outputs and when failure is detected in the main module, a reconfiguration 
module switches from delivering the output of the main module to delivering the output 
of the backup module. There are two types of standby in dynamic redundancy: hot 
standby (where standby module is continuously active) and cold standby (where 
standby module is activated only when needed).  
In the context of the IACoB process, these fault tolerant mechanisms are often 
formulated after the CSA phase (FTA/FMEA). The construction of abstract state 
machines (and subsequently identification of degraded modes) essentially provides a 
state where these fault-tolerance strategies can be considered and taken into account into 
the overall system behaviour, and these strategies can be refined within the design 
progress.   
Events and Transitions 
Transitions between modes can be caused by:  
 Normal events that cause the system to deliver different sets of functions. Such 
events cause a phase change in a phased-mission system. 
 Failure events that causes the system to lose part or all of its functionality (e.g. 
normal transforming to degraded mode).  
 Event that indicates restoration of functionality following failure (degraded modes 
back to normal mode).  
Note that transitions are not only triggered by external events, i.e. stimuli from users 
and the environment. A transformation at a higher level of a mode chart can occur 
because of an event that occurs in the lower level, or by the occurrence of logical 
combinations of lower-level transitions. This allows us to capture the failure 
propagation of the system because as we move upwards from the lower level to the 
higher level, the mode charts capture how deviations or failure in the lower level (sub 
systems) affects the mode changes in higher level. Figure 29 illustrates this type of 
transitions triggered by internal events.  At the higher level (level 1), the system 
changes its mode from normal to degraded when failure in subsystem S1 occur 
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(S1_Fail). Lower-level (level 2) state machines looks into how subsystem S1 reaches its 
fail mode after failure in C1 and C2 occur. 
 
Figure 29:  Mode charts showing high level and low level of system state transitions 
Communications between mode charts can be established between different levels in 
these ways:  
 Horizontal communication (peer charts) – transition results in an action that 
triggers other transitions in the same level of the chart.  
 Vertical communication (Parents and sub charts) – transition in lower level 
mode chart triggers a transition in the higher level charts, and vice versa. 
Upwards communication where lower level charts can initiate an event that acts 
as the trigger for an action that activates a transition in higher level charts is 
common when the model aims to show how failures in subsystem trigger higher-
level system failures.  
One benefit of this organization technique is the ability to efficiently identify the 
relationship between transitions. Transition labels can be categorized according to the 
failure propagation points. One systematic method to identify possible failure-related 
(Level 1) System S Mode chart  
(Level 2) System S1 Mode chart  
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events that trigger transitions from one mode of a system to another is through the 
observation of the system‟s:  
1. Peer-system‟s failure (same level) – a transition event in an immediate structural 
(input) block can trigger a transition event in another block.  
2. Subsystem‟s failure (lower level) – a transition event in a lower level subsystem 
can trigger a transition event in a higher level system  
3. Internal failure – internal malfunction of a block itself can be the basic cause of 
the transition.  
3.6.3 Translation of FMEA Results to an Abstract State Machine  
To construct system modes at an early functional level we need to identify system 
functional configurations and their possible transformations. To construct the events, we 
need to determine possible transitions between these configurations. At the same time, 
the FTA/FMEA results derived from previous stages provide information on failure 
relationship between functions. These results allow us to establish failure propagation 
and shows the effects (and criticality) of a failure event on the output function.  
3.6.3.1 FMEA-MODECHART Assistance Table  
Here we propose the construction of an assistance table to effectively identify and 
capture significant variables from the FMEA results for the main elements of mode 
chart. The table aims to organize information gathering from FTA/FMEA into a more 
systematic process of mode chart construction, as opposed to the traditional ad-hoc 
process.  This assistance table is organized to identify:  system modes, severity of each 
mode, output functions delivered in that mode, failure event(s) causing transition, and 
target mode(s) this transition leads to. 
This information can be obtained from the previous IACoB processes. “Modes” are 
derived from previous FHA analysis where output function failures have been 
categorized according to their failure severity. The severity assessment process allows 
us to establish which function failures are tolerable, and which function failures are 
intolerable. It is then possible to categorize the delivery (or not) of these functions into 
88 
 
different modes. Failure to deliver functions that do not lead to hazardous effects is 
tolerable, and generally leads to degraded mode. Hazardous failure is intolerable and 
leads to a failed mode. This essentially allows us to establish graceful degradation for 
the system in the presence of failures. 
The “Functions Delivered” column outlines lists of (output) functions delivered in the 
particular mode. This information can be obtained during the grouping of modes 
according to the functions delivered. “Functional Failure Causing Transition” describes 
the type of failure event that can occur (i.e. deviation in each of the corresponding 
output function). This information can be obtained from each of the output function 
which has been annotated with failure behaviour. Finally, “Target Mode” defines the 
mode a particular failure event leads to during a transition.  
With this key information (modes and events which trigger transformations) now 
gathered in the assistance table, the process of constructing the abstract state machine is 
relatively straightforward.  
Table 5 shows an example of an assistance table for the sample system presented in 
Figure 18. The first mode identified is System_Normal, where all output functions 
(Function F7, F8 and F9) are delivered. Each output function is susceptible to an 
omission failure which results in the inability of the system to deliver the particular 
function. From the earlier FFA, Function F8 is identified as a critical function, and this 
brings us to the second mode, System_Degraded. In System_Degraded mode, output 
function F8 is delivered regardless of the condition of function F7 or F9. System mode 
goes to System_Fail when omission in Function F8 occurs. Please note that even in the 
System_Degraded or System_Fail mode, Function F7 and/or Function F9 can still be 
delivered. It is also possible to include other degraded modes to further define the 
delivery (or not) of Function F7 or Function F9 if necessary.  
Table 5: FMEA-ModeChart Assistance Table   
Mode  Severity  Functions 
Delivered  
Functional 
Failure Causing 
Transition  
Target  Mode  
System_Normal - Function F7 Omission of 
Function F7 (O-
F7) 
System_Degraded 
Function F8  Omission of System_Fail  
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Function F8 (O-
F8) 
Function F9 Omission of 
Function F9 (O-
F9)  
System_Degraded 
System_Degraded Marginal  Function F8  Omission of 
Function F8  
System_Fail  
System_Fail Hazardous - - - 
Figure 30 illustrates an example of the mode chart which can be constructed based on 
the assistance Table 5 above.  
 
Figure 30: Example of mode chart constructed from FMEA-ModeChart Assitance Table  
It is important to note that events that can occur in a mode are not limited to the ones 
listed in “Functional Failure Causing Transition”.  This column helps to draw focus on 
events that are significant enough to affect delivery of functions (thus causing transition 
between modes). In some cases, it is possible to have dormant failures in a mode where 
occurrence of a failure doesn‟t cause transition from a mode until another failure occurs. 
This can potentially cause almost-immediate transition from normal mode to fail mode.  
One way to manage this is by fully taking into account all possible failure occurrence in 
a mode and if necessary, by creating another intermediate degraded mode to manage 
dormant failure (for example, where alarm was raised) so that system does not move 
from normal to fail mode in succession. An example of this is shown in Chapter 4.  
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3.6.4 Translation of HiP-HOPS Failure Annotations to a Refined State 
Machine  
Once the information on lower level components become more available, it is possible 
to refine transition triggers in the once-abstract mode charts. At this stage, it is no longer 
as significant, although it is still possible, to define the „modes‟ based on delivery of 
component outputs (compared to the definition of mode according to the delivery of 
system functions earlier).  
While the analysis of FTA/FMEA in earlier stages and the use of assistances table can 
help in the generation of an abstract state machine, the generation of a more refined 
state machine at a later stage involves a slightly different approach. This is because, 
unlike abstract state machines, most information required for failure-relevant transitions 
in more refined state machines can be obtained directly from HiP-HOPS component 
failure annotations.  
It is important to note that our mode charts are not tied to any commercial state chart 
tool. It is possible to use available commercial tools like Matlab Stateflow or Statemate 
to provide graphical description. Converter tools are available (sf2smv 
(Banphawatthanarak et al., 1999), (Bobbie, 2001), stm2smv (Loer, 2003), or mdl2smv 
(Juarez-Dominguez et al., 2008)) to convert state machine models from these 
commercial tools into model checking input models. While the use of intuitive interface 
(Barfield, 2004) and graphical tools is helpful for acceptance, (Schatz et al., 2002) 
highlights that it is not essential for the concept. Also, to perform model checking, the 
state machines eventually need to be converted into model checking input models.  
For these reasons, here we explore how the more refined mode-charts representing 
behaviours of lower-level designs can be expressed directly as a NuSMV model.  
Each component block is represented as a module in NuSMV. Information flow 
between blocks of components can be modelled through the use of module parameters. 
These parameters provide links between the output (port) of a source component to the 
input (port) of a target component. In a similar manner, these input parameters are also 
used to relay and model the failure propagation between components. It is important to 
91 
 
note that because multiple failure types could occur at one output, all of the deviations 
need to be passed to the target component input parameters.  
The basic of HiP-HOPS failure expression can be represented as:  
Output_deviation = Internal_malfunction AND/OR Input_Deviation 
 
This expression can be incorporated into the NuSMV model by assigning the output 
deviations as the corresponding module internal variables. These output deviations are 
passed along as module parameters to other components/modules at the receiving end of 
the information flow. Internal malfunctions are defined within modules too, and once an 
internal malfunction occurs, it is assumed to be persistent throughout the entire run, 
unless correcting event is specified and triggered. Input deviations for failures 
propagated by other components are defined through the modules input variables.  
For example, given HiP-HOPS failure expression:  O-O.out = O-in1 + BEA1 + BEA2, 
the generated NuSMV model from the annotated HiP-HOPS model can be seen in the 
following NuSMV model excerpt. Output deviations and each component basic events 
are declared as Boolean data types. All basic events are initialised to hold value 0 as the 
system starts operation in normal mode. Lastly, as basic events are assumed to be 
permanent, its next value will remain as „1‟ if the current value is „1‟. 
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It is perhaps important to note that the current translation from HiP-HOPS annotation to 
NuSMV model is performed manually. And because the extracted behaviour is based on 
failure annotation, the NuSMV module produced is essentially a failure-extended model 
(error model). This model can eventually be extended to include further relevant 
nominal behaviour, or be integrated with nominal model if the nominal model was 
developed in parallel (please see chapter on future work).  
3.6.5 Refinement of Events to Maintain Traceability  
Refinement refers to the process of providing a system solution with more details or 
precision in an incremental development process. This includes the process of adding 
more constraints and developing details of system/component attributes. Refinement of 
a design often traverses abstraction levels and captures sub systems. In a later design 
phase, these subsystems are further refined by adding more constraints, including non-
functional aspects, and by improving the model solutions.  
The refinement process will affect both structural and behavioural elements of a system. 
Dynamic behavioural models need to reflect and capture refinement of behavioural 
decomposition. Structural refinement is captured through the decomposition of the 
physical system into sub-systems. As discussed earlier, structural decomposition in a 
MODULE module1(O-in1,...)  
 
VAR 
O-O.out: boolean ; 
BEA1 : boolean ; 
BEA2 : boolean ; 
... 
ASSIGN 
init (BEA1) := 0 ; 
init (BEA2) := 0 ; 
O-O.out := O-in1 | BEA1 | BEA2  ;  
next (BEA1) := case  
BEA1 =1 : 1 ; 
1 : {1,0} ;  
esac;  
next (BEA2) := case  
BEA2 =1 : 1 ; 
1 : {1,0} ;  
esac; 
 
... 
Input Deviation  
Internal 
Malfunction  
Failure 
Expression for O-
O.out   
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NuSMV model is represented as individual NuSMV modules. Similarly, refinement for 
behavioural models can be achieved through the decomposition of modes into sub-
modes.  
A systematic management of the decomposition process helps to provide good 
traceability. Traceability refers to the ability to maintain and navigate the relations 
between different stages of the model and manage that information. Such relations 
should allow designers/analysts to follow the evolution of the design more closely and 
establish connections between earlier and later design models.  
We believe that - in addition to facilitating decomposition - a systematic process of 
event refinement (especially those events relating to failure behaviours) contributes to 
better traceability. One way to achieve this is through clear communication and linking 
between events in earlier abstract design models and more detailed events in later 
models. Well-established traceability between early and later models is particularly 
useful in situations where errors are discovered through model checking, in which case 
it is possible to trace errors to earlier design decisions and eventually investigate and re-
evaluate their effects on high-level design assumptions and goals.  
Here we aim to provide methodological guidelines to assist event refinement 
systematically. This can be achieved by two main approaches: 1) refinement of events 
through minimal cut sets and 2) refinement of events through compositional annotation.  
They are discussed further in the following sections.  
3.6.5.1 Refinement of events through minimal cut sets 
The first possible way to refine a state machine is by replacing the transition event 
expression with its causing events. As the transition events are losses of functions or 
malfunctions which form top events of fault trees in HiP-HOPS, the causing events can 
be effectively obtained and mapped from HiP-HOPS FTA/FMEA results. For each top 
event, its minimal cut sets can essentially be used to form the replacement expressions.  
This approach works well in several scenarios. It is appropriate for situations where 
focus is placed more on the verification of behavioural modes in higher level abstract 
systems compared to behavioural modes in refined individual subsystems. This usually 
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means that the verification process aims to explore the effects of the lower level 
subsystem failures on the modes changes at the higher level, instead of exploring the 
nominal dynamic behaviour for each of the subsystem.  
The following example is presented to illustrate this further. Figure 31  presents an 
abstract model that describes system A. System A is then gradually refined into 
subsystems A1, A2, A3, and A4. The refinement allows us to update the abstract 
dynamic model for system A to take into account failure events occurring in the lower 
level subsystems.  
 
 
  
Abstract system A (in earlier stage)   
Refined subsystems of A (in later stage)   
Figure 31: Refinement for system A  
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Presented in the following is the failure information of system A and subsystems A1, 
A2, A3, A4. Subsystems A1,A2 and A4 are assumed to simply have one failure type, 
Omission (O-A1, O-A2, O-A4 respectively) caused by corresponding internal failures 
BEA1, BEA2, BEA4. Subsystem A3 has both Omission and Value failure types which 
are caused by internal failures BEA3 and VBEA3 respectively.  The following table 
summarizes the failure behaviour:  
Table 6: Failure behaviour for System A and Subsystems A1, A2, A3, A4  
System / 
Subsystem  
Internal 
Malfunctions  
Output 
Deviations  
Description of Output 
Deviation  
Causes of Output 
Deviation (Output 
Deviation Failure 
Expression)  
A  - O-A.out1 Omission deviation in output 
1 (out1) of system A  
O-A3.out 
O-A.out2  Omission deviation in output 
2 (out2) of system A 
O-A4.out  
  V-A.out1  Value deviation in output 
1(out 1) of system A 
V-A3.out 
A1 BEA1 O-A1.out Omission deviation in output 
(out) of subsystem A1  
BEA1 
A2 BEA2 O-A2.out Omission deviation in output 
(out) of subsystem A2 
BEA2 
A3  BEA3 O-A3.out Omission deviation in output 
(out) of subsystem A3  
BEA3 OR (O-A3.in1 
AND O-A3.in2) 
 VBEA3 V-A3.out  Value deviation in output 
(out) of subsystem A3 
VBEA3 
A4  BEA4 O-A4.out Omission deviation in output 
(out) of subsystem A4  
O-A4.in1 AND 
BEA4 
System A can be operated in several abstract functional modes, namely Mode1, Mode2, 
Mode3, Mode 4 and Mode5. System A starts with nominal Mode1 when there is no 
failure occurrence. From Mode1, it either moves to Mode2 when O-A.out1 occurs, or 
moves to Mode3 when O-A.out2 occurs. If both O-A.out1 and O-A.out2 occur, it 
moves to Mode4.  Mode5 occurs when system A experiences a V-A.out1 failure.  We 
assume that the severity analysis process has identified Mode4 to be hazardous. The 
abstract mode chart for this abstract model can be seen in Figure 32:  
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Figure 32: Mode chart for system A 
From the tabulated failure information in Table 6, HiP-HOPS produces the following 
minimal cut sets for each of the system output failures:  
O-A.out1 = {BEA1.BEA2 , BEA3}  
O-A.out2 = {BEA2.BEA4}  
V-A.out1 = {VBEA3} 
These analysis results allow us to refine the abstract state machine of system A (Figure 
32) into a more refined state machine (Figure 33) which takes into account failure 
propagations of its subsystems in the event transitions. The event transit ions are now 
expressed fully in terms of the components internal malfunctions.  
 
Figure 33: Refined transitions for System A 
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Subsequently, the expression of mode charts in the NuSMV input language enables us 
to verify various (generic) requirement specifications , for example “If failure in 
subsystem A4 does not occur, hazardous Mode4 shall not occur”, which in this 
example, is relatively straightforward. 
AG(!BEA4 → !(SystemMode = Mode4)); 
The checking of this property can also be arguably performed through manual analysis 
of FMEA results table to establish the effects of causing events (and their combinations) 
on the corresponding output deviations. For example, by manually working through the 
FMEA table to decide if any combination of all basic events without BEA4 can lead to 
failure “O-A.out1 AND O-A.out2” (Mode4). It is also possible to perform this via FTA 
by studying the minimal cut sets. However, this could become inconvenient for larger 
systems with more complicated modes. The translation into the model checking input 
language allows verification to be done more quickly and automatically.  In addition to 
that, this formal analysis via model-checking is also able to take into consideration other 
nominal behaviour which is not captured by the FMEA. 
With this approach, focus is placed on the abstract high-level system mode chart, which 
is often sufficiently contained within the NuSMV Main Module. One of the advantages 
of adopting the results from CSA is the easy representation of both deviations and 
component basic events in NuSMV as Boolean data types. Here, failure logic is used 
instead of success logic, meaning that instead of defining output(s) of the system 
according to the outputs of subsystems, output deviations are defined by failures in 
subsystems. This is done by assigning to it the corresponding minimal cut sets.  
One downside of this approach is the fact that focus is placed on the abstract mode chart 
and how the occurrence of internal malfunctions affects the abstract system modes. 
Little attention is placed on the other non-failure relevant behaviour of subsystems 
(although they can be included if necessary). Also, these internal malfunctions are 
modelled within the main module (therefore not benefiting from any hierarchical 
structure). An example of the generated NuSMV model from an annotated HiP-HOPS 
model can be seen in the following NuSMV model excerpt:  
MODULE main 
 
VAR 
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BEA1 : boolean ; 
BEA2 : boolean ; 
BEA3 : boolean ; 
Mode : {Mode1, Mode2 };  
... 
ASSIGN 
init (BEA1) := 0 ; 
init (BEA2) := 0 ; 
init (BEA3) := 0 ; 
... 
init (Mode) := Mode1;  
O-O.out := BEA3 | BEA2 & BEA1  ;  
next (BEA1) := case  
BEA1 =1 : 1 ; 
1 : {1,0} ;  
esac;  
next (BEA2) := case  
BEA2 =1 : 1 ; 
1 : {1,0} ;  
esac; 
next (BEA3) := case  
BEA3 =1 : 1 ; 
1 : {1,0} ;  
esac; 
next (Mode):= case  
Mode = Mode1 & O-O.out : Mode2; 
1: Mode;  
... 
3.6.5.2 Refinement of Events through Compositional Annotation  
This approach extends the previous approach by focusing not only on the abstract high 
level mode chart, but also by modelling each subsystem‟s behaviour in its own module. 
It captures and reflects the functional hierarchy by constructing independent mode 
charts and NuSMV modules for each function (subsystem), which in turn allows non-
failure related behaviours of each subsystem to be effectively modelled and considered 
in their roles of contributing to system failures.  
To effectively link failure behaviour to input modules and capture the structural 
topology, transition events (labels) are maintained in a similar structure similar to the 
ones in HiP-HOPS failure annotations for system and subsystem output deviations. This 
means they are expressed in terms of input deviations and internal malfunction events.  
To illustrate this approach using the previous example (Figure 31), the failure behaviour 
for System A and Subsystem A1, A2, A3, A4 can be modelled in the following mode 
charts, each capturing their failure expressions in the transition labels:   
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The compositional failure annotation in HiP-HOPS also allows systematic generation of 
a NuSMV model for the system and subsystems. Each NuSMV module contains 
information about internal malfunctions, input deviations and the definition of output 
deviations, all of which are obtainable from component failure annotations. Like HiP-
HOPS, flow of information is obtained through the structural topology. The „higher-
level‟ module SystemA manages these connections and the flow of information between 
subsystems by passing the output variables of a source subsystem to the input 
parameters of target subsystem during module initiation. This allows linking between 
components to be established and subsequently connect input deviation to 
corresponding output deviations.  
Figure 35 to Figure 39 illustrates the connection between components annotated with 
HiP-HOPS failure data and their corresponding NuSMV models which shows the 
hierarchical structure and failure propagations of these subsystems:   
 
Figure 34: Mode charts for system (and subsystems of) A 
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MODULE SystemA    
 
VAR 
A1: SubsystemA1; 
A2: SubsystemA2; 
A3: SubsystemA3 (A1.O-A1.out, A2.O-
A2.out); 
A4: SubsystemA4 (A2.O-A2.out);  
Mode : {Mode1, Mode2, Mode3, Mode4, 
Mode5};  
O-A.out1 : boolean; 
O-A.out2 : boolean; 
V-A.out1 : boolean; 
 
ASSIGN 
init (Mode) :=Mode1; 
O-A.out1 := A3.O-A3.out;  
O-A.out2 := A4.O-A4.out;  
V-A.out1 := A3.V-A3.out;  
 
next(Mode) := case 
Mode = Mode1 & O-A.out1 : Mode2;  
Mode = Mode1 & O-A.out2 : Mode3;  
Mode = Mode1 & V-A.out1 : Mode5;  
Mode = Mode2 & O-A.out2 : Mode4;  
Mode = Mode3 & O-A.out1 : Mode4;  
Mode = Mode3 & V-A.out1 : Mode5;  
Mode = Mode5 & O-A.out1 : Mode2;  
1: Mode;  
esac; 
... 
Figure 35: NuSMV model for system A   
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MODULE SubsystemA3 (O-in1, O-
in2)  
 
VAR 
O-A3.out: boolean ; 
V-A3.out: boolean; 
BEA3 : boolean ; 
VBEA3 : boolean ; 
Mode: {Normal, Fail};  
 
ASSIGN 
 
init (BEA3) := 0 ; 
init (VBEA3):= 0 ; 
init (Mode) := Normal;  
O-A3.out := BEA3 | (O-in1 & O-
in2) ; 
V-A3.out := VBEA3 ;  
 
next (BEA3) := case  
BEA3 =1 : 1 ; 
1 : {1,0} ;  
esac;  
 
next (VBEA3) := case  
BEA3 =1 : 1 ; 
1 : {1,0} ;  
esac;  
 
next(Mode) := case 
Mode = Normal & O-A3.out : 
Fail;  
1: Mode;  
esac; 
 
O-in1  
O-in2  
Failure propagation of 
SubsystemA3  
O-A3.out  
V-A3.out  
BEA3  
O-A1.out 
O-A2.out 
Figure 36: Failure propagation for subsystem A3 
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MODULE SubsystemA1 
 
VAR 
O-A1.out: boolean ; 
BEA1 : boolean ; 
Mode: {Normal, Fail};  
 
ASSIGN 
init (BEA1) := 0 ; 
init (Mode) := Normal;  
O-A1.out := BEA1;  
 
next (BEA1) := case  
BEA1 =1 : 1 ; 
1 : {1,0} ;  
esac;  
 
next(Mode) := case 
Mode = Normal & O-A1.out : Fail;  
1: Mode;  
esac; 
 
 
O-A1.out  
BEA1 
Failure propagation of 
SubsystemA1 
 
MODULE SubsystemA4 (O-in1)  
 
VAR 
O-A4.out: boolean; 
BEA4: boolean; 
Mode: {Normal, Fail};  
 
ASSIGN 
init (BEA4) := 0 ; 
init (Mode) := Normal;  
O-A4.out := BEA4 & O-in1;  
 
next (BEA4) := case  
BEA4 =1 : 1 ; 
1 : {1,0} ;  
esac;  
 
next(Mode) := case 
Mode = Normal & O-A4.out : 
Fail;  
1: Mode;  
esac; 
 
 
O-in1  
O-A4.out  
BEA4  
O-A2.out 
Failure propagation of 
SubsystemA4 
Figure 37: Failure propagation for subsystem A4 
Figure 38: Failure propagation for subsystem A1 
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One of the benefits of systematic establishment of connections and failure propagation 
is a better traceability between design models.  It allows the designer to visit earlier 
models to see if they are still correct and re-examine any design decisions that were 
made based on the analyses of these systems. This subsequently enables verification of 
early hypotheses as details become more available. If errors are discovered during 
model checking on these NuSMV models, it is possible to trace the errors to earlier 
design decisions and investigate the effects of early assumptions.  
In summary, the input, process and output of this process are:  
Input   Functional model annotated with failure information  
 FMEA results showing relationship between failures   
Process   Identification of modes (states) and events  
 Construction of state machines from FTA/FMEA results  
Output  System state machines  
 NuSMV model  
MODULE SubsystemA1 
 
VAR 
O-A2.out: boolean ; 
BEA2 : boolean ; 
Mode: {Normal, Fail};  
 
ASSIGN 
init (BEA2) := 0 ; 
init (Mode) := Normal;  
O-A2.out := BEA2;  
 
next (BEA2) := case  
BEA2 =1 : 1 ; 
1 : {1,0} ;  
esac;  
 
next(Mode) := case 
Mode = Normal & O-A1.out : Fail;  
1: Mode;  
esac; 
 
 
O-A2.out  
BEA2 
Failure propagation of 
SubsystemA2 
 
Figure 39: Failure propagation for subsystem A2  
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3.7 Application of Model Checking  
Once state machines are constructed and translated into the model checking input 
language, formal methods can be used to validate system requirements.  
The background of model checking has been introduced in chapter 2. In this section, 
attention is primarily drawn to the value of model checking as part of IACoB in early 
design stages; classes of requirements and properties that can be verified; and common 
errors discovered through early application of model checking.  
General steps involved in this process are:  
1. Generation of a NuSMV model  
2. Creation of a specification that defines a property which is required of 
the model  
3. Running of model checker 
4. Model checker produces confirmation statement if the property holds or  
produces a counter example if the property is breached 
5. Based on the results of the model checker, analysis takes place to 
determine whether modifications are required for: 
i. Design of model  
ii. Formulation of properties  
System specifications and requirements which are expressed in temporal logic can 
generally be classified into different categories.  (Bérard et al., 2001) distinguishes these 
properties that can be verified by a model checker into: reachability, safety, liveness and 
fairness properties. 
3.7.1  Reachability 
Reachability properties define that a particular configuration φ (a state in the Kripke 
structure) of the model can be reached. Three possible variations of such properties can 
be distinguished, as shown in the following CTL logic:  
 Reachability from the current state: EF φ 
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 Reachability from any execution state: AG EF φ 
 Reachability from under some condition σ: E[σ U φ]  
3.7.2 Safety  
Safety properties define that under certain conditions, configuration φ never occurs. 
This can only be proven if all execution paths are explored, therefore a CTL logic that 
can be used to specify this is:  
AG (! φ) 
 
A common application of a safety property is the analysis of mutual exclusions. For 
example, a CTL expression that specifies σ and φ are to be mutually exclusive:  
AG !(σ ˄ φ) 
 
Safety properties can also be used to formulate configurations where a desired property 
holds:  
AG φ 
 
3.7.3 Liveness  
Liveness properties define that under certain conditions, a Kripke state where 
configuration φ holds will eventually be reached.  
One common application of a liveness property is the analysis of response to 
configurations. For example, a specification which states that whenever σ holds, 
eventually a state must be reached where φ holds:  
AG (σ -> AF φ) 
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It is also possible to specify in a liveness property that whenever σ holds, some 
responding state where φ holds will be visited within m to n time units. Time in 
NuSMV can only be measured qualitatively in terms of execution steps. Abounded 
liveness property specifies when some response is required.  In NuSVM, this bounded 
liveness properties can be formulated in CTL:  
AG (σ -> ABF m..n φ) 
 
3.7.4 Fairness 
Fairness properties define that under certain conditions, states where some property φ 
holds will occur infinitely often.  
Fairness properties are expressed in LTL, and are not expressible in CTL format 
because it is not possible to specify that some expression holds repeatedly (Huth &  
Ryan,2000). In NuSMV, fairness constraints can be introduced with the inclusion of 
“FAIRNESS φ;” which corresponds to  
GF φ 
 
in LTL, this expression defines that state φ holds continuously without interruption.  
3.7.5 Common Errors Discovered Through Model Checking  
Considering the fact that the general application of model checking has been primarily 
targeted at mature design models, it is important to understand and determine its values 
at earlier design stages. (Miller et al., 2003) and (Tribble & Miller, 2003) presented case 
studies which demonstrate that formal models can be effectively used to find errors 
before implementation of the system. One common error found through model checking 
is inaccuracy in the original requirements (or how it was phrased). This generally leads 
to modifications to refine the requirements to be more specific and accurate.  
Other errors could involve situations where more than one input arriving at the same 
time and in combination drives the model into an unsafe state.  There are several ways 
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to deal with simultaneous input events, for example: stating a rule whereby only one 
input variable can change in any step (Miller et al., 2003). Additional logic is included 
to assign priority to multiple events, and when simultaneous input events occurs, lower 
level priority events can either be discarded or stored in a queue for processing in 
succeeding steps.  
(Juarez-Dominiguez, 2008) also highlights the importance of model checking in 
detecting hazardous interactions between system features (e.g. software components). 
These software components which control mechanical components are often developed 
in isolation, and their combination can sometimes cause unexpected or undesired 
system behaviour. Model checking can be used to detect these hazardous combinations 
in a design.  
In chapter 4 and 5, we demonstrate how in practice model-checking can be usefully 
employed to verify or not the satisfaction of properties on behavioural models 
constructed using IACoB method.  
3.8 Potential for Automation 
Currently, the translation process between the different models in IACoB is performed 
manually. In the context of a larger, more complex system, this can become an error-
prone process. To address this, we note the potential for automation in IACoB. The key 
aspects of the process which can be automated include the translation from HiP-HOPS 
annotated model to NuSMV model.   
The construction of NuSMV models from HiP-HOPS annotated model can be achieved 
by mapping the failure information as discussed in section 3.6.4. As mentioned 
previously, this results in a failure-extended NuSMV model (error model). Basic states 
and transitions can be assigned by default for each module. The basic states generally 
include Normal state to describe states where component functions as intended, and Fail 
state(s) to describe states where failure(s) of component occurs. The default transitions 
between these basic states are described using the corresponding events which are the 
causes of the failure.  
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The following is a sketch of hips2smv algorithm. It presents steps which can be used to 
describe the translation process from HiP-HOPS annotation to the NuSMV model. 
For each component, a NuSMV module is created within which the following steps are 
performed: 
 Step 1: Identify input parameters  
The input parameters of a NuSMV module are the input deviations of that component. 
To identify these input deviations, we use HiP-HOPS fault tree synthesis algorithm 
which provides a record of the deviations for each input port of the component.  
 Step 2: Declare the internal variables  
Internal variables which can be assigned automatically from HiP-HOPS models 
typically include the internal malfunctions, output, and output deviations. These are 
declared as Boolean data type.  
 Step 3: Specify initial values for the internal variables  
Initial value of internal malfunction and output deviations are set to 0 by default, 
reflecting the assumption that the system starts from normal state.  
 Step 4: Define output deviation  
Output deviation is defined according to the failure expression provided in HiP-HOPS 
annotation. It is described in terms of basic events and input deviations.  
 Step 5: Specify next value for internal variables  
The „next‟ notion in NuSMV relates current and next state variables to express 
transitions. As mentioned previously, once internal variables occur (set to 1), the next 
value stays at 1 as it is persistent throughout the entire run. Next value of output 
deviation can also be defined here in relation to current value of internal malfunction 
and input deviations.  
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In addition to modules which represent components in the system, a MAIN module is 
also constructed for each NuSMV model to:  
 Construct instances of all component modules.  
 Define the connections between components modules. This is achieved by 
connecting the parameters of each component module‟s input ports (and 
supplying them as input parameters) to the corresponding output ports of other 
module which is connected to it.  
Refinement of these state machine transitions (using ways described in sections 3.6.3 
and 3.6.4) can also be automated. The algorithm for refinement through minimal cut 
sets works by constructing one main NuSMV module to model the internal 
malfunctions of all components. The initial state of the system is set to Normal, and all 
internal malfunctions are set to be absent. The output deviation is defined in terms of its 
minimal cut sets generated from the FTA, as opposed to defining it in terms of input 
deviation and internal malfunctions.  
The refinement through compositional annotation can be achieved using the algorithm 
described above where one NuSMV module is constructed for each component. This 
way, the structural, hierarchical and failure propagation information are retained.   
This automation is particularly useful for refined state machine when establishing 
failure connections between components are more crucial than describing system states 
and therefore it is sufficient to use basic states and transitions.   
However, there are also several aspects of the process that require human intervention.  
In general, human intervention is required to obtain information on the system dynamic 
behaviour which is not captured in the initial CSA model. This may include:  
1) Description of system states  
In addition to the basic states (Normal and Fail states) which are automatically 
assigned, other classifications of system states (for example, degradation states) 
may be required. These inputs need to be manually specified and defined. This is 
particularly important in the early abstract state machines where degradation 
states play important roles in the understanding of system high-level behaviour, 
which are not captured in CSA‟s HiP-HOPS model.  
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2) Description of system transitions  
In addition to basic transitions (from normal to fail states), specification on how 
the system moves from one state to another (for example, to a degraded mode) 
also need to be specified.  
3) Requirement specification  
Requirement specification needs to be manually provided by the analysts in 
terms of CTL.   
These processes which require human intervention can be assisted with improved 
support tool, for example, by extending current editor tool, storing frequently-used 
specifications in a library, or by introducing graphical tool for state machine (please see 
future work session).  
3.9 Chapter Summary  
In summary, this chapter describes the IACoB process which consists of a number of 
key phases, along with the following main activities involved in each phase:  
Phase  Input  Process  Output  
Construction of 
system 
functional 
model 
Or in later 
stage, 
architectural 
model  
Requirements  
Or in later 
stage, a less-
refined model  
Identify, define and relate 
functions  
Translate requirements into 
functional model 
Or in later stage, refinement of 
model 
Functional model 
Or architectural 
model 
Severity 
assessment of 
output function 
(or component)    
System 
functional 
model  
(or 
architectural)   
Estimate risk and classify the 
severity of output function (or 
component) failures based on 
their consequences  
Severity analysis 
of output 
functions 
(components)  
Narrowed focus 
on higher priority 
functions (or 
components)   
Establishing 
local failure 
behaviour  
System model  Establish failure information 
for each functional (or 
architectural) block  
Functional model 
with data 
information  
111 
 
Establish causes 
of output failure 
Fault tree and 
FMEA 
synthesis and 
analysis  
System model 
with local 
failure 
behaviour  
Generate FTA and FMEA for 
system model  
Identify weak points in system 
design 
Effects of failure  
on output function 
(or component)  
Better 
understanding of 
the criticality of 
function (or 
component)  
Generation of 
state machine  
System model 
annotated with 
failure 
information  
FMEA results 
showing 
relationship 
between 
failures 
Identify modes and events  
Construct state machine from 
FTA/FMEA results  
System (abstract) 
state machines 
NuSMV models  
Model 
Checking  
NuSMV model  Apply model checking to 
verify system 
Affirmation or 
counterexample  
The application of the whole process is illustrated in the next chapter. 
Overall, IACoB combines the advantages of compositional safety analysis such as 
simplicity, efficiency and scalability, with the benefits of formal verification such as the 
ability to perform verification of safety requirements on dynamic models of the system. 
This helps increase confidence in the design and leads to an improved model-based 
safety analysis process compared to the reliance of only one technique. In terms of 
identifying potential failures, the part of IACoB which employs CSA focuses on the 
relationship (causes and effects) of failures between components. The application of 
BSA can potentially further uncover errors as it takes into consideration component 
dynamic nominal behaviour (and their interaction with failures).This can potentially 
uncover new failures which have not been anticipated in CSA. For example, weakness 
in the design of logical connections or flow of information between components. This is 
illustrated in the case study presented in Chapter 5.  
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CHAPTER 4. Case Study on Brake-by-wire 
Functional and Behavioural Analysis of a Brake-by-
wire System 
This chapter demonstrates application of the IACoB method. We present a case study 
which explores the design and analysis of a simplified brake-by-wire system for cars. 
The study produces safety analyses which help us to gain better understanding of this 
system. The analysis deliberately starts from a simple model, where fault-tolerant 
functions and other well-established heuristics for good design in such systems have 
been omitted. The idea is to demonstrate how the proposed process could systematically 
help designers arrive at such measures.  
The case study consists of two main system models, namely a purely functional model 
and a model where functions have been allocated to an architecture of components, to 
exemplify different application stages for the process.  
The case study is structured as follows: in section 4.1, the vehicle brake-by-wire system 
is introduced. The safety assessment of this system is discussed in 4.2. Section 4.2.1 to 
4.2.2 describe the construction and analysis of fault trees, FMEA and a mode chart for 
the design. Safety requirement properties are discussed in section 4.2.4 and the system 
design is checked against the predefined list of properties. Section 4.2.5 discusses the 
ways to refine transition events in the mode chart by exploiting results from FMEA. 
This is followed by section 4.3, which presents a scenario where a more detailed 
architectural model for the system is derived. In sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2, both single 
failure and multiple failures FFA, FTA/FMEA are performed for this revised model, the 
relevant mode chart is constructed and the system is again verified against safety 
requirements.  
4.1 Introduction to Brake-By-Wire System 
Brake-by-wire systems are a recent drive-by-wire technology in the automotive 
industry. Drive-by-wire technology employs electronic control systems which use 
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electromechnical actuators to replace traditional hydraulic and mechanical control 
systems. Brake-by-wire systems replace traditional automotive braking components 
(like brake boosters, pumps, and master cylinders) with electronic sensors and actuators. 
Although the application of brake-by-wire is not as widely commercialized in relative 
comparison to its x-by-wire counterparts (x representing commanded action) like 
throttle-by-wire, or steer-by-wire (Langenwalter, 2004), many experts believe that 
brake-by-wire systems will eventually become common in the future (Carley, 2004).  
Nossal and Lang (2002) presented a model-based approach to building an x-by-wire 
application.  
Brake-by-wire systems can be classified into two types: brake-by-wire with hydraulic 
backup and brake-by-wire without hydraulic backup. Brake-by-wire with hydraulic 
backup, also called Electric Hydraulic Brake (EHB) is realized through hydraulic pumps 
and additional electrically controlled valves. If the electronic control fails, the complete 
electric hydraulic system will be deactivated and the brake system will behave like a 
pure hydraulic system which delivers only emergency brake function with reduced 
brake force.  Brake-by-wire without hydraulic backup is often known as Electric 
Mechanical Brake (EMB). EMB transfers electrical commands generated through the 
driver to computer controlled electro-mechanical actuators. EMB does not possess the 
fail-safe mechanics of hydraulic backup, and therefore must be developed with strict 
fault tolerant properties.   
The brake-by-wire system used in this case study is based upon a model provided by 
Daimler, but also draws from designs in (Hedenetz & Belschner, 2008) and (Colombo, 
2008).  The system consists of one vehicle-level processor and four local-level wheel 
processors. The vehicle-level processor reads in brake command input from the driver, 
communicated through a human-machine interface (for example, the brake pedal or 
parking brake interface), and subsequently generates braking command for each local-
level wheel processor based on high-level advanced brake functions such as an Anti-
Lock Brake System (ABS) or Electronic Stability Program (ESP). This braking 
command is broadcasted using two replicated data buses. Local-level wheel processors 
are located physically close to the wheels. Upon receiving braking command from the 
vehicle-level processor, each local-level processor calculates the value of braking 
pressure, taking into consideration various local-level information including actuator 
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position and speed. This value of braking pressure is then fed to an actuator which then 
applies the actual braking pressure on the corresponding wheel of the car. These 
functions are distributed using the Time-Triggered Communication Protocol (TTP) 
(Hedenetz & Belschner, 2008) which is especially designed for safety-related 
applications. The system is usually powered by two independent power supply units.  
To maintain the simplicity of this example, communication architecture and power 
supply units are not included in the discussion.  The physical configuration of the brake-
by-wire system is illustrated in Figure 40, which depicts the system general topology.  
 
Figure 40: General topology of Brake-By-Wire system 
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4.2 Analysis of System Functional Models  
In accordance with the IACoB method, we start the safety assessment process from a 
high-level functional model. For this simplified system, two initial main functions can 
be delivered: 1) Function which delivers basic braking 2) Function which delivers 
braking with driving assistance anti-lock (ABS). These two functions can arguably be 
combined into one as they are not physically distinct. In this early model, however, they 
are free from architectural detail and are modelled as two separate logical functions to 
facilitate the illustration of function delivery. If required, these functions can be 
combined with a conjoining function.   
The Matlab Simulink model illustrated in Figure 41 represents a high-level abstraction 
of the brake-by-wire system. It is simplified to consist of input functions, braking 
command processing functions (vehicle-level and local-level), ABS command 
processing function, and output functions. As local-level processing provides identical 
function for each wheel of the vehicle, we assume it is sufficient to discuss and analyze 
one (instead of all four) in this initial model. There are four input blocks which read in  
driver‟s initiated braking demand from brake pedal (Input_brakeDemand), readings for 
wheels‟ speed ( Input_wheelSpeed), external  variable readings (Input_external)  , and 
local-level feedback (Input_local). Information on brake demand, wheel speed and 
external environment is passed to the vehicle-level processing function 
(VehicleLevelProcessing) which calculates and generates the independent brake 
commands for each local-level processing (LocalLevelProcessing). It also relays the 
information needed for ABS calculation to the ABSProcessing function. The wheel 
local-level processing controls the output functions which provide basic braking or ABS 
braking. This early model does not yet incorporate any fault tolerance mechanisms.  
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Figure 41: Abstract functional model for Brake-By-Wire 
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4.2.1 FFA   
Once the model is constructed, we proceed to perform the FFA on the system. The main 
aim of this process is to classify and analyse the effects and severity of failures in the 
output functions, BasicBraking and ABSBraking. In this case the focus is placed on the 
omission and commission failure types, although it is also possible to perform analysis 
on value or timing failures. The following Table 7 presents an extended FFA which 
includes identification of detection, potential recovery plan and recommendation 
columns for each failure.  
Table 7:  Functional failure analysis of Brake-By-Wire 
Function Failure 
Type  
Effects on 
System  
Severity Detection  Recovery 
Plan 
Design 
Recommendation   
BasicBraking Omission No brake 
force ; 
vehicle 
cannot be 
stopped; 
driver loses 
control.  
Catastrophic  Using 
pressure 
feedback 
Not 
possible  
Redundant back 
up mechanism 
should be 
introduced  
BasicBraking Commission  Vehicle 
tends to 
drift; loss 
of stability  
Critical  Comparing 
pedal input 
(demand) 
and 
pressure 
feedback 
Release 
Pressure   
Commission 
failure should not 
be allowed to 
propagate 
ABSBraking Omission  Loss of 
steerability
; less 
efficient 
brake  
Marginal  Using 
feedback on 
wheel 
speed and 
pressure  
Not 
possible  
Situation can be 
compensated by 
driver 
ABSBraking Commission  No brake 
force 
available  
Catastrophic  Comparing 
wheel 
speed and 
pressure 
feedback 
 Switch 
off ABS 
function  
Commission 
failure should not 
be allowed to 
propagate  
 
From the examination of this FFA table, it can be seen that the severity of an omission 
failure of function BasicBraking (O-BasicBraking) is categorized as having a 
catastrophic effect, and therefore should be mitigated with fault tolerant design.  The 
second functional failure related to the provision of braking pressure is commission. 
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The commission failure in BasicBraking function (C-BasicBraking) is identified as 
having critical consequences and therefore should not be allowed to propagate and 
influence other functions in the wrong way. One way to achieve this is by detecting the 
commission failure, forcing the system to fail silent and then handling the omission 
accordingly by putting a fault-tolerant mechanism in place. The failure for the 
ABSBraking function is categorized as having catastrophic severity in its commission 
failure and marginal effects in its omission failure. This is due to the nature of the 
ABSBraking function which provides driving assistance rather than those of imperative 
role in braking. This suggests that it is more favourable for the function to fail in 
omission, and therefore the function should fail-silent when commission failure is 
detected.   
To perform FTA and FMEA, these functional blocks are annotated with failure 
behaviour before being analyzed by HiP-HOPS. Table 8 summarizes the internal 
malfunction of each of the function. To maintain the simplicity of this example, output 
blocks are modelled to be free from internal malfunctions, and instead can only 
propagate failures. 
Table 8:  Functional blocks internal malfunctions 
Function Failure Mode   Description  
Input_brakeDemand  BDBE Internal malfunction in function which reads 
in brake demand, causing Omission failure.  
Input_wheelSpeed  WSBE Internal malfunction in function which reads 
in wheel speed, causing Omission failure. 
Input_external  ESBE Internal malfunction in function which reads 
in external measurements, causing Omission 
failure. 
Input_local LSBE Internal malfunction in function which reads 
in local actuator measurements, causing 
Omission failure. 
VehicleLevelProcessing VLPBE Internal malfunction in vehicle-level 
processing function or which causes 
Omission failure. Most probably a hardware 
failure.   
VLPBEc Internal malfunction in vehicle-level 
processing function which causes 
Commission failure. Most probably a 
software failure.   
VLPBEabs Internal malfunction in vehicle-level 
processing function which causes ABS to be 
absent.  
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 VLPBEabsC Internal malfunction in vehicle-level 
processing function which causes anti-lock 
ABS to be instantiated without intention. 
ABSProcessing ABSBE Internal malfunction ABS processing 
function which causes anti-lock ABS to be 
absent.  
LocalLevelProcessing LLPBE Internal malfunction in wheel local-level 
processing function which causes Omission 
failure.  
LLPBEc Internal malfunction in wheel local-level 
processing function which causes 
Commission failure. 
Braking Energy  ActBE Internal malfunction in Braking Energy  
which causes Omission failure. 
ActBEc Internal malfunction in  BrakingEnergy  
causes Commission failure. 
 
4.2.2 FMEA  
As discussed in the earlier chapter, once the model has been annotated with its local 
failure information, fault trees can be generated and analyzed, and an FMEA can be 
obtained automatically using HiP-HOPS tool. The following Table 9 summarizes the 
FMEA results. The table defines how failures in other functional blocks propagate and 
contribute to failure O-BasicBraking, O-ABSBraking, C-BasicBraking and C-
ABSBraking. As the initial design does not include any fault-tolerant strategies, the 
table shows us how each internal malfunction in every function can become direct 
contributors to the omission and commission failures of the braking and ABS functions.  
Table 9: FMEA for Basic Brake-By-Wire functions 
Function  Failure 
Mode  
Direct Effect Severity  Comments/ 
Recommendation 
Input_brakeDemand BDBE O-
BasicBraking  
Catastrophic  Redundancy required   
Input_external ESBE O-
ABSBraking 
Marginal  
Input_local LSBE O-
BasicBraking 
Catastrophic  Redundancy required  
Input_wheelSpeed WSBE O-
ABSBraking 
Marginal - 
VehicleLevelProcessing VLPBEabs O-
ABSBraking 
Marginal - 
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VLPBE O-
BasicBraking  
Catastrophic  Redundancy required 
VLPBEc C-
BasicBraking  
Critical  Should fail silent 
 VLPBEabsC C-
ABSBraking 
Catastrophic VLPBE should not 
propagate and when 
detected, ABS should be 
deactivated.   
LocalLevelProcessing LLPBE O-
BasicBraking 
Catastrophic  Redundancy required 
LLPBEc C-
BasicBraking 
Critical Should fail silent  
BrakingEnergy  ActBE O-
BasicBraking  
Catastrophic Redundancy required 
 ActBEc C-
BasicBraking  
Critical  Should fail silent 
ABSProcessing  ABSBE O-
ABSBraking 
Marginal - 
To implement a more robust design, several advisable design changes can also be 
determined from an analysis of the FMEA table above. These are recorded in the 
recommendation column. Recommendation and Severity for each function correspond 
and reflect the severity and recommendation of the output function failures they cause.   
One important (and most obvious) technique to achieve fault-tolerance is the 
introduction of redundancy in the „module‟. Module here refers to function for 
functional model or components for the more refined architectural model.   
As an industry common practice,  fault tolerant design for brake-by-wire systems can be 
implemented through either the inclusion of a hydraulic system (in an EHB system) or 
through replicated electronic components (in an EMB system). For this example, we 
introduce a hybrid system which implements both hydraulic as well as redundant 
electronic modules (with lower numbers of redundant modules compared to a pure 
electronic EMB). Due to the cost and space constraints in automotive x-by-wire 
systems, it is often important to reach a compromise between the degree of fault 
tolerance and the number of redundant components (Isermann, 2004). For this example, 
it is assumed that it is sufficient for us to adopt duplex (i.e. consisting of two elements) 
redundant structure, which would enable a system to tolerate single-point failures.  
The analysis of FMEA in Table 9 therefore provides an insight that assists us in 
distinguishing critical functional failures that contribute to failures which have 
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catastrophic or critical consequences (O-BasicBraking, C-BasicBraking, C-
ABSBraking) from those that contribute to failures with marginal effects (O-
ABSBraking). This knowledge subsequently allows us to establish the appropriate 
resource management priority and design improvement. For example, we learnt that the 
failure in input blocks that detects braking demand (Input_brakeDemand) could have 
more severe consequences (causing O-BasicBraking) than other input blocks 
(Input_external) which failure only lead to O-ABSBraking. 
First we examine the input blocks. Two input blocks, the Input_brakeDemand function 
and the Input_local function, are identified to be the contributing causes to O-
BasicBraking which is catastrophic, and therefore it is necessary to configure these 
functions to be at least fail-operational by introducing a redundant module to backup 
each function. As mentioned earlier, failure in Input_external and Input_wheelSpeed 
only lead to O-ABSBraking and therefore in this example, will be tolerated. We also 
identified that there is a need to introduce redundant function for 
VehicleLevelProcessing as its failure also leads to O-BasicBraking. Additionally, 
LocalLevelProcessing can be connected directly to the function Input_brakeDemand to 
read raw braking command. This way, in the occurrence of a failure in the 
VehicleLevelProcessing function, basic braking command can still be obtained. 
Similarly, an omission failure in basic braking caused by internal malfunction in 
LocalLevelProcessing and BrakingEnergy can be mitigated by introducing redundant 
functions to support these critical functions.  
In addition to this independent redundancy for individual modules, we could also 
include a hydraulic function which acts as the group backup mechanism to provide 
emergency braking in the presence of failures that affect the electrical-based functions.  
Commission failures on both braking and ABS functions have been identified as critical 
and catastrophic respectively. It is therefore recommended that any function which leads 
to commission failure should fail-silent instead. This can be achieved by deactivating or 
switching off the function whenever commission failure is detected. This, in turn, 
transforms the commission failure into omission failure, which will then be treated 
accordingly.   
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To manage the redundancy for omission failure, we look into the redundancy technique 
mentioned earlier in Chapter 3. In our case, duplex dynamic redundancy configuration 
is adopted for two of the input functions, the vehicle-level processing, the local-level 
processing, and the braking energy functions. Figure 42 shows an example of redundant 
configuration for VehicleLevelProcessing which consists of main function VLP A and 
backup function VLP B. Third module VLP O is used to monitor their outputs, and in 
the case of failure, select to relay the correct output. To maintain the simplicity of this 
example, VLP O is assumed to be reliable enough to only propagate failures; and 
therefore their failure behaviours are not modelled. In practice, safety monitoring 
components like VLP O, although practically more reliable (with lower failure rate 
compared to modules they monitored), possess their own failure behaviours. More 
discussion on failure behaviours of fault-monitoring modules and detectability 
properties are presented in the chapter 6.   
   
 
Figure 42: Redundant module for Vehicle-Level Processing function 
The complete backup scheme structure for each function can be found in Appendix A.   
Figure 43 illustrates the revised model with backup components incorporated. Dark-
coloured blocks signify redundancy. To summarize, several key changes as a result of 
the examination of FMEA in Table 9 are:  
 Inclusion of redundant functions employing duplex configuration for input 
functions, VehicleLevelProcessing, LocalLevelProcessing, and BrakingEnergy 
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 Transformation of commission failure to omission failure in 
VehicleLevelProcessing, LocalLevelProcessing, and BrakingEnergy.  
 LocalLevelProcessing can be connected directly to Input_brakeDemand 
  Introduction of hydraulic backup mechanism.  
These key changes illustrate the strength and contribution of CSA towards the 
improvement of the system design, in particular, the identification of the system critical 
points. By identifying and addressing design weakness in these critical points early, a 
more robust revised design can be formulated before the design progresses further.  
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Figure 43: Revised model with duplex redundant mechanism   
125 
 
The inclusion of these new redundant mechanisms results in the introduction of new 
failure behaviours, which requires the FTA and FMEA to be updated. The new fault-
tolerant redundant structure means that there are no longer any single-point failures 
which directly cause O-BasicBraking.  As there is no backup for functions 
Input_external ,Input_wheelSpeed, and ABSProcessing  they are shown to directly 
cause direct effect to O-ABSBraking in the updated FMEA table. The rest of the 
functional failures which causes O-BasicBraking in combination with other functional 
failures are recorded in FMEA Table 11:   
   
Table 10: Direct ffects FMEA for revised model 
Function  Failure Mode  Direct Effects 
ABSProcessing ABSBE O-ABSBraking 
Input_external ESBE O-ABSBraking 
Input_wheelSpeed WSBE O-ABSBraking 
 
Table 11: Further Effects FMEA for revised brake-by-wire for failure O-BasicBraking  
Function  Failure 
Mode  
Further Effects Contributing Failure  
ACT A ActBEc O-BasicBraking ActB.ActBEc AND 
HydraulicBackup. HBBE 
ActB.ActBE AND HydraulicBackup. 
HBBE 
ActBE O-BasicBraking  ActB.ActBEc AND 
HydraulicBackup. HBBE 
ActB.ActBE AND HydraulicBackup. 
HBBE 
ACT B ActBEc O-BasicBraking ActA.ActBEc AND 
HydraulicBackup. HBBE 
 ActA.ActBE AND HydraulicBackup. 
HBBE 
ActBE O-BasicBraking  ActA.ActBEc AND 
HydraulicBackup. HBBE 
 ActA.ActBE AND HydraulicBackup. 
HBBE 
HydraulicBackup HBBE O-BasicBraking  ActA.ActBE AND 
ActB.ActBE 
ActA.ActBE AND 
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ActB.ActBEc 
ActA.ActBEc AND 
ActB.ActBE 
ActA.ActBEc AND 
ActB.ActBEc 
Input_local1.LSBEa AND 
Input_local1.LSBEb 
LLPA.LLPBE AND LLPB.LLPBE 
LLPA.LLPBEc AND LLPB.LLPBE 
LLPA.LLPBE AND LLPB.LLPBEc 
LLPA.LLPBEc AND LLPB.LLPBEc 
Input_brakeDema
nd.IBDA 
BDBEa O-BasicBraking  Input_brakeDemand.IBDB. BDBEb 
Input_brakeDema
nd.IBDB 
BDBEb O-BasicBraking  Input_brakeDemand.IBDA. BDBEa 
Input_local.LSA LSBEa O-BasicBraking Input.localSensor.LSB.LSBEb AND 
HydraulicBackup.HBBE 
Input_local.LSB LSBEb O-BasicBraking Input.localSensor.LSA.LSBEa AND 
HydraulicBackup.HBBE 
LLP A  LLPABE O-BasicBraking  LLPB.LLPBE AND 
HydraulicBackup.HBBE 
 
 LLPB.LLPBEc AND 
HydraulicBackup.HBBE 
 
LLPABEc O-BasicBraking  LLPB.LLPBE AND 
HydraulicBackup.HBBE 
 
 LLPB.LLPBEc AND 
HydraulicBackup.HBBE 
 
LLP B LLPBBE O-BasicBraking  LLPA.LLPBE AND 
HydraulicBackup.HBBE 
 
 LLPA.LLPBEc AND 
HydraulicBackup.HBBE 
 
LLPBBEc O-BasicBraking  LLPA.LLPBE AND 
HydraulicBackup.HBBE 
 
 LLPA.LLPBEc AND 
HydraulicBackup.HBBE 
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4.2.3 Construction of Mode charts 
 FTA and FMEA can be iterated until the design model meets early predefined 
requirements, for example until a satisfactory level of redundancy configuration is 
achieved (i.e. system tolerant to n number of failures). In this case study, we assume 
that elimination of single point failures for O-BasicBraking is sufficient. As FTA and 
FMEA results have shown this, the design is deemed to be acceptable for the next stage 
of the process. This allows us to proceed and model the design dynamic behaviour by 
constructing an abstract state machine.  
To construct the state machine, it is first of all, important to identify the primary 
elements: abstract states (as discussed in previous Chapter 3, referred to as „modes‟) and 
transition events. Modes are derived based upon provision of system functions, which in 
this case are the BasicBraking function and the ABSBraking function. Each of the 
functional failures in the Table 7 then causes a transition to degraded or failed modes. 
Corrective measures can be identified through FFA or the fault trees which explore the 
causes of the failure. In general, these potential treatments can be classified into three 
categories: untreatable failures, failures that always require identical treatments, failures 
that require different treatments depending on root causes. In this example at this stage, 
the recovery plan is not taken into consideration, and therefore is not modelled in the 
mode chart. 
1) Normal (BBW_Normal) mode where both Braking and ABS functions are delivered  
2) Permanent Degraded (BBW_PD) mode where basic Braking is delivered, but ABS 
function can no longer be delivered  
3) Fail (BBW_Fail) mode where no braking pressure is delivered.  
The table summarizes system modes, related severity (whether mode is hazardous), 
functions delivered, potential functional failures that could occur in that mode, 
transition these failure could cause and the target mode after transition.  
Transitions can be formulated according to the failures that could occur to each of the 
functions; in this case, all such failures are of omission type as commission failures 
have been transformed into omissions by design. As explained in section 3.8, default 
128 
 
modes (BBW_Normal and Fail) can be automatically assigned. Degraded mode 
BBW_PD and its corresponding transitions, however, need to be manually described.  
Table 12 summarizes three modes the system that can be derived by considering the 
delivery of functions in which:  
1) Normal (BBW_Normal) mode where both Braking and ABS functions are delivered  
2) Permanent Degraded (BBW_PD) mode where basic Braking is delivered, but ABS 
function can no longer be delivered  
3) Fail (BBW_Fail) mode where no braking pressure is delivered.  
The table summarizes system modes, related severity (whether mode is hazardous), 
functions delivered, potential functional failures that could occur in that mode, 
transition these failure could cause and the target mode after transition.  
Transitions can be formulated according to the failures that could occur to each of the 
functions; in this case, all such failures are of omission type as commission failures 
have been transformed into omissions by design. As explained in section 3.8, default 
modes (BBW_Normal and Fail) can be automatically assigned. Degraded mode 
BBW_PD and its corresponding transitions, however, need to be manually described.  
Table 12: FMEA- ModeChart Assistance Table  
Mode  Severity  Functions Delivered  Functional Failure 
Causing Transition  
Target  Mode  
BBW_Normal  ABSBraking O-ABSBraking PD 
BasicBraking   O-BasicBraking Fail   
BBW_PD Marginal  BasicBraking  O-BasicBraking Fail  
Fail  Hazardous  - - - 
 
Based on this assistance table, we compose an abstract mode chart depicted in Figure 44 
which models the system dynamic behaviour at this early stage:  
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Figure 44: Mode chart for Brake-By-Wire  
The level of safety assessment (requirements verification) depends on the level of detail 
provided in the mode chart. For this reason, it can be useful to refine the abstracted 
mode chart.  Here, for example, to more closely reflect the inclusion of different type of 
pressure source, we could refine the function BasicBraking into Electrical and 
Hydraulic. This is made possible by the fact that we could utilize the current HiP-HOPS 
Matlab interface to set Electrical and Hydraulic blocks as „system outport‟ therefore 
allowing fault trees and FMEA to be constructed for these functions. In the following 
Figure 45, additional blocks Electrical and Hydraulic are placed to illustrate this. For 
this reason, Electrical and Hydraulic blocks do not have failures of their own and only 
propagate failures. This break-down allows a more transparent functional distribution. 
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Figure 45: Brake-By-Wire revised model showing Electrical and Hydraulic sources 
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In response to this, the original Normal and Degraded modes are now extended to 
reflect the modelling of Electrical and Hydraulic modules. Subsequently, dynamic 
behaviour can now be modelled in the following modes:  
1) BBW_Normal mode where both basic braking and ABS braking functions are 
delivered. Braking function in normal mode is delivered through the primary source, 
Electrical module.  
2) Permanent Degraded 1 (BBW_PD1) mode where braking function is delivered by 
the Electrical module, but the ABS braking function can no longer be delivered.  
3) Permanent_Degraded2 (BBW_PD2) mode where braking pressure is delivered by 
Hydraulic module, ABS function is not delivered.  
4) Fail mode where no braking pressure is delivered. These are summarized in the 
updated FMEA-Mode chart assistance Table 13, and depicted in the following Figure 
46 mode chart.  
Table 13: Updated FMEA-Mode chart Assistance Table 
Mode  Severity  Functions Delivered  Functional Failure 
Causing Transition  
Target  Mode  
BBW_Normal  ABSBraking O-ABSBraking PD_1  
BasicBraking  
(Electrical)  
O-Electrical  PD_2  
 BBW_PD1 Marginal  BasicBraking 
(Electrical)  
O-Electrical PD_2  
 
BBW_PD2 
Marginal  BasicBraking   
(Hydraulic)  
O-Hydraulic  Fail  
Fail  Hazardous  - - - 
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Figure 46: Updated mode chart  
4.2.4 Requirement Verification 
In keeping with the proposed process and to enable the verification of requirement 
properties, once the mode chart is constructed, it is converted into a NuSMV input 
model.  For this high level NuSMV model, four modules are constructed to represent 
the system main module and each functional module (ABSBraking, Electrical, and 
Hydraulic). The complete NuSMV model can be found in Appendix B.1.  
Among the requirement properties, safety requirements are often of primary concerns in 
this case study. The verification process here aims to investigate and verify that the 
design goals are achieved, while ensuring that the model conforms to the safety 
requirements.   In this scenario, designers are provided with a list of „safety 
requirement‟ (SR). These are presented and analysed throughout this section to 
exemplify the set of possible requirement properties. Possible general SRs which are 
expected to hold through the design are as follows:  
SR1:  Driving assistance function(s) shall never hazardously interfere with the system 
state.  
SR2: The system shall be able to withstand the occurrence of n failures, without 
entering a hazardous state.   
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SR3: Dormant functions shall only be activated when needed 
These requirements first have to be interpreted in terms of the behaviour specified in the 
mode chart model. One possible translation of SR1 for this model is that the driving 
assistance ABSBraking function, in its presence or absence, shall not cause the system to 
move into a hazardous mode. These can be expressed as the following SR1.1 and 
SR1.2:  
SR1.1: “The presence of the ABSBraking function shall not lead the system into Fail 
mode” 
SR1.2:  “The absence of the ABSBraking function shall not lead the system into Fail 
mode”  
Property SR1.1 can be interpreted as situation must not occur where the presence of 
driving assistance always results in the system entering Fail mode. Although relatively 
straightforward, this helps ensure the ABSBraking does not behave hazardously when 
selected. CTL property for this can be written as:  
!(AG(absB.Output = 1 -> SystemMode = BBW_Fail)); 
 
Apart from assuring that ABSBraking function behaves as expected in its normal mode, 
SR1.2 property can be interpreted as situation must not occur where omission failure in 
ABSBraking function always results in the system entering Fail mode. The CTL 
property can be written as:  
! (AG (absB.Output = 0 -> SystemMode = BBW_Fail)); 
 
The model checker confirms that these properties hold, and therefore we can be assured 
that as a non-critical function, failure in driving assistance ABSBraking will not dictate 
system failure.   
Next, the SR2 requirements can be investigated. SR2 checks the robustness of the 
system and aims to ensure that the system can tolerate a certain number of failures. For 
this, SR2 can be further refined into:  
SR2.1: “If the system is in normal mode, a single functional failure shall not cause it to 
move directly into hazardous mode”  
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This property aims to ensure that when a single functional failure occurs while the 
system is operating in its normal mode, the next state will be one of the degraded modes 
instead of the fail mode.  To model this, a failure counter is introduced in the NuSMV 
model to record the number of functional failure occurrences. The highest possible 
number of the counter is three as at this stage we are keeping track of three functions 
(the ABS function, the Electrical function and the Hydraulic function), and failures are 
assumed to be permanent. This can be expressed in CTL as:  
AG (((SystemMode = BBW_Normal) & (counter = 1)) -> AX !(SystemMode = 
BBW_Fail)); 
This property is also verified to be true by the model checker.  
One important thing to note is how inclusive the transition definitions are when 
modelling dormant functions. For example, the mode chart in Figure 46 is inclusive 
enough for the updated model if the hydraulic backup is a dynamic „cold standby‟, 
where the hydraulic back up is only activated when O-Electrical is detected. However, 
for dynamic „hot standby‟ where the hydraulic backup is continuously active, the 
transition definitions are no longer sufficient. This is because of the fact that if hydraulic 
backup is continuously active, it is possible for the system to experience a malfunction 
in the Hydraulic system (O-Hydraulic) when it is operating in BBW_Normal mode. If 
O-Hydraulic occurs in BBW_Normal, according to the mode chart in Figure 46, the 
system mode will stay in BBW_Normal, and when O-Electrical eventually occurs, the 
system will move to BBW_PD2 for one execution step before swiftly moving to 
BBW_Fail mode in the next step.  Although it is not technically wrong, this could create 
a false sense of security because the system is not expected to fail by the occurrence of 
O-Electrical in BBW_Normal mode, especially as the mode chart aims to show a 
systematic degradation phase. For this reason, it can be helpful to take into 
consideration Hydraulic functional failures (if it is activated) in modes where Hydraulic 
output is not expected (in this case BBW_Normal and BBW_PD1).  
One possible way to better address this is by introducing an additional temporary mode 
(BBW_TD1), to model the failures in the Hydraulic function when basic braking is 
provided correctly through Electrical system. This degraded BBW_TD1 mode could 
serves as a potential warning that the backup function has failed before the primary 
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function, a state in which potential recovery steps can also be included and performed. 
This can be illustrated in the mode chart in Figure 47 below. 
 
 
Figure 47: Modified mode chart for Brake-By-Wire 
SR3, however, works with the assumption that the Hydraulic backup function is 
activated only when Electrical module does not supply any output presssure (Figure 46). 
It aims to ensure only either one or another is activated at the same time. This 
interpreation and its CTL specification can be expressed as follow:  
SR3.1: “Both Hydraulic and Electrical power shall not be activated at the same time” 
AG !((Hydraulic.state = ON) & (Electric.state = ON)); 
4.2.5 Refinement of Transition Events  
As explained in the previous chapter, the level of detail in the verification is also 
dependent on the level of detail in the model itself. This phase of the process allows the 
brake-by-wire abstract mode chart (Figure 47) to be refined.  The refinement of 
transition labels of this mode chart can be derived from either the FMEA directly or 
hierarchically through the model failure behaviour described in the failure annotations.  
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4.2.5.1 Refinement of Transition Events through Minimal Cut Sets  
The first possible way to refine this mode chart is by replacing the transition event 
expression with its causing events, where the causing events can be effectively obtained 
and mapped from the HiP-HOPS FTA results. For each top event, its minimal cut sets 
can essentially be used to form the replacement expressions. In this case, Figure 48 
presents the fault tree for the condition failure “O-Hydraulic”. Figure 49 presents the 
accompanying mode chart incorporating the corresponding root causes as transition 
events. Compared to mode chart in Figure 47, the examination of this expanded mode 
chart allows analysts to establish direct links between internal module malfunctions and 
the effects of their occurrence on the system mode transitions. The expanded mode chart 
is considerably more informative and allows more verification properties to be checked 
(i.e. checking whether certain malfunctions or their combinations would lead to changes 
in system functionality modes). For example, instead of only being able to check the 
effects of O-ABSBraking, O-Hydraulic, and O-Electrical, this expanded mode chart 
allows us to ensure that malfunction events LSBEa and LSBEb will not always cause a 
transition to a hazardous state: “!(AG(LSBEa & LSBEb) -> (States = BBW_Fail));”  
One of the main advantages of composing the transition events directly from their root 
causes is the fact that the mode chart and NuSMV models can be build without the need 
to model every level of the component or module behaviour. This is useful for effective 
iteration of abstract verification before details of module behaviours become available. 
Once details for each module are available and more dynamic behaviours are to be 
modelled (for example, to include non-failure related transitions), the mode chart can be 
refined as described in section 4.3.2.  
 
Figure 48: Fault tree for Omission of Hydraulic Failure  
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Figure 49: Expanded mode chart with minimal cut sets mapped to transition events 
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4.2.5.2 Refinement of Transition Events through Model Failure Annotation  
As discussed in the previous chapter, it is also possible to construct the mode chart 
which captures and reflects the functional hierarchy by constructing independent mode 
chart and SMV modules for each function. To effectively link failure behaviour to input 
modules and capture the structural topology, transition events retain a similar structure 
to the ones of HiP-HOPS failure annotation. This means they are expressed only in 
terms of input functions and internal malfunction events. To illustrate this, Figure 50 
presents the structural model of BrakingEnergy (ACT) module which consists of 
primary and backup modules ACT A and ACT B. ACT receives its input from 
localLevelProcessings (LLP), and outputs the results of the process through ACT O. 
ACT O serves as the output module and only propagates failures.  
 
 
Figure 50: Structural model of Braking Energy 
As with all other HiP-HOPS models, it is annotated with failure information which 
describes its failure behaviour. The failure annotation for ACT A (which is identical 
ACT B) for describes the causes of omission failure O-Out as:   
O-Out = ActBE OR ActBEc OR O-in1 
This failure behaviour is identical for ACT B. This can be mapped into the mode chart 
and subsequently the NuSMV model. The following Figure.51 illustrates how the 
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failure annotation can be represented as the mode chart transition. As ACT A receives its 
input from LLP which is in the same hierarchical level as ACT A, O-LLP can be used to 
directly replace O-in1 in the mode chart.  ACT A can hold two failure-relevant modes: 
ActA_Normal (when it delivers its output) and ActA_Fail (when O-Out occurs and it 
fails to deliver its output). Once ACT A enters its ActA_Fail mode, it sends the 
appropriate global broadcast signal (“/O-ActA”) to announce the occurrence of O-Out 
in ACT A.  
 
  
Figure.51: Mode chart for failure behaviour in ACTUATOR 
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The translation of this failure behaviour in HiP-HOPS to a NuSMV model can also be 
done in a structured way. Module ACT A input variables are used to represent input 
deviations, while its internal malfunctions are defined locally. This way, failure 
expression can be directly represented in the local definition of O-Out which is then 
used to affect the outcome of Out. Module ACT B can be constructed in a similar way. 
And as ACT A and ACT B are subsystems of ACT, output deviations O-ActA and O-
ActB are passed as input deviation variables for module ACT. Main module manages 
the global architecture of the network and the broadcasting of events which enable 
transitions between modules. These are illustrated in the excerpt of a NuSMV model for 
an actuator module presented in the Figure 52:  
 
MODULE ACTA (O-in1)  
VAR  
O-Out: boolean;  
Out: boolean;  
ActBE: boolean;  
ActBEc: boolean;  
 
ASSIGN 
init(ActABE) := 0; 
O-Out := O-in1 | ActBE | ActBEc;    
Out := !O-Out; 
 
next(ActABE):=case 
ActABE = 1 : 1;  
1: {1,0};  
esac;  
 
next(ActABE):=case 
ActABE = 1 : 1;  
1: {1,0};  
esac;  
 
ACT A   
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MODULE ACT (O-ActAOut, O-ActBOut)  
VAR  
O-Out: boolean;  
Out: boolean;  
 
ASSIGN 
 
O-Out := O-ActAOut & O-ActBOut;    
Out := !O-Out; 
 
 
ACT  
MODULE ACTB (O-in1)  
VAR  
O-Out: boolean;  
Out: boolean;  
ActBE: boolean;  
ActBEc: boolean;  
 
ASSIGN 
init(ActABE) := 0; 
O-Out := O-in1 | ActBE | ActBEc;    
Out := !O-Out; 
 
next(ActABE):=case 
ActABE = 1 : 1;  
1: {1,0};  
esac;  
 
next(ActABE):=case 
ActABE = 1 : 1;  
1: {1,0};  
esac;  
 
ACT B 
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Figure 52: Excerpt of the NuSMV model for the Braking Energy 
This refinement of the NuSMV model captures and retains the hierarchical composition 
of the model and allows more detailed verification to be performed. By examining the 
relationships between the dynamic behaviour of modules it is now possible to verify 
more safety related requirements, from more straight-forward ones like “As long as 
Braking Energy ACT A is functioning, the Braking Energy function shall be present”, or 
for a cold-standby system which examines the electrical and hydraulic modules: “Only 
either Electrical pressure or Hydraulic pressure shall be supplied at one time”, to the 
 
MODULE main  
 
VAR  
 
llp: LLP;  
acta : ACTA(LLP.O-Out);  
actb : ACTB(LLP.O-Out);  
act: Actuator(acta.O-Out, actb.O-Out); 
 
Other_local_variables ... 
Other_definitions... 
... 
MAIN 
MODULE LLP( LLP_inputDeviation_variables...)  
 
VAR 
Out: boolean;  
O-Out : boolean;  
C-Out : boolean;  
LLPBE : boolean;  
LLPBEc: boolean; 
 
ASSIGN 
init(LLPBE) := 0; 
O-Out := LLPBE;  
Out := !O-Out;  
C-Out := LLPBEc;  
 
next(LLPBE) := case 
LLPBE = 1: 1; 
1: {1,0};  
esac; 
 
LLP  
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effects of this function behaviour on the system modes: “ System shall not be allowed to 
enter hazardous mode when Electrical system is functioning”.  
Although the processes of construction and refinement of state machines are currently 
manual, the potential for future automation has been outlined in Chapter 3.8. With 
IACoB, the construction of these state machines (presented in Figure 44, Figure 46, 
Figure 47, Figure 49, Figure.51, and NuSMV excerpt in Figure 52)  are no longer ad 
hoc, but made systematic with the help of FTA/FMEA results. The ability to verify 
listed safety requirements (SR 1.1 to SR 3.1) also highlights the benefits of the 
application of BSA at this early stage. 
4.3  Architecture-allocated Functional Model 
To illustrate the iterative application of the IACoB process in a more detailed design, 
we present another phase of analysis in an architecture-allocated functional model of the 
BBW system. The architecture-allocated functional model extends the purely functional 
model by taking into account early system architecture and concisely represents 
allocation of functions to architectural elements without going into fine details of the 
architecture. Figure 53 illustrates the architecture-allocated model of the system for the 
corresponding four wheels of the vehicle. This model is developed based upon the 
earlier functional model (Figure 45) and allocates functions to components.  
VehicleLevelProcessing function is assigned to (and therefore from now onwards 
referred to as) an ECU (electronic control unit). Similarly, each LocalLevelProcessings 
function is allocated to a BCU (Brake Control Unit) which, together with an actuator, 
are assigned for each wheel. It is common that multiple architectural components are 
assigned to perform a single function, or for a single components to be shared between 
multiple functions. Here ABSBraking function is realized by sharing BCU and actuators. 
ABS command is fed directly from ABS processing components to the BCUs to reflect 
the correct value of braking pressure applied by each actuator.  
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Figure 53: Architecture-allocated functional model for brake by wire system 
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In accordance with our proposed process, the iterative analysis begins again from the 
construction and analysis of an FFA, followed by an FTA and FMEA. At this phase of 
analysis, we place the focus on the BCU and the delivery of each wheel braking 
pressure as part of the whole brake-by-wire structure, and explore the relationship 
between the delivery (and absence) of this function from different wheels, as opposed to 
the independent analysis performed previously in section 4.2.  
The system delivers four braking functions, each handled by a BCU delivering 
commands to actuator for each wheel. The longitudinal symmetry of this functional 
design means that the potential single functional failures on each side of the car and 
their effects of the systems are similar to those on the other side of the car. For this 
analysis, single functional failure and multiple combinatorial failures will be 
investigated. 
4.3.1 Analysis of Single functional failure  
The first part of the FFA identifies potential single functional failures of the wheel 
braking function. Here we introduce a new type of failure, LockedWheel, and 
investigate the effects of this failure on the system. The LockedWheel failure occurs 
when a wheel experiences rapid deceleration (causing it to „lock‟) and stop much more 
quickly than the vehicle could. This is usually prevented by the ABS anti-lock function 
which alternately reduces the pressure to the brake until it sees acceleration, and 
increases pressure until it sees deceleration again. This is performed within a very short 
period of time, resulting in the slowing down of the wheel matching deceleration rate of 
the vehicle.   
In this example, the supervision of relevant parameters (e.g. wheel speed reading) and 
the processing of ABS commands are shared between ECU and ABS processing 
component. To maintain simplicity, we assume that the ABS processing component only 
propagates failure, and the failure in ECU is enough to cause failure in producing 
correct ABS command.  The LockedWheel (L-BrakingPressure) failure occurs when the 
new internal malfunction LockBE occurs in the BCU and at the same time the ECU fails 
to produce necessary command/information to instruct the ABS to prevent locking 
(Omission of ABS command or O-ABScmd). LockBE could represent an internal 
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failure in the BCU algorithm causing maximum brake pressure to be applied. This can 
be expressed in the following failure logic for the BCU:  
L-BrakingPressure = O-ABScmd AND LockBE 
Figure 54 presents a fragment of the architecture-allocated functional model to illustrate 
how failure can be propagated through the topology, eventually causing front-left (FL) 
wheel to lock:  
 
 
Figure 54: Failure propagation to BCU  
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Table 14 presents the FFA for single wheel braking function for front left wheel. 
Omission and commission failures were as addressed and treated in previous chapter 
(section 4.2), and the effects of wheel locking with or without braking intention are 
examined: 
Table 14: Functional failures for single wheel braking function 
Function Failure Type  Effects on 
System  
Severity Detection  Recovery Recommenda
tion 
FL_Braking
Pressure 
 
 
Locking-Com. 
 
Permanent 
wheel lock 
when there is 
no braking 
intention 
Vehicle 
tends to drift 
to side. 
Severe lost 
of control as 
maximum 
brake is 
applied  
Critical  Comparison 
of pedal 
input and 
pressure 
sensor 
feedback 
- Assume 
commission of 
brake pressure 
is transformed 
to omission of 
brake 
pressure. 
FL_Braking
Pressure 
 
 
Locking-Om.  
 
Permanent 
wheel lock 
when there is 
braking 
intention 
Vehicle 
tends to drift 
to side. 
Severe lost 
of control as 
maximum 
brake is 
applied 
Critical  Comparison 
of pedal 
input and 
pressure 
sensor 
feedback 
- ABS 
algorithm to 
prevent 
permanent 
locking.  
*Additionally, 
intentional 
locking of 
diagonal 
wheel  
4.3.2 Analysis of multiple functional failures  
Apart from single functional failure analysis, the effects of combinations of multiple 
functional failures in the vehicle wheels can also be examined. The analysis involves 
conjunctions of two to four functional failures, and combinations of failures that require 
further examination are identified. As the system incorporates four braking functions 
(one for each wheel) and there are six corresponding failure modes for each function, 
there appears to be a large number of possible combinations. However, a systematic 
analysis of unique combinations yields a relatively small number. The reason is that due 
to the symmetry of the brake-by-wire system, only certain combinations are unique. 
Certain failure combinations are also inapplicable because they can only occur in 
mutually exclusive modes, for example, braking and absence of braking. Here, analysis 
of the L-BrakingPressure failure is performed in a scenario where the locking occurs 
148 
 
when brake pressure is required. The full analysis of the FFA is too long to include and 
will not contribute much to this discussion. We focus on the analysis regarding wheel 
locking which shows that:  
 Severity of single wheel locking failure is critical and affects the stability and 
steeribility of the vehicle.  
 Severity of two locking failures in diagonal wheels is marginal because stability 
is improved. 
 Severity of three locking failures is critical.  
 Locking in all four wheels is identified as less severe than locking in three, or in 
some cases, two wheels.  
From these FFA results, we are able to identify recovery mechanisms against such types 
of failures by incorporating the ability to perform intentional locking: the intentional 
locking of a diagonal wheel can be performed in response to a single wheel locking 
failure, and intentional locking of all four wheels can be used as recovery mechanism to 
reduce the severity of a failure of three wheels.   
Working with the assumption that the recovery plan to unlock the wheel (e.g. by 
releasing pressure in time) is not possible, it is decided that the ability to intentionally 
lock the wheel can be incorporated as an additional function to each BCU. This new 
function enables intentional locking by applying maximum braking pressure to the 
wheel. An additional module (DL) is used to monitor the output of each BCU to detect 
locking failure (L-BrakingPressure) and subsequently activates the locking of 
corresponding diagonal wheel. This DL module can be implemented as part of the ECU 
or as a separate independent module. It is also possible to further analyse the failure to 
provide this intentional locking (omission and commission failure of DL). To maintain 
the simplicity of this example however, we assume DL only propagates failures and 
focus the analysis on the degradation phases the system experiences in the occurrence of 
wheel locking, and ensuring required safety properties hold during these phases. The 
revised functional model of the BCU can be seen illustrated in the figure below. FL 
indicates Front-Left wheel, FR indicates Front-Right wheel, RL indicates Rear-Left 
wheel, and RR indicates Rear-Right wheel.  
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Figure 55: Updated BCU for wheels with Intentional Diagonal Locking (DL)  
Following the introduction of the new function to enable intentional diagonal locking, 
we aim to analyze and verify that the system holds true the key safety requirements in 
its degraded mode.  And as with the earlier example, FTA and FMEA results are used to 
assist in the construction of a mode chart where this dynamic behaviour can be 
analyzed. FTA/FMEA results are used to derive root causes of locking L-
BrakingPressure for each wheel. This in turn enables us to study the how failures from 
different wheel propagates to cause the locking of the diagonal wheel, and if safety 
requirements still hold. 
Figure 56  presents the fault tree for L-BrakingPressure for FL wheel and the list 
minimal cut sets derived:  
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Minimal Cut Sets For L-FL_BrakingPressure:  
 FL_BCU.LockBE AND Input_wheelSpeedSensor.WSBE 
 FL_BCU.LockBE AND Input_externalSensors.ESBE 
 ECU.ECUA.ECUBEabsC  AND ECU.ECUB.ECUBEabsC  AND 
FL_BCU.LockBE 
 ECU.ECUA.ECUBEabsC  AND ECU.ECUB.ECUBEabs  AND 
FL_BCU.LockBE 
 ECU.ECUA.ECUBEabs AND ECU.ECUB.ECUBEabsC  AND 
FL_BCU.LockBE 
 ECU.ECUA.ECUBEabs  AND ECU.ECUB.ECUBEabs  AND 
FL_BCU.LockBE 
Figure 56: Fault tree for L-FL_BrakingPressure 
To understand how these root causes affect the changes in system modes and the 
activation of newly introduced intentional diagonal locking, we examine the dynamic 
behaviour of the DL module. In its normal mode, the DL module's function is to monitor 
for the occurrence of locking in any wheel and (when detected) instantiate the locking 
of the diagonal wheel. As mentioned earlier, the DL only propagates failures and 
therefore would only respond to external failures. So instead of modelling how it 
degrades in response to the failure of delivery of its monitoring and activating function, 
the modes are decided based upon the condition of locking of each wheel. The 
following modes are possible:  
151 
 
 
1) Normal:  when there is no wheel locking occurring 
2) TDn_Critical_ X : Temporary degraded mode when locking occurs in wheel(s) X 
with total n number of locking occur in the vehicle.  
3) PDn_ X:  Permanent degraded mode when locking occurs in wheel(s) X with 
total n number of locking occur in the vehicle 
X  here represents vehicle wheel(s): FL, FR, RL, RR. X ⊆ {FL, FR, RL, RR}. The states 
are mainly categorized based upon the n number of wheels locked (intentionally or not). 
Temporary degraded (TD) modes are marked as critical because they are only assigned 
to occurrence where either one or three wheels are locked, the occurrence of which has 
critical effects. These modes are temporary because the entry behaviour (which is 
executed immediately once the mode is entered) triggers event “/X DiagonalLock” 
which locks the corresponding diagonal wheel X, and therefore causes the system to 
move to a non-critical permanent degraded mode. Permanent degraded (PD) modes are 
not critical as they occur when two diagonal wheels or all four wheels are locked.  
Figure 57 below describes this relationship and the transitions between modes. Here 
assumption is made that DL is designed in such way that it processes one locked wheel 
signal at a time. In a real-life scenario, it is possible for locking of multiple wheels to 
occur within a time period so close to one another it appears to be occurring 
simultaneously. To handle this, the DL is assumed to be able to register the time 
difference and sequence of occurrence. This allows appropriate action to be taken (i.e. 
intentionally activating the locking of diagonal wheel if necessary) before processing 
the next locked wheel(s). 
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Figure 57: Mode chart for DL Controller  
  
The events that trigger the mode transitions are signals from individual BCUs to 
indicate wheel locking. This locking can be caused by an intentional locking command 
from DL or unintentionally as a result of L-BrakingPressure. Figure 58 presents the 
mode chart for the wheel BCUs.  
Front Left (FL) BCU  
 
Front Right (FR) BCU  
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Rear Left (RL) BCU  
 
Rear Right (RR) BCU  
 
Figure 58: Mode chart for Wheel BCU  
Similar to the previous process at this stage in section 4.2, we are able to extend the 
mode charts here by mapping the failure “L-X_BrakingPressure” to its minimal cut sets 
identified through FTA/FMEA (Figure 59 for FL wheel):  
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Figure 59: Expanded transition based on Minimal Cut Sets  
At this stage we could also construct the mode chart to reflect the hierarchical structure, 
and enable generation of a NuSMV model which captures all the relevant modules that 
trigger corresponding transition events in BCU. The figure below depicts the mode 
charts for the FL_BCU, ECU, and two input sensors relating to the failure O-ABScmd:  
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Figure 60: Mode chart for modules relating to Locking of Front Left (FL) wheel  
The corresponding NuSMV model for the FL_BCU is presented below. As the 
FL_BCU receives its input from the ABS module (please see Figure 53), the propagated 
input deviation O-ABScmd gets passed as its input variable. It also receives the 
command to intentionally lock its wheel from the DL, FLDiagonalLock (Figure 55), 
which is also passed as an input variable. Its internal malfunction LockBE is also 
included as part a local variable. These allow the forming of its output deviation failure 
expression: 
LockBE AND O-ABScmd OR FLDiagonalLock 
The complete SMV model can be found in Appendix B.2. 
MODULE FL(O-ABScmd, FLDiagonalLock) 
VAR  
States : {Normal, Locked} ; 
LockBE : boolean;  
counter : 0..1; 
FLlockSig : boolean;  
locked: boolean;  
 
ASSIGN  
init(States) := Normal; 
init(LockBE) := 0; 
init(counter) := 0; 
 
locked := (LockBE & O-ABScmd)| FLDiagonalLock;  
FLlockSig := case 
States = Normal : 0; 
1: 1;  
esac; 
 
next(States):=case 
States = Normal & locked = 1 : Locked;  
1: States;  
esac; 
 
next(LockBE) := case  
LockBE = 1 : 1;  
1: {0,1} ;  
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esac;  
 
next(counter):=case  
States = Locked : 1;  
1: counter;  
esac; 
 
This case, again, demonstrates how CSA assists the identification of root causes (of 
locking failure in a wheel), and its role in the construction of the system state machines. 
The modelling of the intentional locking (nominal behaviour) of diagonal wheels by DL 
Controller in response to the locking failure of other wheels highlights the role of BSA. 
By enabling the modelling of these different aspects of the system, IACoB allows a 
better understanding of the system dynamic behaviour and enables verification of safety 
properties in this context.  
For example, with this introduction of an intentional locking function, it is important to 
ensure that the system still adheres to the list of safety requirements (SR1 – SR3) 
defined in section 4.2.4. This modelling of modules and DL controller in behaviour in 
NuSMV subsequently allows verification of these safety properties for the extended 
model. Possible scenarios for safety and reachability of the control for intentional 
locking function can be examined. First we investigate SR1: “Driving assistance 
function(s) must never hazardously interfere with basic critical function(s)”. This is 
adapted into SR1.3 to reflect the fact that the driving assistance function (anti-lock) to 
be investigated here refers to intentional diagonal locking, and in addition to 
investigating whether it affects the braking pressure, we aim to ensure that the activation 
of diagonal locking will not cause unintentional locking which lead to hazardous states.    
SR1.3: “Intentional locking of diagonal wheel should not lead to hazardous state” 
To do this, “hazardous state” is defined as the condition either where one wheel locks or 
where three wheels lock, i.e. the occurrence of either TD1_Critical_ X or TD3_Critical_ 
X respectively:  
Hazardous := case 
States = TD1_Critical_FR |States = TD1_Critical_RL | States = 
TD1_Critical_FL | States = TD1_Critical_RR |States = 
TD3_Critical_FRRLRR |States =  TD3_Critical_FLRRFR | States = 
TD3_Critical_FLRRRL : 1; 
1: 0;  
esac;   
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The activation of DL (DLActive) is defined as the condition when any of the wheels has 
been diagonally locked intentionally:   
DLActive := FLdiagonalLock |  RLdiagonalLock |  FRdiagonalLock  | 
RRdiagonalLock; 
 
We aim to verify that the diagonal locking function itself will not lead to or always be 
the cause of the system entering this hazardous state. This can be expressed in CTL as:  
SPEC !AG(DLActive -> Hazardous); 
As this property is verified to be true by the model checker, the next SR2 - “The system 
shall be able to withstand the occurrence of n failures, without entering a hazardous 
state.  ” - can be investigated. Instead of counting the number of failures, the Counter 
variable is assigned to keep record of the number of locked wheels (whether intentional 
or caused by a failure). For this scenario, the initial aim here is to ensure that when the 
number of locked wheels is not one or three, the system should not reach the Hazardous 
state. This can be specified in the following SR2.2 and the accompanying CTL 
expressions:  
SR2.2:  “In situations where the number of wheels locked is not one or three, the system 
shall not enter the hazardous mode”  
SPEC AG((!(Counter = 1) & !(Counter = 3))->!Hazardous)); 
This property does not hold and the model checking traces demonstrate that the locking 
of two non-diagonal wheels at one point leads to locking of three wheels, which is 
Hazardous. With the current arrangement of DL, however, this means that the locking of 
two non-diagonal wheels should always eventually lead to the locking of all four 
wheels. Variable TwoParallelWheelsLocked is assigned to represent the locking of two 
non-diagonal wheels. This state of reachability can be verified through the following 
modified properties:  
SR2.2: “In situation where two non-diagonal (parallel) wheels are locked, all four 
wheels shall eventually be locked”  
TwoParallelWheelsLocked =(flw.States = Locked & rlw.States = Locked)|( 
frw.States = Locked & rrw.States = Locked) | (flw.States = Locked & 
frw.States = Locked) | (rlw.States = Locked & rrw.States = Locked) 
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AG(TwoParallelWheelsLocked -> AF(States =  PD4_AllWheelsLocked)); 
 
This property is verified to be true by the model checker, and therefore we are assured 
that non-diagonal locking of two wheels will also lead to locking of all four wheels 
(non-hazardous state).   
Next we continue to check the requirement SR3: “Dormant functions shall only be 
activated when needed”. In this scenario, intentional diagonal locking should only be 
instantiated when the ABS function is not working, as in its presence, the ABS would be 
expected to manage the prevention of wheel locking:  
SR3.2:  “Intentional locking of diagonal wheel shall not be instantiated when ABS 
function is working”  
For this, we need to again define the condition ALLOFF where no diagonal locking is 
taking place. For every situation where the ABS is working (therefore omission O-
ABScmd = 0), ALLOFF should be true. This can be expressed in CTL as:  
 
SPEC AG((O-ABScmd = 0)-> ALLOFF) ; 
 
This is also verified to be true by the model checker.  
Additional properties to check system robustness and failure recoverability could 
include the verification of whether intentional diagonal locking will always eventually 
result in the system moving from the hazardous state to a non-hazardous state. This 
aims to ensure that the DL fulfils its function as a fail-safe mechanism.  Non-hazardous 
states refer to the condition where either only two diagonal wheels are locked or all four 
wheels are locked, which brings us to the next requirement to verify, SR4:  
SR 4: “Intentional locking of wheels shall always eventually lead the system to non-
hazardous states”  
This can be modelled in CTL as:  
SPEC AF (DLActive ->! Hazardous); 
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This property aims to ensure that DLActive is performing its task to ensure system 
moves from a hazardous state to a non-hazardous state. This is also verified to be true 
by the model checker.  
4.4 Chapter Summary  
This chapter explored the application of the IACoB process in a vehicle brake-by-wire 
system. It investigated how the approach utilizes CSA and BSA to help perform safety 
assessment and influence system design in the early phase of the system development.  
Two main models were presented to highlight different discussion elements. The first 
model described high level system functional design where FFA and FTA/FMEA 
(CSA) were used to effectively identify root causes of hazardous functional failures (i.e. 
absence of braking pressure). Appropriate design modification and improvements, 
including introduction of backup mechanisms for critical functions, were then made to 
reduce or avert risk of failure. This was followed by formal verification (BSA) via the 
NuSMV model checker to verify that the design adheres to safety requirement 
specifications. The second model provided more details about allocation of functions to 
architectural elements. It explored a further particular failure (i.e. wheel locking) and 
subsequently recommended an additional new function (diagonal locking) to help the 
system respond to this failure. The integration of this function into the design and 
whether or not the predefined safety requirements specifications still hold were then 
analyzed.  
The proposed approach provides assistance in evaluating the design and allows both 
CSA and BSA to exploits analysis results from previous stages to help with the safety 
assessment. In particular, generation of the mode chart in order to enable BSA utilizes 
results from FTA/FMEA in the composition of its event transitions. The process also 
allows verification to be performed early on an abstract mode chart before more 
concrete details are available. 
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CHAPTER 5. Case Study on Aircraft Wheel Brake 
System  
5.1 Introduction to Aircraft Wheel Brake System  
This second case study aims to explore further the role of BSA in influencing the 
system design. It investigates the application of IACoB process to an aircraft wheel 
brake system. The model presented here is mainly an adaptation from the (ARP 4761) 
aircraft wheel brake system, which is also referenced in (Joshi et al., 2006).  
The main function of the wheel brake system is to provide safe braking function for 
aircraft during the taxiing and landing. This mainly involves supplying correct pressure 
and preventing skidding. Secondary functions of the wheel brake system also include 
preventing unintended aircraft motion when parked, and stopping main gear wheel 
rotation upon gear retraction.  
The braking system consists of two primary hydraulic pumps: GreenPump and 
BluePump. On Normal braking mode, GreenPump provides the required hydraulic 
pressure and the Alternate mode, which is powered by BluePump, is held on standby. 
When failure occurs on normal system, the brake is driven by hydraulic power 
generated by BluePump.  
In the original (ARP 4761) example, another backup mechanism was in place lest both 
of the pumps fail. Here, however it has been deliberately excluded in the beginning of 
this discussion to demonstrate how our process arrives to the conclusions for the need of 
the safety measures. Therefore in the initial system model of this example, it is assumed 
that one backup hydraulic pump (Blue Pump) is sufficient.  
In normal mode, BSCU (Brake System Control Unit) receives brake pedal positions as 
input and processes this information to produce control signals to the brakes. BSCU also 
monitors various input signals that indicate certain critical aircraft and system states to 
provide correct brake functions and improve fault tolerance mechanism, generate 
warnings, indications, and maintenance information to other systems.   
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5.1.1 Nominal system model  
The brake system used in this study is a modified version of the one used in ARP4761. 
Its architecture is illustrated in Figure 61.   
The system consists of the following main components: BSCU (Brake System Control 
Unit), two hydraulic pressure lines, mechanical components, and an output component. 
BSCU (Brake System Control Unit) is the digital controller in the system which accepts 
inputs to compute braking and anti-skid commands. Aircraft speed and deceleration rate 
are used when auto brake is true. For brevity, the auto brake function has been excluded 
from discussion. The BSCU itself consists of two redundant Command and Monitor 
units. The Command units perform the computation to output the required braking 
command as well as the anti-skid command. The Monitor units supervise their 
corresponding Command units, and when deviation is detected in the first Command 
unit, the second unit is selected. When both Command units are detected to be invalid, 
BSCU is said to be invalid. 
Two hydraulic pressure lines - Normal (green line powered by GreenPump) and 
Alternate (blue line powered by BluePump) - are used. The GreenValve and the 
BlueValve are used to control the pressure from the GreenPump and the BluePump 
respectively. In normal working condition, GreenValve and BlueValve are both open to 
provide constant stream of pressure to SelectorValve. The SelectorValve selects only 
one of the two redundant hydraulic systems to prevent a situation where both the green 
and blue system provide pressure to the brake, with the green line selected by default. 
This pressure is relayed to corresponding meter valves which adjust the valve position 
to output the required amount of pressure based on the command from BSCU. WBS is 
an output function which outputs the pressure.  
The system switches to Alternate when one of these conditions occurs:  
1) GreenPump produces pressure below threshold (or omitted) 
2) Or when any other failures occur along the green line causing normal line output 
to fall below threshold (or omitted).  
Once BSCU decides that Alternate line should be activated, it sends an OnAlternate 
signal which   informs SelectorValve to inhibit any pressure from GreenValve.  The 
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SelectorValve in turn engages the Alternate mode and relay pressure from BlueValve. 
Once the system switches to Alternate, it will not revert back to Normal. Figure 61 
shows the basic system system structure. NormalP, AlternateP and WBS blocks are 
intermediate blocks which only propagate failures.  
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Figure 61: Simulink model of wheel brake system  
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5.2 FTA/FMEA  
Once constructed, the system model is extended with failure information. To maintain 
simplicity, each component is assumed to carry one internal malfunction which directly 
causes omission of the component‟s output. BSCU, however, has two types of internal 
malfunction, which are related to the Monitor and Command units. Inputs to the BSCU 
are assumed to be supplied as intended. Table 15 summarizes the failure information for 
each component. Although the analysis has been largely focused on omission failures, 
other failure types like „valve stuck at open‟ (causing commission failure) and „valve 
stuck at value‟ can also be included.  
Table 15: Internal failure for Wheel Brake System components  
Component  Failure Mode  Description  
GreenPump GreenPumpBE Internal malfunction in Green 
Pump which causes omission 
failure  
GreenValve GreenValveBE Internal malfunction in Green 
Valve which causes omission 
failure 
BluePump BluePumpBE Internal malfunction in Blue 
Pump which causes omission 
failure 
BlueValve BlueValveBE Internal malfunction in Blue 
Valve which causes omission 
failure 
CMD/Anti-SkidMeterValveG GCMDASBE  Internal malfunction in the 
command/ anti-skid green line 
meter valve which causes 
omission failure 
CMD/Anti-SkidMeterValveB BCMDASBE Internal malfunction in the 
command/ anti-skid blue line 
meter valve which causes 
omission failure 
SelectorValve selValveBE Internal malfunction in the 
Selector valve which causes 
omission failure 
BSCU CMDBE Internal malfunction in the 
BSCU which causes omission 
failure in both BSCU command 
units  
 MonitorBE Internal malfunction in the 
BSCU which causes omission 
failure in both BSCU both 
monitor units 
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Once failure extension of the model was completed, FTA and FMEA were 
automatically performed by HiP-HOPS. The derived FMEA shows how component 
failures contribute to the omission of pressure failure in WBS. As in the previous case 
study, the effects of component failures are distinguished between direct effects and 
further effects. The direct effect in Table 16 indicates that omission of the BSCU 
Command unit or the SelectorValve will directly contribute to the absence of WBS 
pressure. Additionally, the further effects table Table 17 shows that failures in hydraulic 
pumps, valves, and meter valves lead to omission of WBS pressure but only in 
combination with other failures.  
Table 16: FMEA Direct Effects for Wheel Brake System  
Components Failure Mode Direct Effects Severity Comments/ 
Recommendation  
SelectorValve selValveBE O-WBS.pressure Catastrophic  System should 
move to degraded 
mode. Failure 
should at most 
affect only anti-skid 
command. 
Introduce backup 
that read pedal 
positions 
separately.  
BSCU CMDBE O-WBS.Pressure Catastrophic Backup mechanism  
should be 
introduced to 
provide pressure in 
the event of 
SelectorValve 
failure  
 
Table 17: FMEA Further Effects for Wheel Brake System  
Components Failure Mode Effects Severity Contributing 
Failure Modes 
BluePump  BluePumpBE O-WBS.pressure Catastrophic  GCMDASBE 
GreenValveBE 
GreenPumpBE 
BlueValve BlueValveBE O-WBS.pressure Catastrophic  GCMDASBE 
GreenValveBE 
GreenPumpBE 
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CMD/AS 
MeterValveB 
BCMDASBE O-WBS.pressure Catastrophic  GCMDASBE 
GreenValveBE 
GreenPumpBE 
CMD/AS Meter 
ValveG 
GCMDASBE O-WBS.pressure Catastrophic  BluePumpBE 
BlueValveBE 
BCMDASBE 
GreenPump GreenPumpBE O-WBS.pressure Catastrophic  BluePumpBE 
BlueValveBE 
BCMDASBE 
GreenValve GreenValveBE O-WBS.pressure Catastrophic  BluePumpBE 
BlueValveBE 
BCMDASBE 
Direct reading of the FMEA shows that omission of either the BSCU Command unit or 
the SelectorValve directly lead to omission of pressure on the wheel-brake system. This 
absence of brake pressure is identified as a failure with catastrophic severity, and 
therefore single-points of failure CMDBE and selValveBE should be prevented. This 
can be achieved via introduction of backup mechanisms.  
In this case, an AccumulatorPump and a ManualMeterValve are introduced to support 
the hydraulic system. An Accumulator is an energy storage device which contains built 
up pressure that can be released when both Green line and Blue line fail.  The 
Accumulator supports the Alternate pressure line, and when activated the system is said 
to be in Emergency braking mode.  
5.3 Revised Model 
As shown in the revised model illustrated in Figure 62, the AccumulatorValve is 
introduced and placed between SelectorValve and ManualMeterValve. It receives and 
regulates pressure inputs from SelectorValve and AccumulatorPump. The 
AccumulatorValve also receives a signal from BSCU to indicate the activation of 
Alternate mode. When the system is running under Alternate mode and the 
SelectorValve is providing pressure, the AccumulatorValve does not produce any 
output. But in the case where Alternate mode is on and pressure from the SelectorValve 
is absent or falls under threshold, pressure from AccumulatorPump is released and 
supplied instead.  
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The second critical single-point of failure identified by the FMEA of the initial model is 
the combined failure of BSCU command units, denoted as CMDBE; this is a single 
failure representing the internal malfunction in both primary and secondary command 
units. CMDBE results in omission of the braking command signal being fed to the 
CMD/ASMeterValves, which are designed to supply correct value of pressure according 
to braking command. This subsequently results in the omission of both normal and 
alternate pressure lines. One solution to avert this failure is by enabling the system to 
also obtain the braking commands directly from mechanical pedal position of brake 
pedals. This way, failure in BSCU braking command units will only result in the 
absence of skidding prevention instead of complete loss of pressure. ManualMeterValve 
obtains the basic braking command from MechanicalPedal, which reads the pedal 
position input directly. If pressure is provided from AccumulatorValve, 
ManualMeterValve supplies the braking pressure for the system in emergency mode.  
The introduction of new mechanism means that FTA and FMEA analysis need to be 
updated. Iteration of the analyses is made efficient with the semi-automated nature of 
FTA and FMEA facilitated by HiP-HOPS. The results of HiP-HOPS analysis of the 
improved model which includes new components (AccumulatorPump, 
AccumulatorValve, ManualMeterValve and MechanicalPedal) and their failure 
annotations (partly adapted from (Johsi et al., 2006) show that there is no longer any 
single-point of failure. We assume that elimination of single point failure is sufficient 
and the design is deemed to be acceptable for the next stage of the process.  
The process continues with the construction of state machines that can be used for the 
purposes of a BSA.  These should record normal modes where the system delivers its 
main function of delivering brake pressure and degraded modes where assistance 
function like anti-skid have been lost or sacrificed. Anti-skid feature is only provided 
when the system is operated under normal or alternate condition. This is done with the 
simplified assumption that the pedal position command does not propagate any failure. 
NormalP, AlternateP and EmergencyP are intermediate blocks which only propagates 
failures.  
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Figure 62: Revised model for wheel-brake system 
169 
 
5.4 Construction of Mode charts  
The process proceeds to formulate system states based on delivery of functions. As 
mentioned earlier, WBS produces two different functions: provision of pressure and 
anti-skid. Although it is seemingly similar to the Brake-by-wire study presented in 
Chapter 4 (provision of brake pressure and ABS functions), we take slightly a different 
approach in grouping system modes according to the different way the model is 
presented.  
Based on the delivery of these functions and the different hydraulic lines through which 
pressure can be supplied, one possible way to categorize system modes is as the 
following:  
1) Normal (WBS_Normal) mode: where hydraulic pressure is provided by Green 
line, and anti-skid function is present.  
2) Degraded1 (WBSD1_ALTERNATE): where hydraulic pressure is provided by 
Blue line, and anti-skid function is present.  
3) Degraded2 (WBSD2_EMERGENCY): where hydraulic pressure is provided by 
Accumulator pump and anti-skid function is absent.  
4) Fail (WBS_FAIL): where there is no hydraulic pressure provided.  
Transitions between these modes can be formulated with the help of FMEA-ModeChart 
assistance table:  
Mode  Severity  Functions 
Delivered  
Functional 
Failure 
Causing 
Transition  
Target  Mode  
WBS_Normal - Hydraulic 
pressure 
supplied 
through normal 
(green) line and 
anti-skid 
function  is 
delivered  
O-NormalP WBSD1_ALTERNATE 
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WBSD1_ALTERNATE Marginal  Hydraulic 
pressure 
supplied 
through 
alternate(blue) 
line and anti-
skid function is 
delivered   
O-AlternateP WBSD2_EMERGENCY  
WBSD2_EMERGENCY Critical Hydraulic 
pressure 
supplied 
through 
emergency line  
O-
EmergencyP 
WBS_FAIL  
WBS_FAIL Catastrophic  No pressure 
supplied  
- - 
 
Mode chart for WBS can be constructed based on the information from assistance table, 
which is shown in Figure 63 below:  
 
Figure 63: Abstract state machine for wheel brake system   
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5.5 Model Design Evolution from Requirement Verifications  
Having constructed the abstract mode chart, we could then refine the state machines to 
engage the component behaviour. Translation from HiP-HOPS model to NuSMV 
automata model can be performed as described previously (please see section 3.8). This 
subsequently allows us to perform verifications on system model to ensure that it 
satisfies certain safety properties. As the design advances, both the formal model and 
safety properties are further refined to facilitate necessary lower level verification. It is 
then common to refine the state machine by including more specific parameter values 
(e.g. WBS pressure threshold in this case). 
Verification can be performed with or without constraints on the maximum number of 
faults that can occur. A scenario for this example can be the verification of the property 
that: “When there is omission of normal pressure, alternate will always replace it”. This 
property will not hold because after a certain number of component failures, alternate 
line will eventually fail. The specification can be revised by including specific 
assumptions, for example denoting the number of individual component failures 
deemed acceptable. 
Another interesting aspect of model-checking of this system can be discovered during 
the verification of simple properties like:  
SR5: “When output is not supplied by Normal Line, and there is no failure accounted in 
Alternate line, pressure shall be supplied from Alternate line” 
This property does not hold, and NuSMV produces a counterexample trace that 
demonstrates how the condition is breached. The counter example describes a scenario 
where although omission in output from CMD/ASMeterValveG (Normal line) is 0, input 
deviation and internal malfunction in CMD/ASMeterValveB (Alternate line) is 0, output 
for Alternate line – which is expected to be 1 in this situation – is also 0.   
Upon quick inspection, it is identified that the cause lies in the fact that the system 
employs dynamic cold standby. This information has been added manually to the 
NuSMV (state machine) models to reflect the different types of pressure line, and that 
only one can be active at one time. This means that the backup component is activated 
only when the primary component fails. To model this, we incorporate „activation‟ 
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control as part of the dynamic behaviour modelling of the backup component. 
Activation signal is essentially used to indicate whether the component is expected to 
provide output. This is particularly useful to accurately describe an omission failure. In 
describing an omission failure, it is important to distinguish between absence of 
component output due to the component being not activated (not needed) or due to 
actual failures. Therefore, it is no longer sufficient to define the output of a component 
exclusively based on the negation of omission output, but to also take into consideration 
whether the component is activated. Manual intervention is required to include this 
additional information on as it was not contained in the CSA model.  
To ensure that activation signal is taken into consideration within the modelling of 
CMD/ASMeterValveB for Alternate line, the following simple description exemplifies 
how output and omission of output can be described:  
Omission-Output = Omission-Input OR internal_malfunction 
Output = Active AND NOT(Omission-Output) 
Activation properties can be introduced to describe a set of conditions related to the 
component(s) activation. This helps outline the assumptions needed for verification of a 
safety properties, e.g. to check whether a specification holds when a certain component, 
or a set of components, are activated. For example, we could define activation of 
BackupComponents as the activation of either meter valve in Alternate line or the 
activation of accumulator valve. This enables us to verify properties such as the 
following safety requirement: 
SR6: When Normal line is functioning, no backup mechanism shall be activated.  
Which can be expressed in the following CTL statements, where Backup_Active 
representing condition when either green or blue meter valves are active:  
Backup_Active := CMD/ASMeterValveB.Active  OR AccumulatorValve.Active 
AG((WBS.Status = Normal) -> NOT(Backup_Active)) 
Information to describe assumptions and activation control like this requires manual 
intervention, as they are not captured in the initial CSA annotated model.  
Further examples of how component activation (or their deactivation) can affect the 
modelling and analysis assumptions in Altarica models can be found in (Bieber et al., 
2002).  
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In NuSMV automata model, an activation signal can be passed as an independent input 
parameter or can be assigned from the observation of other relevant input parameters 
(for example, the absence of specific component input). It is also possible to model the 
failure in the activation signal itself. However, in this example, the activation signal is 
assumed to be reliable and not associated with any failure.  
Verification is also useful to uncover overlooked flaws in design. For example, another 
counterexample is produced when we are trying to verify the following properties:  
SR7: When both Normal line and Alternate line are not producing output, as long as 
there is no failure accounted along the emergency line, the system shall not fail. 
This property, again, does not hold and NuSMV returns a counterexample. The 
counterexample indicates that it is possible for a situation to occur such that: when 
internal malfunction CMDBE occurs in BSCU command units – resulting in omission 
failure in both Normal and Alternate lines due to the absence of braking command – the 
AccumulatorValve does not produce output. This subsequently leads to the omission of 
output in the Emergency line, causing the system to fail.  
Upon closer inspection on the counterexample, it is revealed that this is because 
AccumulatorValve is assigned to monitor output from SelectorValve.  It is designed only 
to produce output when SelectorValve fails to supply pressure when system is in 
Alternate mode. In this situation, however, SelectorValve is functioning correctly by 
supplying pressure, and therefore AccumulatorValve does not output any pressure. This 
result in the absence of pressure supplied to ManualMeterValve, and subsequently 
absence of emergency line which lead to system failure.  
In comparison to an analysis performed based on CSA alone, this weakness would not 
have been detected. For example, we assume that condition „system fails‟ refers to the 
top event Omission of WBS system, which could be modelled as:  
O-WBS = O-NormalP AND O-AlternateP AND O-EmergencyP 
For the analysis of requirement SR7, assumption is made that all the minimal cut sets 
for O-EmergencyP are false. The following presents list of minimal cut sets for O-
EmergencyP: 
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MechanicalPedal.MPedalBE 
ManualMeterValve.ManualMBE 
BSCU.MonitorBE 
AccumulatorValve.AccValveBE 
AccumulatorPump.AccumPumpBE AND SelectorValve.selValveBE 
AccumulatorPump.AccumPumpBE AND BlueValve.BlueValveBE 
AccumulatorPump.AccumPumpBE AND BluePump.BluePumpBE 
In the occurrence of BSCU.CMDBE failure which causes omission in both O-Normal 
and O-Alternate, if all these minimal cut sets for O-EmergencyP are false, O-
EmergencyP is false. This implies that failure O-WBS will be false, indicating that the 
system will not fail. This could lead to a false belief that the design fulfilled SR7.  
Model checker has demonstrated how weakness in logical connection like this can be 
uncovered.  
One way to rectify this design weakness is by assigning AccumulatorValve to monitor 
output directly from CMD/ASMeterValveB. If output is not produced when system is on 
Alternate mode, AccumulatorValve should be activated and supply the required 
pressure. The following Figure 64 illustrates the revised model, which is assumed to 
have fulfilled the hypothetical list of safety requirements.  
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Figure 64: Revised model developed with assistance of model-checker  
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In summary, the application of IACoB and corresponding analysis results could help to 
either increase confidence about the safety of the design or identify design weaknesses 
that stimulate design iterations.  
As it has been demonstrated in this case study, CSA and BSA techniques described can 
be iterated as the design evolves and undergoes changes and refinements. Overall, the 
process can contribute towards a more controlled approach towards safety, which does 
not allow safety properties simply to emerge at the end, but attempts to guide the design 
using the result of a continuous safety assessment.  
5.6 Chapter Summary  
This chapter presented a second case study on an aircraft wheel-brake system. To 
demonstrate the application of IACoB at a later stage, an architectural model of the 
system was presented. This case study focused mainly on the value of the model 
checking and how it influences the evolution of the design. IACoB starts with the FTA 
and FMEA performed on the initial model. This provided an assessment of the fault 
tolerant level of the system, and the identification of the system critical points. The 
model was revised based on these analysis results, before model checking was 
performed to verify safety properties or functional correctness of the components. 
Through the model checking, we discovered several behavioural aspects of the model 
which can be improved, which otherwise, could not be detected through the use of 
FTA/FMEA alone. These mainly involved control logic (for example, the activation 
control of a component).  
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CHAPTER 6. Detectability   
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 discussed the potential contribution of IACoB in fault tolerant 
design. The discussion so far has been focused on identifying critical points in the 
design, e.g. single points of hazardous failure, and on producing recommendations e.g. 
on location of functional and architectural redundancies. This chapter explores another 
aspect of fault tolerant design, that of “fault detection”.   
The term fault detection typically describes the process of identifying disturbances in 
processes and deviations from intended behaviour typically caused by component 
failures. Successful early fault detection means that measures can be taken to prevent 
the propagation of such disturbances. Fault detection has become increasingly important 
in many technical processes. 
Components often incorporate mechanisms for detecting errors propagated through a 
system. These mechanisms, in practice, can also fail to detect the faults. The notion of 
detectability used in this thesis precisely refers to the probability of fault detection to be 
performed correctly.  
6.1 Detectability in FMEA  
In the current industrial practice, it is possible to extend an FMEA table with an 
additional column to allow description of the „Detectability‟ of each failure. This can be 
done by identifying the means of detection, typically a monitoring mechanism that 
relies on observation of system parameters or an internal testing mechanism that 
constantly checks the health of a component. By studying this information, it is 
subsequently possible to establish how likely it is that the corresponding failure is 
detected. A detectability number can be assigned to rank the ability of these inspection 
techniques to detect failure modes. Detectability table, for example one that is presented 
in the Table 18 can be used to associate detection likelihood and the detection number. 
The assigned detectability number measures the probability of the failure goes 
undetected, which means a higher detection number signifies a higher probability that 
the failure goes undetected and therefore a lower probability of detection.  
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 Table 18: Detection Evaluation Criteria (Quality Associates, 1997) 
Detection  Criteria  Rank 
Absolute 
Uncertainty 
Design control will not and/or detect failure model; or there is no 
design control  
10 
 
Very Remote  Design control has very remote chance to detect failure mode  9  
Remote Design control has remote chance to detect failure mode  8 
Very Low  Design control has very low chance to detect failure mode  7 
Low  Design control has low chance to detect failure mode  6 
Moderate Design control has moderate chance to detect failure mode 5 
Moderately High  Design control has moderately high chance to detect failure mode  4 
High  Design control has high chance to detect failure mode  3 
Very High  Design control has very high chance to detect failure mode  2 
Almost Certain  Design control will almost certainly detect failure mode  1 
An example fragment from the FMEA table of a vehicle braking system is given in 
Table 19. Failure of function to provide Pressure (Primary and Backup) leads to 
omission of braking. This failure can be detected with a pressure sensor, with a high 
likelihood of correct detection.  
Table 19: Example of FMEA Table Extended with Detectability information  
Function 
  
Failure 
Mode 
Effects  Contributing 
Failure  
Severity  Detection 
Method  
Detectability 
Number  
Primary 
Pressure 
Internal 
Failure  
Omission of 
Braking   
Backup 
Pressure  
Catastrophic Can be detected 
locally using 
feedback from 
pressure sensor  
2 
... ... ... ... ... ... ... 
 
This calculation of detectability numbers in the FMEA is often used as part of the 
calculation for a Risk Priority Number (RPN). The RPN in a FMEA serves as a 
threshold value for evaluation of an action (or recommendation) against failure modes. 
An RPN is determined by calculating the product of severity, occurrence and 
detectability rankings. Recommended evaluation criteria for severity and occurrence can 
be found in (Quality Associates, 1997). Similar to severity ranking (discussed in 
Chapter 3), RPNs can be used to assist prioritisation of failure management.  
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6.2 Detection and Response to Failures  
At the level of system architecture, fault detection commonly involves monitoring 
functions which check variables against anticipated behaviour and generate alarms 
when necessary. Related functions often include automatic protection functions which 
initiate counteractions in response to detected hazardous failure; and fault diagnostic 
functions that locate the root causes of detected faults. For simplicity, we use the term 
detection module to represent the collection of these fault detection and response 
mechanisms, and the term target module to represent the systems or components it 
supervises.   
In practice, „detection modules‟ can be refined into several different types. (Adachi et 
al., 2010) and (Torres-Pomales, 2000) discuss four different types of common 
(particularly in software) fault detection and fault tolerance techniques: self-protection, 
self-checking, checkpoint-restart, and process-pair. Each technique uses a different 
approach in detecting and handling failure, e.g. by blocking or mitigating input failures 
to prevent them from reaching the target module, or by preventing a failure in its target 
module from propagating. 
Self-protection aims to protect the target module by ensuring that it is protected from 
external disturbances. This is done by detecting failures propagated from other (input) 
modules. Self-protection is able to detect all failure modes, but does not possess any 
mechanism to recover from detected failures. Therefore self-protection is often assumed 
to fail-silent when it detects failure.  
Self-checking enables detection of an internal error within the target module itself, and 
aims to block or mitigate the propagation of this failure. It requires internal information 
of the target module, and ports are established to enable this communication. When an 
internal failure occurs in the target module, the information will be sent to the self-
checking module. If the self-checking module successfully detects the failure, it blocks 
or reduces the failure. For instance, by, replacing the missing value with default 
parameter value and feeding it back to target module. This allows the target module to 
continue to work appropriately, unless when self-checking experiences failure itself. 
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The Checkpoint-restart technique detects failures and enables recovery by restarting the 
target module to a predefined restore-point. The Process-pair technique, on the other 
hand, employs redundancy which includes two identical modules. Its detection and 
recovery mechanisms are similar to those of checkpoint-restart but when failure is 
detected, a process-pair can complete execution without returning to stored check-
points. Instead, it uses redundant secondary module and when failure is detected, it 
switches from primary module to the secondary module.  
Logically, these fault tolerant techniques could perform their different mitigation 
strategies only after they successfully detect anomalies in target modules. Traditional 
limit-value based supervision methods of monitoring and automatic protection is often 
done by checking the measurable output variables against allowed limits. Although this 
is a simple and reliable technique, Isermann (Isermann, 2004) highlights its main 
limitation in that they often rely on relatively large change in the measurements, either 
after a large sudden failure or longer-lasting gradually increasing failure. It further 
discusses model-based fault detection techniques (for example, methods which are 
based on parameter estimation, parity equations, and state observers). Although these 
techniques improve classical fault detection methods, in practice there are cases where 
the detection module experience subtle failure and these failures affect the effectiveness 
of detection. Consequently, there is a need to represent and take into consideration the 
failure of the “detection module” itself during the modelling of the system failure 
behaviour.  This is precisely an area where this thesis has hoped to make a contribution. 
6.3 General Modelling of Detectability  
The inability of a detection module to correctly detect failure of the target module also 
means inability to take corrective action.  Further analysis shows a number of common 
scenarios:  
1) Case 1: The detection module fails to detect, and the failure of the target module is 
simply propagated to other parts of the system.  
2) Case 2: The detection module wrongly signals detected failure and inadvertently 
acts in the absence of failure in the target component.  
181 
 
3) Case 3: The detection module correctly detects failure, but then malfunctions and 
corrective measures fail to correct the failure of the target component.  
These scenarios highlight the different situations where a failure in detection module 
does not only cause the inability to prevent failure (through provision of counteraction), 
but also potentially affect the transformation between different failure types, or even 
the occurrence of new failures stemming from the detection module itself.  
Transformation between different failure types can also sometimes be part of the 
nominal behaviour of the detection module. In some scenarios, it is regarded as 
acceptable to transform one hazardous failure into different type of failure which has 
less hazardous consequences. For example, in a fail-silent scheme, the detection module 
is responsible for transforming value or commission failures into omission failures. But 
this failure transformation can only occur after the detection module has successfully 
detected the value or commission failure.  Note that to model this, it is no longer 
sufficient to represent failure behaviour because the “success” of the detection module 
can also contribute to a different more benign failure effect.  In this case, failure of the 
detection module means propagation of hazardous commission and value failures, while 
its success means transformation of these hazardous failures to more benign omissions. 
In order to describe such situations in the context of CSA, and more specifically in HiP-
HOPS analysis, we introduce the following general representation to describe the 
behaviour of a detection module:  
1) Event Failure (representing internal malfunction):  An internal malfunction of a 
detection module can affect failure behaviour just like any other component 
malfunction, and can be treated and analyzed as such. Figure 65 below illustrates an 
example of how internal malfunction Failure in detection module can play a part in 
the modelling of system failure. Detection_Module supervises the output of 
Target_Module. In the occurrence of internal malfunction BE, which causes 
omission failure, Detection_Module performs counteraction and provides correct 
output. However, Failure in Detection_Module alone is enough to cause omission 
failure. The omission failure expression of Detection_Module can be summarized 
as: 
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O-Detection_Module.Out = Failure 
 
 
2) Event Miss: We assign a separate event to represent the occurrence of situations 
where the detection module fails to detect target module failure. Event Miss causes 
the failure of the target module failure to go undetected. For example, Figure 66 
illustrates a situation where omission in Detection_Module can also be caused by it 
failing to detect omission in input deviation from Target_Module. This can be 
expressed as:  
 
O-Detection_Module.Out = Failure OR (Miss AND O-In1)
 
 
 
 
3) Event NOT Miss (¬Miss): To describe situations where detection module in its 
working condition causes a failure, the complement event Not Miss is introduced. One 
common use of Not Miss is in the representation of failure transformation. For 
example, in Figure 66, a timing failure in Detection_Module can be caused by it 
detecting an omission failure in Target_Module. This happens when it tries to recover 
Target 
_Module  
Detection_
Module  
Failure  BE  
Out In 
Target 
_Module  
Detection_
Module  
Failure  BE  
Out In 
Miss 
Figure 66: Event Miss in Detection_Module  
Figure 65: Internal malfunction in Detection Module  
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(e.g. provide) the omitted parameter, and in doing so, become late in the timing. This 
can be expressed as:  
 
T-Detection_Module.Out= ¬Miss & (O-In) 
Classical HiP-HOPS modelling only uses coherent failure logic that uses AND and OR 
gates. The proposed type of modelling which also incorporates NOT gates enables to 
distinguish between success and failure and represent different effects in these two 
circumstances. With this modelling, it is now possible to represent all scenarios of 
failure presented in Cases 1 to 3 above.  
6.4 General Analysis of Detectability  
In HiP-HOPS analysis, events Failure and event Miss are treated like any other 
component internal malfunctions. In fault tree synthesis these are regarded as basic 
events. Consequently, the HiP-HOPS analysis techniques presented in Chapter 2, more 
specifically the MICSUP algorithm, can be used in fault tree analysis.  
The inclusion of the complement ¬Miss, however, creates some complications. ¬Miss 
is implemented with the use of the NOT operator in fault trees. Traditionally, the use of 
negation of a failure event in failure modelling has generally been discouraged for 
several reasons. Firstly, it is often assumed that a component in its working condition 
should not contribute to system failure. In cases where it does, traditional solutions 
often suggest design modification to prevent it. It is also a common notion that the 
probability of the negation of failure event is almost always close to 1 which means it 
can be safely ignored in quantitative analysis. The inclusion of „NOT‟ also results in the 
introduction of non-coherent structure which increases the complexity of analysis. 
Despite these arguments, (Johnston & Mathews, 1983) and (Sharvia & Papadopoulos, 
2008) reviewed several scenarios where inclusion of NOT benefits failure modelling. 
These include conditions where the failure probability of a component becomes 
significant enough for the working probability to be included in quantitative analysis. 
This is often true in conditions that exceed the operation specification for a component. 
The NOT operator is also important in the failure modelling of some multitasking and 
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phased-mission systems. In other cases, the use of negation operator also assists the 
development of repair schedule for components.  
In addition to these, we also argue that the use of negated event is required to allow 
more accurate representation of detectability in a model.  
One alternative to using negated events is by treating the absence of failure Miss as a 
separate independent event. For example, by using new event Catch to represent this 
case instead of ¬Miss, which subsequently allows the model to maintain coherent 
structure. This, however, has been known to cause inaccuracy in the quantitative 
analysis (for example, calculation of failure probability), as demonstrated later in the 
example section. This is very likely due to the way quantitative analysis is performed in 
non-coherent structure, where „hidden‟ cut sets (termed prime implicants in non-
coherent structure) can potentially be produced.   
To facilitate this type of modelling for detectability, HiP-HOPS has been extended with 
the ability to perform non-coherent analysis (Sharvia, 2008). The analysis of non-
coherent fault trees in HiP-HOPS is implemented through an extension to MICSUP 
algorithm to allow iterated Consensus. The Consensus Law states that:  
A.B  + ¬A.C = A.B  + ¬A.C + B.C 
Which describes that if event B causes system failure when event A fails, and event C 
causes system failure when event A works, then the combination of event B and event C 
will inevitably causes system failure regardless the state of A. In such circumstances, 
then B.C is known as a „hidden‟ prime implicant set that can be identified by the 
application of consensus.  
To enable quantitative analysis, quantitative information can be assigned to each of 
these detectability parameters. For example, for the calculation of probability of events 
in the model, failure rate can be assigned for internal malfunctions of type Failure, 
and a fixed probability value can be assigned for events Miss and ¬Miss. In practice, the 
assignment of this detectability probability often relies on the degree of dependence. 
For a module with higher dependence on other modules (for example, because it 
requires information processed by other modules), the probability of Miss is likely to be 
high.  
185 
 
In an NuSMV model, detectability information can be translated to and treated as part 
of the module internal variable.  
  
6.5 Example  
6.5.1 Cruise Control System  
This section presents a simplified adaptive cruise control system to demonstrate the 
application of detectability analysis. The system assists the driver by automatically 
adjusting vehicle speed to maintain safe following distance. It typically uses a radar 
sensor to monitor the vehicle in front and adjust vehicle speed to keep it at a pre-set 
following distance. The system is also extended with a brake support function.  
Figure 67 illustrates the functional structure of the basic adaptive cruise system. It is an 
adaptation of a related driving assistance system, pre-collision detection system, 
presented in (Adachi et al., 2010). The system gets its input from a set of sensors 
including Radar_Sensor, Speed_Sensor, Pedal_Sensor, Switch_Sensor. Radar_Sensor 
provides reading from the wave radar. Speed_Sensor provides information about the 
current speed of the vehicle. Pedal_Sensor provides information on the driver‟s 
operation (for example, input in accelerator or brake pedals). Switch_Sensor provides 
information on the selection of modes (for example whether cruise control is activated). 
And Memory provides information on pre-stored data.  
Monitoring_Module gathers information from several sensors and provides signals 
regarding distance and relative speed of the vehicle ahead. This pre-processed 
information is then passed to Logic_Module which computes the distance between the 
vehicles and determines how fast the vehicle is approaching the vehicle ahead. Based on 
the pre-set desired following distance, it determines the appropriate time to start 
deceleration (or acceleration when the traffic is cleared).  Brake_Support system aims to 
provide effective braking and assistance in cases when collision is imminent. For 
example, in design discussed in (Ford, 2010), if pressure on accelerator pedal is released 
quickly, indicating driver‟s desire to slow down, the system can apply brake pads 
against the brake disk even before the driver presses the brake pedal.  This decelerates 
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the vehicle faster than the driver can move their foot to the brake pedal. In doing so, it 
shortens braking reaction time and braking distance. This information is supplied to 
Cruise_Control, which coordinates the information and decides on appropriate actions. 
It sends signals to corresponding Actuator_Module (i.e. brake or throttle) to perform 
appropriate actions.  
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Figure 67: Cruise Control System 
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One way to demonstrate the contribution of detectability modelling is through 
quantitative analysis of the effect of detection of component failures to the failure 
probability (or unreliability) of the system. Before quantitative data is assigned, we 
annotate the cruise control system with failure information. To maintain simplicity, each 
input sensor is assigned with a uniform internal malfunction BE and each of the other 
main modules is assigned with two internal malfunctions, BE1 and BE2.   BE1 is a 
failure that is generically related to omission and value failure (for example, failure in 
physical or hardware), while BE2 is a failure that is generically related to timing and 
commission failure (for example, failure in software algorithm).  
Hypothetical failure rates are assigned for each of the internal malfunction to illustrate 
the validity of approach. The failure rate for internal malfunction in sensors and 
memory (BE) is assigned at  = 1.15×10−7 and failure rates of internal malfunction in 
other modules (BE1 and BE2) are assigned at  4.6×10−7 and  = 1.12×10−6 
respectively.  
The following table presents the summary of failure expressions for the output 
deviations in the cruise control system modules. Omission, commission and value 
failures at module outputs are discussed:   
Table 20: Failure information for Cruise Control functions 
Function Output Deviation Failure Expression  
(All) Sensors O-out  BE 
C-out  BE 
V-out  BE 
Monitoring_Module  O-out BE1 OR O-in1 OR O-in2  
C-out BE2  OR C-in1 OR C-in2  
V-out  BE1 OR V-in1 OR V-in2 
Logic_Module O-out BE1 OR O-in1 OR O-in2 
C-out BE2 OR C-in1 OR V-in1 OR V-in2 
V-out BE1 OR V-in1 OR V-in2 
Brake_Support  O-out BE1 OR (O-in1 AND O-in2) OR O-
in3 
C-out BE2 OR C-in1 OR C-in2 OR V-in1 
OR V-in2  
V-out BE1 OR V-in1 OR V-in2 OR V-in3  
Cruise_Control O-out  BE1 OR O-in1 OR O-in2 OR O-in3 
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OR O-in4 
C-out  BE2 OR C-in1 OR C-in2 OR C-in3 
OR C-in4  
V-out  BE1 OR V-in1 OR V-in2 OR V-in3 
OR V-in4  
Actuator_Module  O-out  BE1 or O-in1 
C-out  BE2 or C-in1 
V-out  BE1 or V-in1 
6.5.2 Detectability in Cruise Control  
Once the model is annotated, we perform analysis on the cruise control system without 
the inclusion of any fault tolerance technique. For the purposes of this discussion, the 
quantitative analysis is performed examining omission, commission and value failures 
of Actuator_Module (which can be expressed as O-Actuator_Module.out, C-
Actuator_Module.out, and V-Actuator_Module.out respectively) which form the top 
event if fault trees and effects in FMEAs produced by HiP-HOPS. With the failure rates 
provided, the probability of these events can be calculated.  
We assume that in the earlier stage of analysis, C-Actuator_Module.out has been 
identified as being more critical than the other failure types. The process to identify 
critical points in the system contributing to this failure can be performed (as discussed 
previously in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4), and detection modules can be assigned 
accordingly to address this.  To maintain the simplicity of this example, although there 
are a number of contributing internal malfunctions that can contribute to C-
Actuator_Module (for example, BE in input sensors or BE2 in Logic_Module among 
others), we place focus on Monitoring_Module and Brake_Support.  
The detection modules to be added in this architecture can be realized in various 
implementations, adopting different structures and characteristics.  In practice, multi-
objective optimisation techniques can be employed to help determine the optimal 
solutions. HiP-HOPS itself incorporates multi-objective optimisation capabilities 
(Parker, 2010), but their use was deemed out of scope in this work.   
Here we arbitrarily select one possible implementation of detection modules. It is 
presented as a basis for evaluating detectability and therefore by no means represents an 
optimal design solution. Although in practice each detection module might possess 
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different configuration and fault tolerant characteristic, all detection modules in this 
example are identical in their function, they all enforce fail-silence in response to 
detected commission failures. Figure 68 illustrates the design of the system with 
detection modules incorporated. The detection module placed between 
Monitoring_Module and Logic_Module, DM_LM, aims to prevent further failure 
propagation from Monitoring_Module. To achieve this, detection module DM_LM 
transforms commission and value failure into omission failure. The detection module 
placed between Brake_Support and Cruise_Control modules, DM_CC, has the same 
objective and causes failure propagated from Brake_Support to fail silent.  
With the rationale that fault tolerant components are reasonably more reliable than its 
target modules, the failure rates for internal malfunctions Failure in DM_LM and 
DM_CC are both assigned a lower failure rate of  = 1.12×10−7. The probability of 
event Miss in detection modules is assigned a fixed probability of   
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Figure 68: Cruise Control with Detection Module  
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Table 21 summarizes the failure expression of detection modules DM_LM and DM_CC. 
Table 21: Failure information for Detection Modules  
Function Output Deviation Failure Expression  
DM_LM O-out  Failure OR  O-in OR (¬Miss AND (C-in OR V-
in)) 
C-out  Miss AND C-in 
V-out  Miss AND V-in 
DM_CC  O-out  Failure OR  O-in OR (¬Miss AND (C-in OR V-
in)) 
C-out  Miss AND C-in 
V-out  Miss AND V-in 
One obvious effect of the introduction of detection modules is the improvement in 
system reliability. For example, for top event C-Actuator_Module.out, probability 
declines from 0.064 to 0.039 with the use of detection modules. Probability for top 
event V-Actuator_Module.out also decreases from 0.028 to 0.018. This is compensated 
by the increase in probability for top event O-Actuator_Module from 0.028 to 0.058 as 
other failure types are transformed into omission failure. But since omission is deemed 
more benign than inadvertent application of function, this is acceptable.  
To show the significance of detectability modelling, we also compare the analysis 
between situations where detection modules are assumed to model only internal 
malfunction that represents its own failure behaviour (Failure) and situations where in 
addition to this, they also models scenarios where they fail to detect failures of the 
target module (Miss). As expected, the probability for all top events of fault trees 
increase as Miss is introduced. A Summary of tabulated analysis results is presented in 
APPENDIX C.    
The significance of the inclusion of detectability modelling in enabling a more accurate 
qualitative analysis should also be highlighted. For example, the transformation of 
commission and value failures to omission failure requires the Miss event not to occur. 
To accurately model omission failure DM_LM which expresses this condition, the Not 
Miss event is employed. This allows the failure expression to be written as:  
O-DM_LM.out = failure OR O-in OR (¬miss AND (C-in OR V-in)) 
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As mentioned earlier, the inclusion of the NOT operator results in a non-coherent 
analysis. To maintain a coherent fault tree structure, ¬Miss event can be replaced with 
an independent catch event.  
The incorporation of the NOT operator in the failure expression of the detection module 
can have a significant quantitative effect on the probabilities of system-level output 
deviation (Actuator_Module). It can either increase or decrease the probability of 
system failure according to the (different) sets of prime implicants produced compared 
to the use Catch.  
To examine this option of treating ¬Miss as an independent new event Catch, we will 
use a revised version of the model. We now introduce a new processing module and an 
additional detection module into the cruise control system as shown in Figure 69. The 
new processing module, Fading_Brake (Autopressnews, 2006) aims to gradually build 
up the braking pressure in conjunction with constantly hard braking to help reduce the 
risk of wear and retained pedal feeling. It supplies information to achieve this to 
Brake_Support module. Fading_Brake possesses identical internal malfunctions (BE1 
and BE2) and failure rates to the other main processing modules.  
The detection module DM_FB is attached to Fading_Brake and operates in a similar 
way to a backup structure or a check-point-restart technique described in (Adachi et al., 
2010). When Fading_Brake experiences failure, DM_FB restarts the module to a pre-
stored reset checkpoint. This subsequently causes transformation between different 
failure types. For example, when DM_FB detects omission or failure in Fading_Brake 
and resets the module, a value failure will inevitably occur as parameters reset into (and 
execution continue from) their pre-stored point. Similar to previous detection modules, 
the failure of DM_FB is assigned at  = 1.12×10−7 with probability of event Miss 
.  
  
194 
 
 
 
Figure 69: Cruise Control System with Fading Brake 
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Table 22 summarizes the failure information for Fading_Brake module, detection 
module DM_FB and updated Brake_Support. Based on this failure information, the 
system model is updated and analyzed.  
Table 22: Failure Information for Cruise Control with Fading Brake  
Function Output Deviation Failure Expression  
Fading_Brake O-Out  BE1 
C-Out BE2 
V-Out BE1 
DM_FB O-Out  Failure OR (Miss AND O-in)  
C-Out Miss AND C-in  
V-Out (NOT Miss AND (C-in OR O-in) ) OR V-in  
Brake_Support  O-out BE1 OR (O-in1 AND O-in2) OR O-in3 OR O-in4 
C-out BE2 OR C-in1 OR C-in2 OR V-in1 OR V-in2  
V-out BE1 OR V-in1 OR V-in2 OR V-in3 OR V-in4 
To demonstrate the role of non-coherent structure, we replace ¬Miss event with an 
independent Catch event in the expression. This time the analysis produces more 
interesting results. The probability for top event O-Actuator_Module.Out with the use 
of ¬Miss in all detection modules is 0.072, and when Catch is used as replacement the 
probability changes into 0.064. This is a substantial disparity in probability which can 
mislead designers into accepting models which do not meet reliability requirements.  
This disparity in probability calculation can be attributed (as explained previously) to 
hidden prime implicants generated through Consensus algorithm. This is demonstrated 
by further studying the resultant prime implicant sets. Although the analysis of both 
fault trees produces the same number (19) of prime implicant sets, the sets are not 
completely identical.  
The full prime implicant sets for both fault trees are included in the Appendix D. We 
compare the prime implicant sets produced by both fault trees (NOT Miss and Catch 
regarded as interchangeable accordingly) and the following differences are highlighted:  
1) The following prime implicant is produced by analysis of non-coherent fault tree 
(uses NOT Miss), but is not contained within the coherent fault tree (uses Catch):  
Monitoring_Module.BE2 AND DM_CC.NOT_Miss  (exp.1)  
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2) The following prime implicant is produced by analysis of coherent fault tree but 
contained within the non-coherent fault tree:  
Monitoring_Module.BE2 AND DM_CC.Catch AND DM_LM.Miss    (exp.2)   
To understand these differences, we studied the rest of the prime implicant sets which 
are identical between the fault trees. Upon closer inspection, it is identified that prime 
implicant MonitoringModule.BE2 AND DM_LM.NOT_Miss and 
Monitoring_Module.BE2 AND DM_CC.NOT_Miss AND DM_LM.Miss (or 
Monitoring_Module.BE2 AND DM_CC.Catch AND DM_LM.Miss) are originally 
produced from the analysis of both fault trees. The difference is that in the analysis of 
the non-coherent fault tree, these prime implicants produce a new hidden prime 
implicant through Consensus (exp.1): Monitoring_Module.BE2 AND 
DM_CC.NOT_Miss. Occurence of the latter is sufficient to cause system-level failure 
regardless of the presence of  DM_LM.NOT_Miss or DM_LM. Miss. This in turns 
eliminates Monitoring_Module.BE2 AND DM_CC.Catch AND DM_LM.Miss (exp.2) 
which becomes redundant. On the other hand, the coherent fault tree is not able to 
establish the link between event Miss and Catch, and is therefore unable to produce the 
hidden prime implicant in (exp.1). It subsequently retains (exp.2).  
This demonstrates that the use of NOT operator (and non-coherent analysis) helps 
produce a more accurate result in detectability analysis. In the translation process of a 
model to NuSMV, the parameters for detectability can be included in the module 
internal variables like other basic events.  
6.6 Chapter Summary  
This chapter introduced the concept of detectability in the context of CSA, which 
describes the ability of a module to correctly detect errors.  Its role within fault tolerant 
design is explored. The method introduces failure-relevant parameters, which model the 
events where errors are correctly detected (or not) in addition to the internal malfunction 
of the detection module. These parameters can be modelled as part of the failure 
information in HiP-HOPS.  
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The general analysis of these parameters can be performed as a part of the CSA 
analysis. Commonly-used fault tree analysis algorithms can be used, except for the 
events where errors are detected (i.e. it is NOT missed by detection module). This 
notion of detecting error correctly leads to the inclusion of NOT operator, and 
subsequently a non-coherent fault tree structure.  To enable the analysis of non-coherent 
fault tree, HiP-HOPS synthesis and analysis algorithms were extended, and Consensus 
algorithm was implemented.  
The use of NOT operator in a fault tree has been long debated. Here in the context of 
detectability, we showed how it affects the accuracy of quantitative analysis. A small 
example of cruise control system is presented to show the application of detectability. In 
an effort to maintain a coherent structure of the fault tree, an alternative was explored. 
The use of NOT operator has been shown to contribute to a more accurate top-event 
probability calculation.  
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CHAPTER 7. Conclusions  
7.1 Contributions  
Compositional Safety Analysis and behavioural safety analysis techniques have 
emerged as two separate and competing paradigms for performing model-based safety 
analysis.  
This thesis argued that the traditional gap between the two approaches can be overcome, 
as CSA and BSA are effectively combined in a novel model-based design and safety 
analysis process which therefore benefits from the advantages of both approaches, 
namely the flexibility, early applicability and scalability of CSA and the precision, 
behavioural analysis capabilities and detailed insights offered by BSA (see also 
statement of “hypothesis” in Introduction).     
To assess and support this research hypothesis, several objectives were defined. In the 
following discussion, we revisit these objectives and summarize how, and to what 
extent, they have been achieved: 
Objective 1. To examine CSA and BSA techniques and investigate their strengths, 
limitations, and application in different stages of design development. This thesis 
determines complementary aspects of these techniques that can be exploited via 
synergistic combined application. 
This thesis investigated CSA and BSA characteristics and identified potential for 
integration. The review of several prominent CSA and BSA techniques presented in 
Chapter 2 provides insight into the different characteristics, working mechanisms and 
applicability of each technique.  
The strength of CSA lies in the simplicity of its Boolean-based analysis approach. This 
makes it possible for safety analysis to be performed in a quick and iterative manner. 
Fault tree synthesis can be performed in linear time and overall the analysis scales up to 
large and complex models. CSA also facilitates a „divide-and-conquer‟ approach which 
becomes the basis of its compositional nature. The failure analysis of a complex system 
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can be constructed based on the composition of failure analyses of its components. This 
subsequently makes the process easily manageable. CSA also produces safety artefacts, 
namely fault trees and FMEA, which are familiar to safety analysts and therefore eases 
their engagement. CSA is generally used for reliability engineering and it is possible to 
extend this with advanced capabilities for design optimization. Fundamental limitations 
for CSA include the fact that there is no support for formal verification of safety 
properties and that CSA facilitates mostly analysis of static models.  
BSA, on the other hand, uses brute-force exploration to assess system behaviour. This 
exhaustive exploration provides explicit assurance of model correctness with respect to 
safety specifications. BSA often employs model-checking to perform this verification. 
Despite these strengths, BSA can only be applied at a later stage of the design, where 
the design model is relatively mature. This is unfortunate because changes at later stages 
are often costly, and the technique misses opportunities to effectively influence design 
process earlier.  
From the study of these characteristics, we identified the complementary aspects which 
lend themselves to the foundation of integration. First, we looked into the different 
stages of the system development where each technique can be employed. CSA is 
generally applicable from the early PSSA stage up until the end of the design. It is 
applicable to early, experimental models and can be iterated as the design becomes 
more detailed. BSA, in contrast, is generally applicable towards the end of the PSSA, 
and requires formal and more detailed mature models.  
CSA and BSA also aim to achieve different assessment objectives. Although both can 
be used to analyze possible causes for failures, CSA aims to identify safety problems 
early in the design by showing the causes of system failure; while BSA provides 
verification of formal models with regard to safety properties. A combined application 
allows us to achieve wider analysis coverage and a more robust assessment. The ability 
to introduce BSA verification capabilities early in the development stage is particularly 
valuable.  
In this thesis, we have shown that CSA and BSA have different objectives and different, 
complementary strengths and weaknesses. We have therefore made a case for their 
synergistic combined application. “Synergistic combined application” refers to the 
200 
 
process of harnessing analysis results (or safety artefacts) from CSA and BSA for the 
benefit of both techniques in an incremental and continuous manner. The process and 
the activities involved are explained further in the next objectives.  
Objective 2. To propose a systematic method to utilize analysis results from CSA and 
BSA in the course of design. This involves investigating how input to each 
technique can be systematically constructed, in particular, how results of CSA 
can assist the construction of behavioural model for BSA‟s formal verification. 
It is also important to understand how these results can provide constructive 
feedback to designers towards an iterative system modelling process.  
This thesis has developed, IACoB, a novel method for combined synergistic application 
of CSA and BSA. Following the review of prominent CSA-based and BSA-based 
techniques, we have decided to select HiP-HOPS to facilitate CSA and NuSMV model 
checker to facilitate BSA, based on the arguments considered in Chapter 2. In Chapter 
3, the IACoB safety analysis process has been introduced and developed to describe the 
integrated application. IACoB was developed as a process method which allows BSA to 
be performed following CSA by building upon its analysis results and safety artefacts.  
The process starts with a system model, which can be an early functional model or a 
more detailed architectural model. Model construction is followed by an analysis of 
effects of failure or a severity assessment phase, in which the severity level of failures 
of output functions or components is determined. To enable CSA, the elements of the 
system model are then annotated with local failure behaviour. This allows the HiP-
HOPS tool to automatically perform fault tree and FMEA synthesis and analysis. The 
results of CSA offer constructive feedback for designers by providing them with 
information on failure causes and assisting the quick identification of weak points in the 
design. This ultimately helps contribute to a better revised design.  
Once designers are assured by the CSA results, FTA and FMEA results are used to 
assist the construction of a behavioural model of the system for BSA. Behavioural 
models for BSA can be classified in two generic groups according to the stage of design 
where these models are developed. In early functional design where information on 
dynamic behaviour is not widely available, an abstract mode chart can be constructed 
from FMEA results. An FMEA-ModeChart Assistance Table is used to help organize 
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the core elements of the mode chart. The mode chart captures transitions of the system 
from normal to degraded and failed modes in response to the failures predicted in the 
FMEA.  
Note that in this approach FMEA results become directly useful in the construction of 
behavioural models that can be used in the design and BSA of the system. This is a 
novel contribution of this thesis. In a typical industrial practice, FMEAs are employed at 
the end of design for certification purposes, while in IACoB FMEA becomes a design 
tool for assessing, and refining the behaviour of the system. In the later stages of 
development where more design information is available, abstract mode charts of 
IACoB can be refined to make reference to components and their behaviour. These 
mode charts can be enhanced by analysts to show detailed nominal and failure 
behaviour. Model checking performed on these models can be used to verify whether 
the specified system behaviour conform to safety requirements.  
In Chapter 3, we have shown how close ties can be derived and maintained between 
abstract and refined mode charts. This subsequently improves traceability of 
relationships between failures, which is made possible via exploitation of the 
hierarchical mechanism of FTA/FMEA generation in HiP-HOPS.  
Objective 3. To illustrate how a chosen CSA and a chosen BSA technique can in 
practice be harmonised in the context of a method for combined application. 
Different MBSA techniques assume different representations of failure 
information and system modelling. In the context of combined application, it is 
important to explore ways for translation of information (in particular, failure 
information) between relevant models. The thesis shows the integration of HiP-
HOPS with NuSMV and defines a process for useful semi-automatic 
translation of information between the two models.  
This thesis harmonised the representation of failure information between two different 
techniques that presently define the state-of-the-art in their respective areas. In the later 
part of Chapter 3, we described ways of translating information from HiP-HOPS into 
NuSMV. Failure behaviour in HiP-HOPS is captured within the failure annotation of 
components. We have shown that it is possible to preserve this information and 
incorporate it as part of the failure-relevant behaviour in a NuSMV model. HiP-HOPS 
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failure annotations typically contain information on the failure modes (output 
deviations) and their „failure expression‟ which explains the failure causes (described in 
terms of internal malfunctions and input deviations). The translation process involves 
mapping this information into NuSMV variables and defining state transitions relating 
to these failures. In contrast to techniques like FSAP/NuSMV (Bozzano et al., 2003b) 
which is largely based on success-logic, the relationship between failures here can be 
defined and managed as failure-logic. This means that the description of component 
output is determined by the condition of output deviations, and corresponding input 
deviations are assigned and passed accordingly.  
In addition to harmonising and passing failure logic, the system hierarchies and 
propagation of failure effects can also be neatly captured and transferred from HiP-
HOPS into the NuSMV model. We have also shown that this allows connections 
between mode charts to be systematically established, and this eventually enables a 
more-manageable refinement of transitions, and helps to guarantee consistency in the 
model as it evolves.  
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 presented case studies on automotive brake-by wire and 
aircraft wheel-brake system in which we demonstrated the value of combined iterative 
application of CSA and BSA to the design, how the IACoB process can be applied, and 
how analysis results from one technique can be exploited for the benefit of the other 
technique. These case studies ultimately show how the IACoB offers significant 
benefits over using only a single analysis approach.  
Objective 4. The final research objective is to study the potential use of this approach in 
the design of mechanisms for detection and recovery from failures. More 
specifically, we propose a generic mechanism for modelling the Detectability (or 
NOT) of errors propagated among components of an architecture within a 
typical CSA. We show that the inclusion of this mechanism makes it possible to 
use the results of CSA as a basis for rational decisions about the inclusion of 
fault tolerant mechanisms in a design.     
This thesis developed a novel concept for modelling the detectability of failures in CSA. 
The study of detectability in the context of CSA was presented in Chapter 6. We started 
the discussion with the concept of detectability in FMEA, where the detection 
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likelihood of failure modes is evaluated. We then explored further the use of 
detectability in system architecture and its role within fault tolerant design. Detectability 
in this context refers to the ability to correctly detect errors, and this ability is generally 
assigned to a component as part of its fault-detection and fault-tolerance mechanisms. A 
generic method to model detectability was subsequently proposed.  
The method introduced failure-relevant parameters that model not only the internal 
malfunction of the component which performs detection, but also probabilities that 
errors are either correctly detected or go undetected by detection modules. The 
implication of these occurrences is modelled as part of the failure information in HiP-
HOPS.  
Because this concept is introduced as a part of CSA, we also studied how the general 
analysis on detectability can be performed. These parameters can be analysed using 
common fault tree analysis algorithms, with the exception of events where errors are 
detected (i.e. NOT missed by the detection module). The notion of events where errors 
are detected (and handled) leads to inclusion of NOT gates and a non-coherent fault tree 
structure. To enable the analysis of non-coherent fault trees, HiP-HOPS synthesis and 
analysis algorithms were extended, and a Consensus algorithm was implemented.   
The use of non-coherent fault trees (and the inclusion of NOT gate for that matter) has 
been long debated. In this thesis, we presented a case in support of this argument and 
showed how the inclusion of NOT gate enables a more accurate modelling of 
detectability. For a practical demonstration of this, we presented a small case study on 
an automotive cruise control system and showed how detectability can be applied. 
Alternatives were also explored in an effort to maintain coherency of the fault trees and 
the analysis results were compared. From this, it was demonstrated that the inclusion of 
NOT gates have a significant role to play in system analysis, particularly in the correct 
quantification of system reliability.  
7.2 Limitation of concepts  
IACoB inherits the limitations of CSA and BSA. One challenge lies in the limited 
information on dynamic behaviour it initially captures. This is due to the fact that the 
initial failure information is directly obtained from a CSA-based technique, where focus 
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is placed on effectively capturing the failure propagation and hierarchy, rather than the 
dynamic behaviour. In certain circumstances, for example in the analysis of a phased 
mission system, more information on dynamic behaviour might be required than what is 
captured in CSA models. This can be addressed by independently extending the BSA 
model produced.   
The extent of formal verification that can be performed largely depends on the level of 
information contained within the model. For a large complex system, model checking 
faces the challenge of state-space explosion, and this is a challenge that IACoB inherits 
from BSA. Abstraction techniques in model checking ( Bérard, et al., 2001) can be 
further investigated in the future to address this issue.  
Another issue with IACoB is the fact that, currently, the integration process is mainly 
manual. This can be potentially labour-intensive and error-prone when performed 
repeatedly on a larger system. However, there is automation in both CSA and BSA, and 
it is also possible, to a large extent, automate the integration. Another related problem is 
the manual process of assigning failure expressions, which brings about the new kinds 
of manual errors compared to failure-injection methods. Recent development towards a 
language for describing failure patterns (Wolforth, 2010) is one way to improve the 
process. There is also the lack of support for specifying requirement properties. Errors 
are common during the conversion of safety properties from natural language to CTL. 
We believe it can be beneficial to develop tool support that can assist this process.  
Challenges which are related to the nature of manual processing can be potentially 
resolved with automation. We hope supporting tools can be developed in the future to 
ease the task of conversion between models, and improve the process of storing and 
retrieving failure information and safety specifications.  
IACoB is also mainly performed to assess and verify the design, interaction of functions 
or components, and control logic of an early design model. Therefore, another limitation 
of IACoB is that it does not address errors that arise later on in the development 
lifecycle (for example, coding and implementation errors).  
One main problem of the detectability concept is the additional computational expense 
introduced by the analysis of computationally-extensive non-coherent fault tree analysis 
algorithm.  
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7.3 Future Work  
The aim of establishing a framework to allow combined application of CSA and BSA 
has been achieved to a certain extent. The results of this work on the IACoB approach 
provide the foundation for potential future work in the following directions:  
1. Improvement on modelling experience  
In addition to the guidelines on translation of failure information between HiP-HOPS 
and NuSMV models outlined in Chapter 3, we believe it is beneficial to develop an 
automated translation support tool. Although the manual construction of the NuSMV 
model is manageable for smaller systems explored in this thesis, an automated translator 
would ease the process and increase its scalability. Behavioural information (for 
example, description of model states) which is not included within HiP-HOPS 
annotations can be obtained by extending the failure editor.   
Support for graphical representation of sate machines can also be introduced to assist 
behavioural modelling. Various translator tools like sf2smv (Banphawatthanarak et al., 
1999), stm2smv (Loer, 2003), or mdl2smv (Juarez-Dominguez et al., 2008) have been 
developed to convert commercial graphical behavioural tool like Stateflow or Statemate 
into SMV model. We believe that similar capabilities for the HiP-HOPS failure editor 
might be beneficial in making the behavioural modelling process more intuitive. 
Alternatively, future work that looks into the integration of these established graphical 
tools with HiP-HOPS failure editor could be investigated. 
2. Improvement on integration with nominal behavioural model 
The NuSMV models produced from the HiP-HOPS annotated models are essentially a 
formal functional „error-model‟. Although the extension to include description of 
nominal behaviour can be relatively straight forward, we believe a degree of automation 
in this process will be helpful. This is particularly useful if the formal nominal 
behavioural model is developed in parallel with the HiP-HOPS model. One possible 
way to achieve this is by enforcing common references to states and events in the two 
state machines that describe nominal and failure behaviour, and then by automatically 
parsing and combination of both models into a single combined representation. Further 
research can be done in this aspect as it is currently a manual process.  
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3. Support for formal requirement properties and visualization of traces  
The translation of requirements from natural language to temporal-logic formulae is not 
a trivial process. With the reference of general classification of properties from (Bérard, 
et al., 2001), it is beneficial to have a set of generic templates to define the property 
specifications. This template should allow frequently-used property patterns to be saved 
into pattern library, and instantiated whenever needed. Comprehensive review of 
property specification patterns and their hierarchy was presented in (Dwyer et al., 
1999), and example of this specification pattern support is presented in IFADIS (Loer, 
2003).  
Traces are usually produced to show counterexamples. A trace is a sequence of 
execution steps that leads from system initial state to the state that violates safety 
properties. Each step in between describes value changes in the variables. These traces 
produced from NuSMV counterexamples are in textual form. A graphical viewer for 
these traces, for example traces chart illustrated in (Peikenkamp, 2006), can provide a 
more intuitive outlet for display and analysis.  
4. Failure modes completeness and harmonisation  
The concept of failure modes is central to both CSA and BSA approaches. In IACoB, 
we employ generalized failure modes which belong to four categories: omission, 
commission, value or timing failures. These are reflected in the structural as well as 
behavioural models. In occasions where we need to derive an explicit list of failure 
modes and validate its completeness, (Ortmeier, 2004a) describes a method that uses 
failure-sensitive specifications. This method defines an initial chaotic model which 
describes all possible combinations between inputs and outputs. It then extracts the 
combinations which violate specification rules, which are made into a list of failure 
modes, and eliminates ones that are not relevant. The remaining „good‟ combinations 
(those that conform to the specification rules) are validated against the nominal model, 
which is constructed separately. Lastly this model is integrated again with the failure 
modes to form the „error model‟. This technique yields the benefits of being able to 
generate a more complete specification of failure modes and validation of the nominal 
formal model. However it does suffer from the exponential size of the sets used. 
Therefore, one area that we could look into in the future is the potential of applying this 
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approach as part of IACoB for selected critical components, as opposed to the whole 
system.  
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APPENDIX A: Backup structure for brake-by-wire 
system  
The following figures show the backup structure scheme for brake-by-wire system 
presented in Chapter 4.  
A.1. Brake Demand Input Function  
 
A.2. Local Parameters Input Function 
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A.3. Vehicle Level Processing Function  
 
A.4. Local Level Processing Function  
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A.5. Braking Energy Function 
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APPENDIX B: NuSMV model for brake-by-wire 
B.1. The following shows an example of how the abstract mode chart for brake-by-wire 
system can be represented in NuSMV model:  
MODULE ABS  
VAR  
O-Output: boolean;  
Output: boolean;  
counter: 0..1;  
 
ASSIGN 
init(O-Output) := 0;   
Output := !O-Output; 
 
counter :=case 
O-Output : 1;  
1: 0;  
esac;  
 
next(O-Output):= 
case 
O-Output = 1: 1;  
1: {1,0};  
esac;  
 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
MODULE ELEC 
 
VAR  
O-Output: boolean;  
Output: boolean;  
counter: 0..1;  
 
ASSIGN 
init(O-Output) := 0;   
Output := !O-Output; 
 
counter :=case 
O-Output : 1;  
1: 0;  
esac;  
 
next(O-Output):= 
case 
O-Output = 1: 1;  
1: {1,0};  
esac;  
 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
MODULE HYDRAULIC  
 
VAR  
O-Output: boolean;  
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Output: boolean;  
counter: 0..1;  
 
ASSIGN 
init(O-Output) := 0;   
Output := !O-Output; 
 
counter :=case 
O-Output : 1;  
1: 0;  
esac;  
 
next(O-Output):= 
case 
O-Output = 1: 1;  
1: {1,0};  
esac;  
 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
MODULE main  
 
VAR  
SystemMode: {BBW_Normal, BBW_PD1, BBW_PD2, BBW_Fail};  
counter: 0..3; 
 
absB: ABS; 
elec: ELEC;  
hydraulic : HYDRAULIC;  
 
ASSIGN 
 
init(SystemMode) := BBW_Normal;  
next(SystemMode):=case 
SystemMode = BBW_Normal & elec.O-Output = 1 : BBW_PD2;  
SystemMode = BBW_Normal & absB.O-Output = 1 : BBW_PD1; 
SystemMode = BBW_Normal & elec.O-Output = 1 & hydraulic.O-Output = 1 : 
BBW_Fail;  
SystemMode = BBW_PD1 & elec.O-Output = 1 & hydraulic.O-Output = 1 : 
BBW_Fail; 
SystemMode = BBW_PD1 & elec.O-Output = 1 : BBW_PD2; 
SystemMode = BBW_PD2 & hydraulic.O-Output = 1 : BBW_Fail;  
1: SystemMode;  
esac; 
 
counter := absB.counter + elec.counter + hydraulic.counter; 
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B.2.The following shows an example of how the refined mode chart can be constructed 
for brake-by-wire system:   
 
MODULE FL(O-ABScmd, FLDiagonalLock) 
VAR  
States : {Normal, Locked} ; 
LockBE : boolean;  
counter : 0..1; 
FLlockSig : boolean;  
locked: boolean;  
 
ASSIGN  
init(States) := Normal; 
init(LockBE) := 0; 
 
locked := (LockBE & O-ABScmd)| FLDiagonalLock;  
FLlockSig := case 
States = Normal: 0; 
1: 1;  
esac; 
 
next(States):=case 
States = Normal & locked = 1: Locked;  
1: States;  
esac; 
 
next(LockBE) := case  
LockBE = 1 : 1;  
1: {0,1} ;  
esac;  
 
counter:=case  
States = Locked : 1;  
1: 0;  
esac; 
 
------------------------------------ 
MODULE FR(O-ABScmd, FRDiagonalLock) 
VAR  
States : {Normal, Locked} ; 
LockBE : boolean;  
counter : 0..1; 
FRlockSig : boolean;  
locked: boolean;  
 
ASSIGN  
init(States) := Normal; 
init(LockBE) := 0; 
 
locked := (LockBE & O-ABScmd)| FRDiagonalLock;  
FRlockSig := case 
States = Normal : 0; 
1: 1;  
esac; 
 
next(States):=case 
States = Normal & locked = 1 : Locked;  
1: States;  
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esac; 
 
next(LockBE) := case  
LockBE = 1 : 1;  
1: {0,1} ;  
esac;  
 
counter:=case  
States = Locked : 1;  
1: 0;  
esac; 
 
------------------------------------ 
MODULE RL(O-ABScmd, RLDiagonalLock) 
VAR  
States : {Normal, Locked} ; 
LockBE : boolean;  
counter : 0..1; 
RLlockSig : boolean;  
locked: boolean;  
 
ASSIGN  
init(States) := Normal; 
init(LockBE) := 0; 
 
locked := (LockBE & O-ABScmd)| RLDiagonalLock;  
RLlockSig := case 
States = Normal : 0; 
1: 1;  
esac; 
 
next(States):=case 
States = Normal & locked = 1 : Locked;  
1: States;  
esac; 
 
next(LockBE) := case  
LockBE = 1 : 1;  
1: {0,1} ;  
esac;  
 
counter:=case  
States = Locked : 1;  
1: 0;  
esac; 
------------------------------------ 
 
MODULE RR(O-ABScmd, RRDiagonalLock) 
VAR  
States : {Normal, Locked} ; 
LockBE : boolean;  
counter : 0..1; 
RRlockSig : boolean;  
locked: boolean;  
 
 
ASSIGN  
init(States) := Normal; 
init(LockBE) := 0; 
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locked := (LockBE & O-ABScmd)| RRDiagonalLock;  
 
RRlockSig := case 
States = Normal : 0; 
1: 1;  
esac; 
 
next(States):=case 
States = Normal & locked = 1 : Locked;  
1: States;  
esac; 
 
next(LockBE) := case  
LockBE = 1 : 1;  
1: {0,1} ;  
esac;  
 
counter:=case  
States = Locked : 1;  
1: 0;  
esac; 
------------------------------------ 
 
MODULE ABS (O-ECUabs)  
VAR  
States : {Normal, Fail} ; 
O-ABScmd: boolean; 
 
ASSIGN  
init(States) := Normal; 
 
next(States):=case 
O-ECUabs = 1 : Fail;  
1: Normal;  
esac; 
 
O-ABScmd := case  
States = Normal : 0;  
1: 1;  
esac;  
 
------------------------------------ 
 
MODULE ECU (O-WS, O-ES)  
VAR  
States : {Normal, Fail} ; 
O-ECUabs: boolean; 
ECUABEabs: boolean;  
ECUABEabsC: boolean;  
ECUBBEabs: boolean;  
ECUBBEabsC: boolean;  
 
ASSIGN  
init(States) := Normal; 
 
next(States):=case 
O-WS | O-ES | (ECUABEabsC & ECUBBEabsC) | (ECUABEabsC & ECUBBEabs) | 
(ECUABEabs & ECUBBEabsC) | (ECUABEabs & ECUBBEabs)  : Fail;  
1: Normal;  
esac; 
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O-ECUabs := case  
States = Normal : 0;  
1: 1;  
esac;  
 
next(ECUABEabs):=case 
ECUABEabs = 1 : 1;  
1: {1,0};  
esac;  
 
next(ECUABEabsC):=case 
ECUABEabsC = 1 : 1;  
1: {1,0};  
esac;  
 
next(ECUBBEabs):=case 
ECUBBEabs = 1 : 1;  
1: {1,0};  
esac;  
 
next(ECUBBEabsC):=case 
ECUBBEabsC = 1 : 1;  
1: {1,0};  
esac;  
 
------------------------------------ 
 
 
MODULE WS  
VAR  
States : {Normal, Fail} ; 
WSBE : boolean;  
O-WS : boolean;  
 
ASSIGN  
init(States) := Normal; 
init(WSBE) := 0; 
 
next(WSBE) :=case 
WSBE = 1 : 1;  
1: {1,0};  
esac;  
 
next(States):=case 
WSBE  : Fail;  
1: Normal;  
esac; 
 
O-WS:= case 
States = Normal : 0;  
1: 1;  
esac;  
 
 
------------------------------------ 
 
MODULE ES  
VAR  
States : {Normal, Fail} ; 
ESBE : boolean;  
O-ES : boolean;  
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ASSIGN  
init(States) := Normal; 
init (ESBE) := 0; 
 
next(ESBE) :=case 
ESBE = 1 : 1;  
1: {1,0};  
esac;  
 
next(States):=case 
ESBE  : Fail;  
1: Normal;  
esac; 
 
O-ES:= case 
States = Normal : 0;  
1: 1;  
esac;  
 
 
------------------------------------ 
MODULE main  
 
VAR  
States: {Normal,TD1_Critical_FR,TD1_Critical_RL, 
TD1_Critical_FL, TD1_Critical_RR, PD2_FR-RLDiagonalLock,  
PD2_FL-RRDiagonalLock, TD3_Critical_FRRLFL,TD3_Critical_FRRLRR, 
TD3_Critical_FLRRFR,TD3_Critical_FLRRRL,PD4_AllWheelsLocked};  
counter: 0..4; 
FLdiagonalLock: boolean;  
FRdiagonalLock: boolean;  
RLdiagonalLock: boolean;  
RRdiagonalLock: boolean;  
O-ABScmd : boolean; 
FRlockSig : boolean;  
RLlockSig : boolean;  
RRlockSig : boolean;  
FLlockSig : boolean;  
 
ALLOFF: boolean;  
DLActive: boolean;  
Hazardous : boolean;  
TwoParallelWheelsLocked : boolean;  
 
 
flw : FL(O-ABScmd, FLdiagonalLock); 
frw : FR(O-ABScmd, FRdiagonalLock);  
rlw : RL(O-ABScmd, RLdiagonalLock);  
rrw : RR(O-ABScmd, RRdiagonalLock);  
ws: WS; 
es: ES; 
ecu : ECU (ws.O-WS, es.O-ES);  
abs : ABS(ecu.O-ECUabs);  
 
ASSIGN 
init(States) := Normal;  
O-ABScmd := abs.O-ABScmd;  
 
counter := flw.counter + frw.counter + rlw.counter + rrw.counter ;  
FRlockSig := frw.FRlockSig; 
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RLlockSig := rlw.RLlockSig; 
RRlockSig := rrw.RRlockSig; 
FLlockSig := flw.FLlockSig;  
init (TwoParallelWheelsLocked) := 0;  
 
 
FLdiagonalLock:= case 
States = TD1_Critical_RR | States = TD3_Critical_FRRLRR : 1;  
1: 0;  
esac;  
 
FRdiagonalLock:= case 
States = TD1_Critical_RL | States = TD3_Critical_FLRRRL: 1;  
1: 0;  
esac;  
 
RRdiagonalLock:= case 
States = TD1_Critical_FL | States = TD3_Critical_FRRLFL : 1;  
1: 0;  
esac;  
 
RLdiagonalLock:= case 
States = TD1_Critical_FR | States = TD3_Critical_FLRRFR : 1;  
1: 0;  
esac;  
 
ALLOFF := !FLdiagonalLock &  !RLdiagonalLock &  !FRdiagonalLock  & 
!RRdiagonalLock;  
DLActive := FLdiagonalLock |  RLdiagonalLock |  FRdiagonalLock  | 
RRdiagonalLock;  
Hazardous := case 
States = TD1_Critical_FR |States = TD1_Critical_RL | States = 
TD1_Critical_FL | States = TD1_Critical_RR |States =  
TD3_Critical_FRRLRR|States =  TD3_Critical_FLRRFR | States = 
TD3_Critical_FLRRRL : 1; 
1: 0;  
esac;   
 
next(TwoParallelWheelsLocked):=case 
TwoParallelWheelsLocked = 1: 1;  
1 : ((flw.States = Locked & rlw.States = Locked)|( frw.States = Locked 
& rrw.States = Locked) | (flw.States = Locked & frw.States = Locked) | 
(rlw.States = Locked & rrw.States = Locked)) & counter = 2;  
esac;  
 
next(States) := case 
States = Normal & FRlockSig : TD1_Critical_FR;  
States = Normal & RLlockSig : TD1_Critical_RL;  
States = Normal & FLlockSig : TD1_Critical_FL;  
States = Normal & RRlockSig : TD1_Critical_RR;  
States = TD1_Critical_FR & RLlockSig : PD2_FR-RLDiagonalLock;  
States = TD1_Critical_RL & FRlockSig : PD2_FR-RLDiagonalLock; 
States = TD1_Critical_FL & RRlockSig : PD2_FL-RRDiagonalLock; 
States = TD1_Critical_RR & FLlockSig : PD2_FL-RRDiagonalLock; 
States = PD2_FR-RLDiagonalLock & FLlockSig : TD3_Critical_FRRLFL;  
States = PD2_FR-RLDiagonalLock & RRlockSig : TD3_Critical_FRRLRR;  
States = PD2_FL-RRDiagonalLock & FRlockSig : TD3_Critical_FLRRFR;  
States = PD2_FL-RRDiagonalLock & RLlockSig : TD3_Critical_FLRRRL;  
States = TD3_Critical_FRRLFL | States = TD3_Critical_FRRLRR | States = 
TD3_Critical_FLRRFR | States = TD3_Critical_FLRRRL : 
PD4_AllWheelsLocked;  
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1: States;  
esac; 
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APPENDIX C: Summary of Quantitative Analysis  
The effects of detectability parameters on system probability for top event C-
Actuator_Module.Out: 
Cruise Control System without activation of any detection module:  
Minimal Cut sets Produced  Probability  
11 0.064 
 
Cruise Control System with activated detection module:  
Detectability Parameters  Minimal Cut sets Produced  Probability  
Internal Malfunction Failure  6 0.036 
Internal Malfunction Failure, 
Event Miss, ¬ Miss 
11 0.039 
 
Detectability Parameters  Prime Implicants Produced  Probability 
Event ¬ Miss 11 0.039 
Event Catch  11 0.039 
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Cruise Control System with Fading Brake for top event C-Actuator_Module.Out:  
Detectability Parameters  Prime Implicants Produced  Probability 
Event ¬ Miss 11 0.039 
Event Catch  11 0.039 
 
Cruise Control System with Fading Brake for top event O-Actuator_Module.Out:  
Detectability Parameters  Prime Implicants Produced  Probability 
Event ¬ Miss 19 0.072 
Event Catch  19 0.064 
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Appendix D: Prime Implicants for Cruise Control 
System 
Prime implicant results for O-Actuator_Module (Cruise Control System with Fading 
Brake) with the use of ¬ Miss:  
13 x Cut Sets of Order  Probability 
Monitoring_Module.BE1 0.00458944 
Logic_Module.BE1 0.00458944 
Cruise_Control.BE1 0.00458944 
Brake_Support.BE1 0.00458944 
Actuator_Module.BE1 0.00458944 
Switch_Sensor.BE 0.00114934 
Speed_Sensor.BE 0.00114934 
Radar_Sensor.BE 0.00114934 
Pedal_Sensor.BE 0.00114934 
Memory.BE 0.00114934 
DM_LM.failure 0.00111937 
DM_FB.failure 0.00111937 
DM_CC.failure 0.00111937 
 
5 x Cut Sets of Order  Probability 
Monitoring_Module.BE2 
DM_CC.NOT_miss 
0.00980101 
Monitoring_Module.BE2 
DM_LM.NOT_miss 
0.00980101 
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Brake_Support.BE2 
DM_CC.NOT_miss 
0.00980101 
Fading_Brake.BE1 
DM_CC.NOT_miss 
0.0040387 
DM_FB.miss 
Fading_Brake.BE1 
0.000550732 
 
1 x Cut Sets of Order  Probability 
Fading_Brake.BE2 
DM_CC.NOT_miss 
DM_FB.NOT_miss 
0.00862489 
 
 
Prime implicant results for O-Actuator_Module (Cruise Control System with Fading 
Brake) with the use of Catch:  
13 x Cut Sets of Order  Probability 
Monitoring_Module.BE1 0.00458944 
Logic_Module.BE1 0.00458944 
Cruise_Control.BE1 0.00458944 
Brake_Support.BE1 0.00458944 
Actuator_Module.BE1 0.00458944 
Switch_Sensor.BE 0.00114934 
Speed_Sensor.BE 0.00114934 
Radar_Sensor.BE 0.00114934 
Pedal_Sensor.BE 0.00114934 
Memory.BE 0.00114934 
DM_LM.failure 0.00111937 
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DM_FB.failure 0.00111937 
DM_CC.failure 0.00111937 
 
4 x Cut Sets of Order  Probability 
DM_LM.catch 
Monitoring_Module.BE2 
0.00980101 
Brake_Support.BE2 
DM_CC.catch 
0.00980101 
DM_CC.catch 
Fading_Brake.BE1 
0.0040387 
DM_FB.miss 
Fading_Brake.BE1 
0.000550732 
 
2 x Cut Sets of Order  Probability 
DM_CC.catch 
DM_FB.catch 
Fading_Brake.BE2 
0.00862489 
DM_CC.catch 
DM_LM.miss 
Monitoring_Module.BE2 
0.00117612 
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APPENDIX E:  List of Abbreviation  
ABS   Anti-lock Brake System  
BBW   Brake-by-wire 
BDD    Binary Decision Diagram  
BSA   Behavioural Safety Analysis 
BSCU    Brake System Control Unit 
CEG   Cause Effect Graphs 
CFT   Component Fault Trees 
CSA   Compositional Safety Analysis  
CTL    Computational Tree Logic  
DSPN   Deterministic and Stochastic Petri Nets 
EHB   Electrical Hydraulic Brake  
EMB   Electrical Mechanical Brake 
ESP    Electronic Stability Program 
ESSaReL   Embedded Systems Safety and Reliability Analyser 
FFA    Functional Failure Analysis  
FFBD   Functional Flow Block Diagram  
FHA   Functional Hazard Assessment 
FMEA   Failure Modes and Effects Analysis  
ForMoSA  Formal Methods and Safety Analysis 
FSAP/NuSMV Formal Safety Analysis Platform/NuSMV 
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FSM   Finite State Machine  
FTA   Fault Tree Analysis 
HAZOP   Hazard and Operability Study  
HiP-HOPS  Hierarchically Performed Hazards Origin and Propagation 
Studies 
IACoB   Integrated Application of Compositional and Behavioural  
IF-FMEA  Interface Focussed FMEA  
LTL    Linear Temporal Logic  
MBSA   Model-based Safety Analysis  
MICSUP  Minimal Cut Set UPward 
NuSMV  New Symbolic Model Verifier  
PLTL    Propositional LTL  
PSSA    Preliminary Safety Assessment  
RPN   Risk Priority Number  
SEFT   State-Event Fault Trees 
SMV   Symbolic Model Verifier 
TTP   Time-triggered Communication Protocol 
WBS   Wheel-brake system  
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